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Abstract 
This dissertation contains three essays involving empirical research in the area 
of equity portfolio management. Specifically, two of the essays contribute to the 
existing funds management literature by examining issues concerning portfolio 
performance evaluation and asset allocations. These being, equity fund benchmark 
mismatching, and equity fund industry allocations during the Australian mining boom. 
The third essay investigates issues relating to socially responsible investing.  
The first essay uses Australian equity fund data to examine the appropriateness 
of equity funds’ self-reported benchmarks. Given the lack of regulation surrounding 
the benchmarking of Australian managed funds and the absence of publicly available 
equity style indices, this essay explores if fund benchmarks are able to adequately 
capture passive investment styles and whether funds are better suited to alternative 
benchmarks. This essay further explores if funds with inappropriate benchmarks are 
able to outperform relatively, on account of the strategic nature of managers to report 
underperforming benchmarks, and whether this influences asset flows. Despite 
Australian equity funds reporting an array of different investment styles, this essay 
shows that managers largely self-report broad-market based indices as their 
benchmarks. Whilst this suggests that funds are largely benchmarked to style-
inappropriate indices, a large majority are found as being best suited to their self-
reported benchmarks. The funds that are style-mismatched, however, are shown to be 
better matched to alternative S&P/ASX indices instead of passive style-specific 
indices. These funds are also unable to achieve superior benchmark-relative 
performance. The findings from this essay therefore refute those from previous studies, 
such as Sensoy (2009), who suggests that benchmark mismatching will be prevalent 
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amongst funds in industries where regulations concerning benchmarking are not 
stringent. The implication of these findings is that Australian equity fund investors 
should remain confident when relying on a fund’s self-reported benchmark to 
sufficiently capture passive style returns.  
The second essay of this dissertation also investigates the asset allocation and 
performance evaluation of Australian equity funds. Using the Australian mining boom 
as an experimental setting, the performance of funds based on their exposure to mining 
stocks is examined. The findings reveal that funds, on average, increased their 
exposure to mining-related stocks across the mining boom in relative and absolute 
terms. This essay further shows that funds with relatively higher exposures to mining 
stocks were unable to outperform funds that were less exposed, in terms of both raw 
and risk-adjusted returns. The mining exposure-performance relationship is shown to 
be more adverse amongst wholesale funds (relative to retail funds), as they are found 
to underperform with increasing levels of mining exposure. Nevertheless, both retail 
and wholesale funds that exhibit higher levels of mining-stock exposure are able to 
attract increased fund flows. These findings indicate that fund managers are unable to 
capture industry outperformance. However, the positive impact that fund mining 
exposure has on flows is consistent with investors being attracted to hot investment 
styles and misinterpreting industry allocation as fund skill.  
In light of prevalent literature having argued that socially responsible 
investment (SRI) underperforms ‘non-SRI’, the rapid growth in SRI in recent years 
suggests that some form of non-financial satisfaction is being derived by investors 
who incorporating such mandates into their investment strategies. As such, the final 
essay of this dissertation provides a measure for the value of this non-financial 
satisfaction that accrues to individuals from investing in a socially responsible manner. 
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This non-financial benefit is referred to as the “psychic dividend” of SRI. Previous 
studies attempt to quantify this value as the difference in certainty equivalent returns 
of SRI and non-SRI portfolios. This chapter extends the definition of certainty 
equivalence to consider constant relative risk aversion and loss aversion. Constructing 
portfolios of ‘socially responsible’ and ‘socially irresponsible’ stocks using U.S equity 
data from 2000 to 2013 shows that non-SRI is unable to outperform SRI on a raw or 
risk-adjusted basis. However, the psychic dividend is measured as being at least four 
basis points per month for a long-only portfolio of socially responsible stocks and at 
least 85 basis points per month (10.2% p.a.) for a portfolio that is long socially-
responsible stocks and short socially-irresponsible stocks. This psychic dividend is 
shown to increase with investor risk aversion and also during economic recessions. 
Consequently, due to this non-financial satisfaction that accrues to investors, asset 
managers could be free to incorporate SRI mandates into their investment practices 
without the repercussion of asset outflows resulting from possible portfolio 
underperformance.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation of the Dissertation  
The value of Australia’s funds management industry is estimated at $2.34 
trillion as at March 2014. This represents a 15 fold increase from $153.2 billion in 
June of 1988, thus making Australia the fastest growing and fourth largest funds 
management industry in the world behind the U.S., Luxembourg and France despite 
having the 12th largest economy. 1 2 The size of this industry is largely attributed to the 
growth in the superannuation (pension) sector over the last two decades due to 
government initiatives of introducing compulsory contributions and concessional 
taxation rates. The introduction of these initiatives has seen net funds under 
management from this sector increase by an average of 14.5 per cent per annum since 
1990 (Nanda, Wang and Zheng, 2009). Nevertheless, the non-superannuation sector, 
which includes, amongst other investment vehicles; life insurance funds, public offer 
unit trusts, exchange traded funds (ETFs) and hedge funds, are responsible for a 
substantial portion of this growth.  
                                                 
1 Statistics sourced from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) website: http://www.abs.gov.au/ and 
from the Australian Trade Commission-Investment Management Industry in Australia:  
http://www.austrade.gov.au/ArticleDocuments/2792/Investment-Management-Industry-in-
Australia.pdf.aspx. 
2 Economy size is measured in AUD using nominal GDP.   
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The ownership of Australian funds management companies has been largely 
dominated by life insurance companies, domestic banks and international financial 
groups, with many medium size fund companies (whose assets under management 
range from $5 billion to $15 billion) having merged or been acquired by these larger 
companies.3 Nevertheless, there has been a recent emergence of small (boutique) fund 
companies into the Australian market that manage a concentrated range of assets and 
are targeted towards wholesale investors. The most common of these non-
superannuation Australian domiciled funds are opened-ended investment trusts. As of 
May 2014, there were 3,174 of these funds available to retail (household) and 
wholesale investors, which account for $732 billion in assets under management. Of 
these 3,174 funds, 751 are classified as ‘Australian equity-only’ funds, with combined 
assets under management of $190 billion.4 This market segment makes up a modest 
portion of the total Australian equity market which has a market capitalisation of $1.6 
trillion.5 The relative size of this funds management sector, in addition to the assets 
under management held in Australian equities by multi-sector (diversified) funds, 
demonstrates the notable preference that Australian investors have for domestic 
equities. Given this abundance of managed funds that are available to Australian (and 
international) investors, it is important to be able to accurately evaluate them in order 
for appropriate investment decisions to be made, whether it be from a financial 
perspective, or from some other ‘non-financial’ perspective.  
When a fund reports its past returns it is almost always disclosed alongside a 
benchmark index, suggesting that the benchmark should form an important component 
                                                 
3 Refer to the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) Bulletin – ‘Australian Funds Management: Market 
Structure and Fees’, sourced from; http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2003/feb/pdf/bu-0203-
3.pdf   
4 These statistics are retrieved from the Morningstar Direct database on 12th June 2014.  
5ASX News, “ASX’s Market Statistics”: http://www.asx.com.au/about/asx-news.htm.  
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of the portfolio performance evaluation process. Whilst benchmarks may be useful for 
investors when evaluating performance, if poorly selected, they may hinder the 
evaluation process resulting in inaccurate assessments of portfolio performance. The 
first essay of this dissertation therefore explores the ability of a fund’s benchmarks to 
serve as an appropriate performance evaluation tool. The Australian funds market 
provides an interesting setting to examine benchmark reporting due to the absence of 
regulations governing this practice. Subsequently, benchmarking decisions are 
ultimately left in the hands of the fund manager. Furthermore, the public reporting of 
portfolio holdings by fund managers is voluntary. An appropriate benchmark will 
therefore be even more important when evaluating performance. Considering the 
quantity of funds that are benchmarked against broad-market indices such as the 
S&P/ASX300 despite being advertised as subscribing to a specific ‘non broad-market’ 
investment style, it is suspected, prima facie, that a majority of managers fail to report 
an appropriate benchmark. Fund portfolios may therefore be unknowingly exposed to 
certain systematic risk factors that are unable to be captured by their benchmarks, 
hence resulting in the inaccurate evaluation of performance. As such, Chapter 2 
explores how fund exposures to systematic style characteristics are captured by their 
benchmark indices and whether it is advantageous for managers to deviate their 
portfolio exposures away from these benchmarks.  
Despite passive style indices being commonly used as benchmarks by U.S. 
equity funds, there are currently no equity style indices publicly available within the 
Australian market. A sample of investable Australian value/growth-size indices are 
constructed and tested to identify if they are more appropriate at serving as fund 
benchmarks compared to the S&P/ASX indices. This chapter then examines the style 
characteristics of equity funds that are likely to be mismatched from their self-reported 
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benchmarks to determine whether managers distort fund performance through 
inappropriate benchmark reporting. To identify if self-reporting an inappropriate 
benchmark is advantageous for managers, the relationship between performance, 
flows and benchmark appropriateness is also investigated.  
The findings from Chapter 2 show that investors can generally rely on a fund’s 
self-reported benchmark to adequately capture passive style returns, and therefore can 
be used to accurately evaluate performance. This finding contests those from previous 
studies that argue that benchmark mismatching will be widespread amongst funds in 
industries where regulations concerning benchmarking are not stringent. Given that a 
large proportion of funds are found to be appropriately matched to their benchmarks, 
this chapter does not advocate the necessity of equity style indices being made publicly 
available for the Australian market. From a fund manager’s perspective, this chapter 
suggests that outperforming a benchmark may not be as important as initially expected 
(at least for retail funds) given the absence of a relationship being found between fund 
flows and benchmark-relative performance. As such, managers should focus on 
maximising alternative performance measures, such as raw returns or alpha, in order 
to improve fund flows. Potential avenues for future research are also discussed in 
Chapter 2. Specifically, further investigation should be conducted into whether 
actively managed Australian equity funds are in fact correctly classified with respect 
to their advertised investment style objectives, or whether they should instead be re-
classified as having a broad-market style objective. 
The concept of active portfolio management largely involves portfolio 
rotations towards (or away) from particular assets, styles, industries, markets, or asset 
classes based on expectations of future performance. Specific events likely to 
influence markets could result in active managers altering portfolio exposures in 
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attempts to capture some of the benefits associated with these events. Such an event, 
for example, could include industry booms. Arguably the most famous industry boom 
and subsequent bust of modern times was that of the U.S. information technology (IT) 
industry during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Several studies have shown that a 
significant proportion of fund managers actively altered their portfolio exposure 
during this period in an attempt to capture the upside of the boom, however not all 
being successful.6  A more recent example of an industry boom witnessed over a 
prolonged period of time that has similarly influenced an entire equity market is what 
has now become known as, ‘the Australian Mining Boom’.   
The commencement of the Australian mining boom is considered a 
consequence of  the rapid industrialisation and urbanisation of emerging economies in 
Asia, particularly China and India over the last decade, which has led to substantial 
investments in infrastructure, buildings and machinery in these countries and  
subsequent increased demand for raw commodities, especially coal and iron ore 
(Kearns and Lowe, 2011). The abundance of these resources and Australia’s relatively 
close proximity to China has made it a prime source for these resources. This 
subsequently resulted in Australia’s heightened production and investment across a 
broad range of mining-related sectors from around 2005 onwards and ultimately 
ensued this mining boom (Connolly and Orsmond, 2011). This boom assisted the 
Australian economy through the Global Financial Crises of the late 2000s, 
experiencing a milder downturn relative to other developed nations. The economic 
slowdown in China in recent years however has seen a decline in the mining industry 
                                                 
6 A detailed discussion of the performance of funds in relation to the U.S. IT bubble is provided in 
Chapter 3, Section 3.3.c.  
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asset prices from about 2012 onwards, suggesting that the peak of this boom is behind 
us.      
Unlike the IT boom, the Australian mining boom did not eventuate in a crash 
of asset prices. However, this boom provides us another opportunity to examine the 
reactions and implications of funds during periods of industry outperformance. As the 
application of industry-level analysis is considered a key component of active 
portfolio management for those who prescribe to the top-down approach of investing, 
the second essay explores how portfolio exposures of Australian funds are influenced 
by industry booms and the subsequent effect that these exposures have on fund 
performance and flows. Specifically, this essay strengthens our understanding of 
whether funds are able to capture industry outperformance and the effect that exposure 
to a booming industry has on fund investors. 
The findings presented in this essay show that fund exposures to the mining 
industry increased in absolute and relative terms across the mining boom period, 
indicating that equity fund managers are attempting to outperform their benchmarks 
by chasing industry outperformance. However, funds with higher exposure to this 
mining industry (especially wholesale funds) are unable to outperform relative to those 
funds with lower exposures when measured using raw or risk-adjusted returns and 
controlling for fund-specific factors. Nevertheless, this essay shows that funds with 
higher mining exposure are successful in attracting greater funds inflows, which 
indicate that the investment decisions of fund investors are also influenced by industry 
booms. This result is consistent with investors being attracted to hot investment styles 
and misinterpreting industry allocation as fund skill. 
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An investment ‘style’ that has gained popularity amongst portfolio 
management in recent years has become known as Socially Responsible Investing 
(SRI). SRI is a broad concept used to describe the practice of screening investments 
based on some criteria that encourages environmental, corporate governance, social 
justice or any other non-financial related screen that is generally seen as being ‘good’ 
for society (Baker and Nofsinger, 2012). An SRI investor, for example, may invest 
solely in firms that promote renewable energy or human rights, or alternatively avoid 
firms that are related to the production or distribution of tobacco, nuclear power or 
firearms. As definitions of environmental and social responsibility traditionally stems 
from moral, cultural, historical, or religious beliefs, there is no clear distinction as to 
what can or cannot be considered as SRI. As such, the definition of SRI can vary 
significantly from one individual to another.7 Incorporating SRI into the investment 
process however has become increasingly popular amongst individuals and 
institutions in recent years. Increasing awareness and support of SRI has resulted in 
regulatory bodies requiring mandatory disclosure of certain environmental factors by 
listed companies in many markets around the world, particularly within Australia. This 
global demand for greater social responsibility by firms has led to the inclusion of a 
range of SRI policies into investment mandates for an increasing proportion of 
managed funds, with a significant number now being managed primarily from an SRI 
standpoint (USSIF, 2012). Currently, there are over 500 signatories to the United 
Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (UN PRI) across the globe. These funds 
collectively hold over US$18 trillion in assets under management. Australia represents 
the largest signatory body to the PRI, representing about 17 percent of the total number 
                                                 
7  See, for example Domini (2001), Sparkes (2010), and Fung, Law, and Yau (2010) for further 
discussion on socially responsible investing. 
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of global signatories. Furthermore, over half of all funds under management in 
Australia are estimated to be committed to operating in accordance with the major 
principles outlined by UNPRI.8 
There is currently a vast range of products available to investors that are based 
on a wide spectrum of SRI guidelines, which incorporate either negative or positive 
screens or both into their investment mandates. Specifically, the U.S. funds 
management industry has seen a dramatic rise in number of funds that incorporate at 
least one SRI screen, with $3.74 trillion in assets under management as at 2012. This 
industry has seen almost a fivefold increase in SRI-screened funds since 1995, 
representing 11 percent ($3.74 trillion) of all institutional assets under management as 
at 2012 (USSIF, 2012). This growth in U.S. SRI funds under management is not only 
attributed to the fund sector, but is also largely attributed to other funds including 
venture capital funds, hedge funds, private equity funds and property funds that have 
also prescribed to specific SRI mandates (USSIF, 2012). Such global growth in SRI 
may be attributed to increasing awareness of environmental and social issues by 
individuals and investors along with heightened social conscience that is exhibited by 
society as a result of becoming wealthier (Joseph, 1989). The last essay of this 
dissertation (0) subsequently moves from traditional performance evaluation to 
examine other non-financial benefits that investors can obtain.   
Traditionally, it is thought that constraining a portfolio will result in sub-
optimal diversification and performance for the wealth-maximising investor relative 
to an unconstrained portfolio [see, for example Rudd (1981), Grossman and Sharpe 
                                                 
8 Australian Trade Commission-Investment Management Industry in Australia:  
 http://www.austrade.gov.au/ArticleDocuments/2792/Investment-Management-Industry-in-
Australia.pdf.aspx. 
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(1986), Hall (1986) and Diltz (1995)]. A large body of literature has therefore emerged 
that examines the performance differential between ‘SRI-constrained’ and 
unconstrained ‘non-SRI’ portfolios. Whilst the literature does not unequivocally find 
that investors are punished in terms of financial performance for holding SRI 
portfolios, it is unlikely that there is not a financial cost associated with investing in 
SRI. In order to explain the continued and rapid growth of this “investment style” in 
recent times, significant non-financial satisfaction must be accruing to SRI investors. 
This non-financial satisfaction must be valued at an amount that is at least as large as 
the financial cost that is yielded from holding SRI. The last essay of this dissertation 
therefore measures the value of this non-financial benefit, and is referred to as the 
“psychic dividend” of SRI.   
Psychic dividends are measured in this essay from loss aversion utility 
functions that use return distributions that are representative of an SRI and non-SRI 
investor’s portfolio. Socially responsible and socially irresponsible portfolios are 
constructed from monthly U.S. equities data using industry classifications as the basis 
for screening stocks into either portfolio. From these portfolios, this chapter shows 
that SRI does not underperform (or outperform) non-SRI when measured using raw 
or risk-adjusted returns regardless of economic or market conditions. Geczy, 
Stambaugh, and Levin (2005) attempt to measure this cost of SRI using differences in 
certainty equivalence returns between SRI and non-SRI screened portfolio. This essay 
extends their definition of certainty equivalence from the limiting case of exponential 
utility to more general cases that include constant relative risk aversion and loss 
aversion. The findings from this essay show that the psychic dividend to SRI is valued 
at an amount that is at least four basis points per month for a long-only portfolio of 
socially responsible stocks and at least 85 basis points per month for a portfolio that is 
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long socially-responsible stocks and short socially-irresponsible stocks. This psychic 
dividend is shown to increase with investor risk aversion and also during economic 
recessions.  
The remainder of this dissertation is organised as follows: Chapter 2 presents 
the first essay, entitled ‘Equity Fund Benchmark Appropriateness, Performance and 
Flows’. Chapter 3 presents the second essay, ‘Prospecting for Alpha: Equity Fund 
Performance, Flows and the Mining Boom in Australia’ and the last essay, entitled 
‘Psychic Dividends of Socially Responsible Investors’ is presented in 0. The 
dissertation is concluded in Chapter 5.  
1.2 Presentations and Papers Arising from this Dissertation 
Certain work from this dissertation has been produced into working papers 
and/or presented at conferences. A working paper, titled ‘The Appropriateness of 
Equity Funds’ Self-designated Benchmarks,’ that is co-authored with Andrew 
Ainsworth and Kerry Pattenden and has been produced that is based on the work 
contained in Chapter 2. This paper was presented at the 2013 Asian Financial 
Management Association (AFMA) Meeting in Shanghai, China. 
A working paper co-authored with Andrew Ainsworth, titled “Equity Fund 
Performance, Flows and the Mining Boom in Australia”, has been produced that is 
based on the work contained in Chapter 3. This paper was presented at the 2013 
SIRCA Young Researchers Workshop in Sydney, and has been accepted into the 2014 
Southern Finance Meeting in Key West, USA.      
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A working paper, titled “Psychic Dividends of Socially Responsible Investors”, 
that is co-authored with Steve Satchell and Andrew Ainsworth has been produced that 
is based on the work contained in 0. 
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Chapter 2. Equity Fund Benchmark 
Appropriateness, Performance and 
Flows 
 
2.1 Introduction    
 The benchmarking of a portfolio to an index is considered an important 
element of the fund performance evaluation process, as has been illustrated by the 
thousands of passive indices used to track the returns of securities in the hundreds of 
markets throughout the world. The ability to accurately evaluate fund performance has 
been a topic of interest since Sharpe (1966) and Jensen (1968). They both stress the 
importance of using appropriate benchmarks when measuring performance. For a 
benchmark to be considered a useful evaluation tool, it should be able to capture the 
passive component of a portfolio’s returns whilst recognising a manager’s stock 
selection ability through their active share of investments. An inappropriate 
benchmark may therefore be ineffective in assisting investors to make good 
investment decisions, adequately manage risk, or properly measure fund performance 
(Anderson, 2009). In order to adjust for the passive position of a portfolio and to 
adequately capture active variations in returns, a benchmark should be capable of 
adequately mimicking the passive style of the portfolio that it is attempting to evaluate. 
If a fund is found to be closet-indexing an alternative benchmark then it should not be 
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assessed as possessing skill, and instead be scrutinised for charging active 
management fees for effectively being passively managed.9 Similarly, fund managers 
should not be rewarded for outperforming a benchmark if they persistently tilt their 
portfolios exposures to an extent such that they track the returns of an alternative index 
closer than their own benchmark. 
There is a large quantity of Australian equity funds advertised as subscribing 
to specific style objectives despite being benchmarked against broad-market indices. 
Given the absence in regulations surrounding fund benchmarking and holdings 
reporting in Australia, this chapter investigates several issues concerning the 
appropriateness of equity fund benchmarking. These issues include; whether 
Australian equity funds are adequately style-matched to their self-reported 
benchmarks, whether the returns of these funds are better captured by alternative 
passive indices, and whether funds with inappropriate benchmarks are able to 
outperform and attract increased flows.  
The findings from this chapter assist in identifying if regulations concerning 
fund benchmark reporting should be more stringent to ensure that benchmarks can 
reliably be used to evaluate performance. These findings additionally assist in 
determining whether style indices should be made publicly available within Australia 
to allow practitioners greater capacity to compare passive portfolio returns accruing to 
a variety of investment styles. This chapter further identifies whether fund investors 
can rely on self-reported benchmarks to adequately identify passive returns and to 
compare funds amongst their peer group. From a manager’s perspective, this chapter 
                                                 
9 Closet indexing refers to the practice of passively managing a portfolio (tracking a benchmark index) 
of a fund that is believed by investors to be actively managed and whose fees are charged at higher 
‘active’ rates compared to passive funds [see, for example Taylor (2004), Cremers and Petajisto (2009) 
and Cremers, Ferreira, Matos, and Starks (2013) for further discussion on closet indexing].  
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establishes if outperforming a benchmark influences asset flows, and whether this is 
affected by the appropriateness of the fund’s benchmark.  
Using Morningstar Direct data for a sample of 460 Australian actively-
managed equity funds over the period from 2000 to 2012, benchmark-mismatched 
funds are determined using the approach of Levene (1960) to test for homogeneity of 
tracking error volatilities from a sample of passive equity indices. Returns-based factor 
analysis is then applied to identify how well value/growth, size and momentum style 
characteristics are captured by funds’ self-reported benchmarks. Given the absence of 
publicly available ‘style’ indices within the Australian equity market, a basket of 
passive value/growth-size style indices is constructed and tested to determine whether 
these are more appropriate at serving as a benchmark index than currently available 
S&P/ASX indices. To assist in identifying if managers purposefully misallocate 
inappropriate benchmarks in attempts to outperform their peers, fund performance is 
examined using regression analysis to test the hypothesis that funds with 
inappropriately matched benchmarks outperform those with suitably matched 
benchmarks. This chapter then lastly examines how fund benchmark mismatching 
influences investor asset flows, and if managers who have assigned mismatched 
benchmarks are successful at attracting greater inflows. 
Despite the abundance of Australian equity funds that prescribe to specific 
investment styles, this chapter finds that an overwhelming number of managers self-
report broad-market based indices (i.e., the S&P/ASX 200 or the S&P/ASX 200 All 
Ordinaries) as their benchmarks. Whilst this pre-emptively suggests that funds largely 
assign style-inappropriate benchmarks, almost all are found to be suitably matched to 
their self-reported benchmarks, and only a small minority tilt their portfolios away 
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from a particular style characteristic relative to their benchmark. For those few funds 
that are mismatched, they do not group to any one particular style relative to their 
benchmark. Furthermore, these funds are unable to achieve superior benchmark-
relative performance and do not benefit from increased inflows. This implies that, as 
a whole, Australian equity fund managers do not (or are unable to) take advantage of 
the lack of benchmarking regulations in Australia by allocating indices that are easily 
outperformed. These findings do not support the requirement of style indices being 
made publicly available.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 provides a 
review of the current literature that explores fund benchmarking and style 
mismatching, section 2.3 describes the hypotheses that are empirically tested in this 
chapter and section 2.4 describes the data used in this chapter. Section 2.5 explains the 
methodology for testing for benchmark mismatching and evaluating fund performance 
and flows, section 2.6 reports and discusses the empirical findings and section 2.7 
concludes.     
2.2 Literature Review    
2.2.a Introduction 
In practice, funds are often evaluated alongside a benchmark index that is self-
reported by the fund manager. Bailey (1992) suggests that an effective benchmark 
should be, amongst other qualities, unambiguous, tradeable, measurable, specified in 
advance, reflective of current investment opinions, and appropriate (i.e., the 
benchmark must reflect the manager’s style). Meschke (2007) argue that a good 
benchmark should evaluate the performance resulting from the active risks taken by 
managers while controlling for externalities that are unable to be controlled by the 
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manager. Sensoy (2009) describes that in order for an index to serve as a suitable 
benchmark, it should be adequately matched to the fund’s unique investment style so 
as to capture common variations in returns.  
Ferris and Yan (2007) argue that it is important when evaluating a manager’s 
skill that fund performance be measured relative to that of a benchmark index. They 
show that a vast majority of performance evaluation studies fail to provide a realistic 
evaluation of managerial skill because they assume that the appropriate performance 
benchmark is one that is estimated from a market implicit factor model such as the 
Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, or Carhart (1997) four-factor model. 
Ferris and Yan (2007) subsequently show that failing to incorporate a fund’s 
benchmark into the evaluation process will result in a biased measure of risk-adjusted 
performance that will mismeasure manager skill. For example, “ignoring the 
manager’s self-reported benchmark would incorrectly classify as timing, changes in 
factor exposures which merely reflect the manager’s effort to track the time-varying 
sensitivities of her benchmark” (p.1760). Cremers, Petajisto, and Zitzewitz (2012) 
show that commonly used passive benchmarks such as the S&P 500 and Russell 2000 
are assigned large and noisy alphas estimates as well as non-zero and significant 
exposure to systematic risk factors by standard factor models, which ultimately result 
in misleading and biased measures of fund performance. Consequently, when fund 
performance is evaluated by risk-adjusting excess returns over a self-reported 
benchmark, it is expected to provide a more realistic measure and improved level of 
managerial skill than employing an implicit benchmark defined from a standard risk 
factor model. This argument is also supported by Kuenzi (2003) and Belden and 
Waring (2001), who argue that using inappropriate benchmarks leads to built-in 
tracking errors that hinder the evaluation process.  
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2.2.b Investment Styles 
The investment style of a fund can generally be determined by the set of 
investment philosophies, objectives and strategies adhered to by the fund manager that 
govern the portfolio’s asset allocation and ultimately influences its performance 
(Sharpe, 1992). Similarly, style can be referred to as the “subset of the investment 
universe in which a manager is constrained to operate, such as small capitalisation 
stocks versus large stocks, or value versus growth firms” (Ferson, 2010, p. 211). 
Rekenthaler, Gambera, and Charlson (2006) on the other hand argue that “investment 
styles are often used as a proxy for risk and the value of such an approach depends on 
a correct initial assessment of style” (p.6). An abundance of studies show that the 
investment styles of funds appear to vary significantly from those reported by the fund. 
Kim, Shukla, and Tomas (2000), for example, find that more than half of all U.S. funds 
report investment objectives as defined by the funds’ characteristics, investment style, 
and risk/return attributes that are significantly different from their actual holdings. 
This result confirms the earlier findings of diBartolomeo and Witkowski (1997) and 
Brown and Goetzmann (1997), who argue  that a large proportion of U.S. funds are 
misclassified with respect to their stated investment objectives. In the context of 
Australian managed funds, Allen, Phoon, Watson, and Wickramanayake (2010), using 
a Sharpe (1992) returns-based style analysis over a six year period from 2003 to 2008, 
find that up to 77 percent of Australian multi-sector funds are misclassified according 
to their investment styles.  
Chan, Chen, and Lakonishok (2002) argue that a major cause of funds 
reporting misleading investment style objectives is due to temporary deviations in 
style exposures by managers who attempt to time the market. Chan, Dimmock, and 
Lakonishok (2006) suggest that managers may instead report inaccurate investment 
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styles in an attempt to disguise the risk associated with a fund’s actual style exposure. 
Frost (2004) alternatively shows that the style mismatching of funds may arise due to 
the incentive that managers have of placing past performance in the best possible light 
given that retail investors are often shown to use past fund performance to assess 
managerial skill. By presenting performance in the best possible light, managers hope 
to attract investors and thus improve fee revenue from increased fund inflows (Barber 
and Odean, 2000). Gallo, Phengpis, and Swanson (2007) and Brown, Harlow, and 
Zhang (2009) show that the failure to abide by a consistent investment style can 
ultimately lead to inferior performance. Allen, et al. (2010) dispute this, arguing that 
the misclassification of a fund’s investment style has no significant effect on its 
performance. The evidence from these studies suggests that at any point in time it is 
reasonable to expect that not all funds will contain securities that match the styles 
stated by their investment objectives.  
A benchmark should ideally be constructed from a universe of stocks that 
match the style objectives advertised by the underlying fund. diBartolomeo and 
Witkowski (1997) reveal that if the reported investment style of a fund is inconsistent 
with its actual style, then the fund’s benchmark is also likely to be inadequately style 
matched. In terms of equity funds, style may be defined by the characteristics of the 
stocks that the fund invests in. Given the specificity of stock characteristics, Clarke 
and Ryan (1994) indicate that no one-specific benchmark will suit all funds. 
Furthermore, Frost (2004) suggests that if regulatory standards for evaluating fund 
performance are not stringent then fund managers will be inclined to misrepresent 
performance. Managers may therefore attempt to exaggerate past performance by 
benchmarking fund returns against indices that have performed poorly, regardless of 
how well (or how poorly) the index matches the style objectives of the fund.  
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2.2.c Benchmark Mismatching 
The incentive for fund managers to outperform their benchmark is argued by 
Ippolito (1989), who demonstrate that fund flows are positively related to benchmark-
excess returns. This relationship is suggested to be the result of investors being more 
likely to allocate funds based on simple performance measures, such as benchmark-
relative returns, instead of more complicated metrics such as alpha [see, for example 
Sirri and Tufano (1998), Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Del Guercio and Tkac 
(2002)]. Sensoy (2009) argues that it is because of this flow-performance incentive 
that fund managers will strategically report benchmarks that are relatively easy to 
outperform. He shows that managers may achieve this by reporting a benchmark with 
an investment style that has traditionally underperformed the style of the fund, and 
further shows that when funds outperform a ‘style-mismatched’ benchmark, they are 
able to attract greater fund inflows.  
 Wermers (2011) suggests that “managers should be rewarded for bets not 
easily replicated by uninformed investors; that is, managers should not be rewarded 
for easy bets that represent passive or known simple mechanical strategies” (p.538). 
Cremers, et al. (2012) also argue that regardless of whether or not a certain style factor 
is priced, it should be included in the benchmark model because there are extended 
periods of time when certain styles significantly outperform others. Incorporating such 
style factors into the benchmarking process will therefore provide a more accurate 
estimate of portfolio performance relative to a passive style-portfolio. When 
attempting to generate abnormal performance, Wermers (2011) shows that fund 
managers may participate in ‘static’ factor allocation, a strategy that involves 
persistently tilting the weight of their portfolio towards a specific systematic risk factor 
that is expected to exhibit a risk premium. For instance, if value stocks have 
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historically outperformed growth stocks, a manager may attempt to exploit this 
premium by purposefully reporting a growth-styled benchmark yet tilt their portfolio 
persistently towards value stocks. On the other hand, managers may use a dynamic 
factor allocation approach to generate superior benchmark-relative performance, 
which involves temporarily tilting a portfolio towards a particular style that is expected 
to outperform others over the short run. Wermers (2011) stresses the importance of 
distinguishing between static and dynamic factor allocation. He shows that while static 
factor allocation can be a valuable strategy for managers, significant static exposure 
to known risk factors may be easily replicated by low-cost allocations to passive style 
indices in a buy-and-hold portfolio. This may result in scepticism of a manager’s 
rationale to charge active management fees. Passive fund replication, however, may 
only be possible for those certain types of investment styles where passive indices 
exist, such as for size and value/growth style characteristics. As such, identifying a 
fund’s static factor exposure may subsequently be useful when characterising a fund’s 
investment style while identifying any persistent manager bias in a fund’s portfolio 
relative to its benchmark (Wermers, 2011).   
 Sensoy (2009) argues that almost a third of all U.S. equity fund managers 
report benchmarks that are mismatched from the fund’s reported style characteristics. 
He further argues that the self-reported benchmark of almost a third of the total sample 
of funds are unable to capture the exposure to a fund’s size and value-growth 
characteristics as well as alternative published indices. These funds are predominantly 
overexposed from their benchmarks in the direction of small and value stocks, which 
may be an attempt to strategically achieve positive benchmark-adjusted returns by 
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taking advantage of size and value premiums.10 The findings from Sensoy (2009) 
confirm those of Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2003), who reveal that despite the 
prevalence of published style-indices, a large quantity of U.S. equity funds contain 
self-reported benchmarks that are mismatched from their investment styles. 
Specifically, Elton, et al. (2003) show that funds contain exposures to size and value-
growth characteristics that are not reflected in their benchmarks.  
Using a holdings-based approach, Cremers and Petajisto (2009) find that fund 
managers deliberately report benchmarks that are style-mismatched. They find that a 
large majority of U.S. funds that generate positive benchmark-adjusted returns, both 
before and after expenses, hold securities that vary significantly from those reflected 
in the composition of their benchmarks. Funds that maintain holdings that closely 
matched their benchmark, on the other hand, are shown to underperform after 
expenses. Beaumont (2003) also argues that for those “portfolio managers concerned 
primarily with matching a benchmark, mismatches would be rather small, yet for 
portfolio managers concerned with outperforming a benchmark, larger mismatches are 
common” (p.164). Subsequently, the incentive to outperform a benchmark may 
encourage some managers to select certain style-indices that traditionally 
underperform the underlying style of their fund. These incentives may persuade fund 
managers to deviate their style from that of their allocated benchmark, or alternatively, 
to strategically select a misrepresentative benchmark so as to increase their chances of 
consistently beating it. However, a misleading benchmark may simply be due to the 
unavailability of an index that adequately captures the style characteristics of a fund. 
This argument is expressed by Ansell, Moles, and Smart (2003), who suggest that 
                                                 
10 See, for example Fama and French (1992), Davis, Fama, and French (2000), Fama and French (2006), 
O’Brien, Brailsford, and Gaunt (2010) and  Morey and O'Neal (2006) for a discussion on the Value 
premium and Banz (1981), Roll (1983), Gaunt (2004) and O’Brien, et al. (2010) on the size premium. 
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benchmarks should not be treated as “one-size-fits-all”. Blake, Lehmann, and 
Timmermann (2002) also find that it is often difficult to determine an appropriate 
benchmark for a managed fund. They find this to be the result of the difficulty in 
defining investment styles, given that fund managers often have considerable 
discretion in the asset allocation of their portfolios. On a similar note, Kuenzi (2003) 
argue that for those ‘sophisticated’ managers that utilise specialised investment 
strategies, a published index would be unable to serve its purpose of capturing the 
fund’s exposure to common style factors. Consequently, such funds will require 
customised benchmarks in order to accurately evaluate fund performance.   
2.2.d Alternative Explanations to Benchmark Mismatching 
A main cause for benchmarks being unable to capture the styles of their 
underlying funds is argued to be the result of portfolio style drift.11 Funds may follow 
crowds by rotating from their stated styles to mimic funds that have recently been 
successful. Chan, et al. (2002) find that funds are generally consistent in maintaining 
their reported styles and that style drift is most common amongst funds with poor past 
performance and especially in poorly performing value funds. Sensoy (2009) rejects 
the notion that style drift is typically responsible for funds being style mismatched 
from their self-reported benchmarks. He shows that the proportion of mismatched 
funds at the beginning of his sample in 1994 is almost identical to the proportion of 
funds that are overall found to be mismatched from 1994 to 2004. This evidence 
further supports the argument that benchmark mismatching is a result of managers 
attempting to distort fund performance. 
                                                 
11 See, for example Arrington (2000), Barberis and Shleifer (2003), Idzorek and Bertsch (2004), Chen 
and Wermers (2005), Ainsworth, Fong, and Gallagher (2008) and Wermers (2012) on style drift.  
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2.3 Hypothesis Development   
Broad market-based indices such as the S&P/ASX 300 may serve as an 
appropriate benchmark for funds with corresponding broad-market style. However, 
these indices may not be able to adequately capture common variations in returns for 
those funds with narrowly defined styles. For example, it may not be appropriate to 
evaluate the performance of a fund that is heavily exposed to value stocks using a 
benchmark constructed from growth stocks, since any systematic return attributed to 
this value characteristic might incorrectly be recognised as managerial skill. If a 
manager is able to identify an investment style that is expected to outperform, then 
overexposing her portfolio to this style should produce attractive benchmark-relative 
returns as long as her benchmark is not also exposed to this investment style. This 
practise may be prevalent amongst Australian funds due to the voluntary reporting of 
portfolio holdings by fund managers. If benchmarks are intentionally style 
mismatched then it is expected that these funds will exhibit greater benchmark-relative 
exposure towards investment styles that are expected to outperform. Furthermore, If 
benchmark-excess performance has little effect on fund flows, then the ability to beat 
the benchmark, and in turn, ensuring that funds are appropriately matched to their 
benchmarks may not be so important. If however, fund flows are related to benchmark-
relative returns, then it is expected that managers will strive to outperform their 
benchmarks whether it be through managerial skill or through simply reporting a sub-
optimal benchmark. Given that the benchmarking of equity funds is unregulated in 
Australia, it is expected that a large proportion of funds will be inappropriately 
matched to their benchmarks, and that managers will strategically select benchmarks 
that traditionally underperform in attempts to appear more attractive. However, others 
managers, especially in Australia, may have a mismatched benchmark simply due to 
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the unavailability of a benchmark that suitably captures the underlying passive style 
of a fund’s portfolio. It is therefore expected that value and growth funds will be more 
susceptible to mismatching due to these styles being inadequately captured by the 
current S&P/ASX indices.  
If fund managers recognise that retail investors use simple performance metrics 
such as benchmark-excess returns instead of more complicated risk-adjusted measures 
such as alpha when allocating assets, then retail managers will have greater incentive 
and therefore be more inclined to allocate a mismatched benchmark that is easily 
outperformed. Wholesale managers on the other hand, recognising that their investors 
use more sophisticated performance metrics when allocating funds, may be less 
inclined to report an inappropriate benchmark index if the asset flows associated with 
outperforming a benchmark are negligible. Subsequently, it is expected that retail 
funds will be more prone to benchmark mismatching. 
Funds that are identified as being mismatched from their benchmarks are 
expected to produce higher benchmark-relative returns compared to appropriately-
matched funds. Nevertheless, this performance difference is likely to disappear after 
alternative ‘better-suited’ benchmarks are assigned to these funds. This is due to the 
performance differential being a result of the ‘sub-optimal’ benchmark, and not due to 
the performance of the underlying fund.         
Whilst the argument that investors base their fund allocation decisions using 
simple performance metrics such as benchmark-adjusted returns, this may only be the 
case for retail investors who are generally considered as being less-sophisticated, 
household investors. James and Karceski (2006) argue that wholesale and retail 
investors use different criteria when allocating assets across funds. They show that 
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wholesale fund investors do not chase past raw returns in the same manner as retail 
investors but instead use more sophisticated, risk-adjusted, performance metrics when 
selecting funds. Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) reach a similar conclusion when 
examining the behaviour of pension and retail fund investors. Subsequently, compared 
to retail investors, wholesale investors are expected to be less influenced by 
benchmark-excess fund returns when allocating assets across funds and hence 
benchmark mismatching will not affect flows into these as much as it will for retail 
funds.  
2.4 Data  
2.4.a Stock-Related Data 
Month-ending stocks prices, market capitalisations and Global Industry 
Classification Standards (GICS) sector codes for all companies listed on the Australian 
Securities Exchange (ASX) from 2000 to 2012, along with the 13-week Treasury Note 
rate are retrieved from the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific Share 
Price and Price Relative Database (SIRCA SPPR). Data on firm-level book value of 
assets is retrieved from Aspect Huntley. Month-ending prices for all S&P/ASX 
Accumulation indices are retrieved from the Thomas Reuters Tick History (TRTH) 
database.  
Zero-investment factor mimicking portfolios for the two Fama and French 
(1992) factors, size (SMB) and value/growth (HML), are constructed by dividing 
stocks into a 2x3 size-by-book-to-market (BM) matrix using two independent sorts, 
calculating the value-weighted average returns for the stocks in the six portfolios, and 
then constructing its factors using equal-weighted differences between these portfolio 
returns. Specifically, the size factor, SMB (Small minus Big), is defined as (Small-
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Low + Small-Medium + Small-High)/3 minus (Big-Low + Big-Medium + Big-
High)/3. The value/growth factor, HML (high book-to-market minus low book-to-
market), is defined as (Small-High + Big-High)/2 minus (Small-Low + Big-Low)/2.12 
The Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) momentum factor (UMD) is constructed by 
investing long in stocks with positive previous-six month returns and short in stocks 
with negative previous-six month returns following research on momentum in 
Australia by Demir, Muthuswamy, and Walter (2004). The return on the SIRCA SPPR 
value-weighted Australian share index is used as the Australian market return and the 
13-week Treasury Note rate is the risk-free return.  
2.4.b Australian Equity Fund-Related Data 
All fund-related data used throughout Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 are sourced 
from the Morningstar Direct database and include; net fund returns, net dollar value 
of assets under management, inception date, net flow of funds as a percentage of assets 
under management, primary prospectus benchmark index, wholesale/retail 
classifications and investment style classifications for all Australian actively managed 
open-ended equity funds measured at a monthly frequency. Size is calculated as the 
natural log of the dollar value of net assets under management by the fund in each 
month. Fund return is the total percentage return calculated by Morningstar as the 
change in monthly assets under management (AUM) after reinvesting all income and 
capital-gains distributions during that month and subtracting management, 
administrative and other fees taken from fund assets then dividing by the starting 
                                                 
12 The two Fama and French (1993) factors are constructed following the approach of Fama and French 
(1993). However, unlike their approach, which excludes financial-sector stocks, I include financials 
given the importance that this industry plays in the Australian Market. 
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AUM.13,14 Reinvestments are made using actual reinvestment AUM and daily payoffs 
are reinvested monthly. Fund asset flows (hereinafter referred to as flow) is measured 
by Morningstar as the percentage change in AUM over the prior month after 
subtracting the change in funds under management that is related to its past return, 
given by the formula: 
  
𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 =
𝐴𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−𝐴𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1(1+𝑟𝑖,𝑡)
𝐴𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
,                              (2.1) 
where 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 is the net percentage flow of assets under management to fund i across 
period t. 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is the total net assets under management of fund i at the end of period 
t and  𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is the raw return of fund i over time t. Flows are winsorised at 5 percent and 
95 percent levels following Barber, Odean, and Zheng (2005) to avoid effects due to 
measurement errors or extreme observations.   
Net Style Flows are calculated from the aggregate flow of assets under 
management into all funds with the same Morningstar investment style classification, 
s, as fund i, from the following formula: 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠,𝑖,𝑡−1 =
∑ 𝐴𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1
𝑁𝑠
𝑖=1 −∑ 𝐴𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−2(1+𝑟𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑠
𝑖=1
∑ 𝐴𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−2
𝑁𝑠
𝑖=1
,         (2.2) 
where N is the number of equity funds with investment style s during month t-1 and 
∑ 𝐴𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑠,𝑡
𝑁𝑠
𝑖=1  is the value of total net assets asset under management for all funds with 
investment style classification, s, at time t.   
                                                 
13 Front-end loads, deferred loads and redemption fees are excluded from the calculation of fund returns. 
14 Morningstar data may be is prone to containing funds that have duplicate return series but different 
identifiers. To control for this occurrence, a fund should be deleted if it has a 50% overlap in returns 
with another fund.        
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Fund excess return, 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 , is measured as fund raw total return in month i, 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 minus the monthly return on the 13-week Treasury Note. Fund age is calculated as 
the natural logarithm of the number of months since its inception date. Fund volatility, 
𝜎𝑖,𝑡 , is measured as the the historical standard deviation of a fund’s monthly raw 
returns over the previous 12 months beginning in month t-12, from the equation: 
𝜎𝑖,𝑡 = √
∑ (𝑟𝑖,𝑡−𝑟𝑖,̅̅̅
𝑇
𝑡=1 )
𝑇−1
  , T=0,          (2.3) 
where 𝑟?̅? is the mean return of fund i from month t = -12 to T.  
Morningstar classifies Australian equity funds into seven style categories; 
Large-Value, Mid/Small-Value, Large-Growth, Mid/Small-Growth, Large-blend, 
Mid/Small-blend, and Other.15 Fund investment style dummies are constructed that 
take on values of one if a fund is classified as having that respected style, or zero 
otherwise.  
A wholesale dummy variable is constructed that takes on a value of one for 
funds that are classified by Morningstar as being a wholesale fund, or zero for a retail 
fund. Wholesale funds are identified by Morningstar as those that are intended for 
well-informed/professional investors or institutions (i.e., banks, insurance companies 
or superannuation funds) and generally require an initial investment amount of no less 
than $100,000AUD. The associated fees of wholesale funds are generally cheaper due 
to their lower cost structures resulting from less frequent and larger transactions as 
well as streamlined administrative and reporting requirements. Retail funds on the 
other hand are intended for less-informed/household investors (Sawicki, 2001).  
                                                 
15 The ‘Other’ investment style category includes all funds that are considered by Morningstar as either; 
Large Geared, Derivative Income, Other or ‘Unclassified’. 
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Time-varying Carhart (1997) four-factor alpha (hereinafter referred to as 
Carhart alpha) are calculated at the fund level using rolling regressions estimated 
across 24-month horizons from the model:   
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1,𝑖,𝑡(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽2,𝑖,𝑡𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡+𝛽3,𝑖,𝑡𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡+𝛽4,𝑖,𝑡𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,                                                         
(2.4)  
where 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 is the excess-return of fund i at time t above the risk-free rate . 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 is 
the Carhart alpha of fund i estimated over the previous 24 months from time t-25. Rm-
rf, SMB, HML and UMD are the monthly returns from the standard Carhart (1997) 
four factors at time t,   𝛽1,𝑖,𝑡 …𝛽4,𝑖,𝑡   are the estimated coefficients on each of the 
respected four factors and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term of fund i at time t. Time-varying CAPM 
alphas are also estimated using the same approach, calculated as the intercept, 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 , 
from the following regression model across 24-month rolling windows:  
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1,𝑖,𝑡(𝑟𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                      (2.5) 
where the variables are as previous described. 
Fractional performance variables are used in linear piecewise regressions, 
when estimating flow-performance models that capture the asymmetric relationship 
between fund returns and flows.16 To allow for different flow sensitivities across 
various levels of performance, three fractional performance variables (𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 , 
𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 and  𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡) are constructed by first calculating the percentile return 
rank, 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡 , for each fund of month t by sorting the sample in ascending order 
according to fund return in the previous month then dividing by the total number of 
funds in the sample (i.e., the fund with the highest return each month will have a rank 
                                                 
16 See, for example Ippolito (1992), Gruber (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and Tufano 
(1998) and Huang, Wei, and Yan (2007) on asymmetric fund flow-return relationships. 
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value of one). 33%-33%-33% breakpoints are used to then calculate performance 
terciles from the percentile ranks, such that: 
 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 +  𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡,  
where, 
  𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = { 
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡,     𝑖𝑓 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡 < 0.33            
0.33,          𝑖𝑓 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡  ≥ 0.33 ,         
      
 𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = {
  𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡 −  𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡,    𝑖𝑓   𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡 < 0.66       
0.33,         𝑖𝑓 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡  ≥ 0.66,                                  
     
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = {
0 ,   𝑖𝑓   𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡 < 0.66                  
      𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡 − 0.66,   𝑖𝑓 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡  ≥ 0.66.
          (2. 6) 
2.4.c Fund Benchmark Data 
The primary prospectus benchmark data for a sample of 784 Australian equity 
funds used throughout this chapter are sourced from the Morningstar Direct database, 
which contains benchmark data on 461 of these funds. For the remaining 304 funds 
that do not report a benchmark to Morningstar, 157 are hand collected from product 
disclosure statements or from the fund company websites. The remaining 147 funds 
whose benchmarks are unable to be retrieved are eliminated from the sample.17 The 
sample of funds is further limited to those that are benchmarked against the S&P/ASX 
50, S&P/ASX 100, S&P/ASX 200, S&P/ASX 200 Industrials, S&P/ASX 300, 
S&P/ASX 300 Industrial, S&P/ASX 300 Resources, S&P/ASX All Ordinaries, 
S&P/ASX Small Resources and S&P/ASX Small Ordinaries. The funds benchmarked 
to these indices account for approximately 97 percent of the sample. All passively-
                                                 
17 Those funds whose benchmarks are unable to be retrieved predominantly belonged to the same fund 
company. The difference in mean returns between the funds with and without benchmarks is 0.073 
percent per month. This difference is insignificant (t-statistic = 1.12).       
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managed (index) funds and funds with less than 24 months of return observations are 
eliminated from the sample. This reduces the final sample size to 460 funds.  
Table 2.1: Australian Equity Fund Sample Size 
This table reports the sample size of actively managed Australian equity funds, refined from 
the aggregate sample of Australian domiciled funds contained in the Morningstar Direct 
database from January 2000 to December 2011.  
   
 No. of Funds 
Managed Funds domiciled in Australia 3,338 
Equity Funds Domiciled in Australia  1,730 
Australian Equity Funds 784 
Actively Managed Australian Equity funds 765 
Equity funds with benchmarks supplied by Morningstar   316 
Funds with handed collected Benchmarks +157 
Funds with insufficient return observations  -13 
Total Sample Size 460 
 
2.4.d Passive Investable Style Index Construction 
 Six investable passive value/growth-size style indices are constructed using 
monthly return data from the largest 300 stocks according to their one month-lagged 
market capitalisation. These stocks are sorted according to their one-month lagged 
book-to-market ratios, with the top 30 percent (90 stocks) being classified as value 
stocks and the bottom 30 percent as ‘growth’ stocks. 18  The Growth index is 
constructed from the monthly value-weighted returns of all growth stocks. The Value 
index is constructed from the monthly value-weighted returns of stocks that are 
considered value stocks. The Large-Value index is constructed from the monthly 
value-weighted returns of stocks that are considered both a value stock and whose one-
month lagged market capitalisation is also amongst the top 50 percent (150) of the Top 
                                                 
18 As a robustness test when constructing the value and growth style indices, a top 50 percent and bottom 
50 percent cut off is used when sorting stocks by their book-to-market ratios into Value and Growth 
categories, respectively. Descriptive statistics of these indices are reported in Table A.1 in Appendix A. 
The results obtained from the empirical analysis when using these alternative style indices are 
qualitatively similar.     
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300 stocks in the Australian equity market by market capitalisation. The Large-
Growth index is constructed from the monthly value-weighted returns of stocks that 
are considered both a growth stock and whose one-month lagged market capitalisation 
is amongst the top 50 percent of stocks contained in the 300 by market capitalisation. 
The Small-Value index is constructed from the monthly value-weighted returns of 
stocks that are considered both a value stock and whose one-month lagged market 
capitalisation falls within in the bottom 50 percent of the Top 300 stocks by 
capitalisation. Lastly, the Small-Growth index is constructed from the monthly value-
weighted returns of stocks that are considered both a growth stock and whose one-
month lagged market capitalisation is also amongst the bottom 50 percent of the largest 
300 stocks in the Australian market by capitalisation. Two additional passive style 
indices are also constructed for this chapter, these being a Large-Core index and 
Small-Core index. The Large-Core index comprises the remaining stocks that are 
included in the largest 150 stock by market capitalisation, but not included in either of 
the Large-Value or Large-Growth index. Similarly, the Small-core index constitutes 
the remaining stocks from the lowest 150 stocks by market capitalisation of the Top 
300 that is not included in the Small-Value or Small-Growth indices. These two indices 
are also value-weighted from one-month lagged market capitalisation values and 
constructing using the same approach as the other style indices.19, 20 
Despite evidence suggesting the presence of momentum in the Australian 
market [see, for example Demir, et al. (2004), Durand, Limkriangkrai, and Smith 
                                                 
19 The style indices are constructed in a value-weighted manner instead of equal-weighted as this is the 
standard approach used by the major publicly available indices, such as Standard and Poors and 
NASDAQ, as well as by all U.S. style indices constructed by Russell Investments. 
20 Correlation coefficients of the monthly returns between each of the eight passively-constructed 
Australian size-value/growth equity style indices as well as for each of the S&P/ASX accumulation 
indices that serve as benchmarks are reported in Table A.2 in Appendix A. 
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(2006), Gaunt and Gray (2003), Hurn and Pavlov (2003) and Brailsford and O'Brien 
(2008)], indices based on this characteristic are not constructed within this chapter. 
This is due to momentum not being prominently recognised as an investment style 
within the Australian funds market as of yet. This is evident as observation into the 
investment objectives of Australian equity funds’ PDS’s and prospectuses’ show that 
the style dimensions of funds almost entirely only consist of size and/or value-growth 
classifications. Furthermore, Morningstar currently only consider size and value-
growth as the only two dimensions in their style box classifications. Similarly within 
the U.S. market, the prominent publicly available style indices are only constructed on 
size and value/growth characteristics despite evidence of momentum also being 
observed in U.S. stock returns. Subsequently, prevalent literature on style 
benchmarking in the U.S., such as Sensoy (2009), only use size and value/growth 
dimensions as style characteristics. 
2.5 Methodology 
2.5.a Testing for Benchmark Matching  
Fund level active management is measured using the tracking error volatility 
(TE) of a fund’s returns from its benchmark index and is used to explain how well a 
benchmark reflects the passive style returns of a fund (Cremers and Petajisto, 2009). 
The lower the TE of a fund, the more capable its benchmark is at capturing its time-
series variations in returns. A passively managed fund for example, would have a TE 
close to zero. The most appropriate benchmark for a fund is therefore considered the 
index that produces the lowest tracking error volatility, as calculated below: 
       𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑏 =  √
∑ (𝑟𝑖,𝑡−𝑟𝑏,𝑡)
2𝑁
𝑡=1
𝑁−1
,    𝑏 = 1,2, … , 𝐾,              (2.7)          
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where 𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑏 is the tracking error volatility of fund i relative to index b. 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is the return 
of fund i at time t and 𝑟𝑏,𝑡 is the return of index b at time i. K is the number of passive 
indices used to test for fund i’s best-suited index. For this study, 24 passive indices are 
used to test for a fund best-suited benchmark index, these  include; the S&P/ASX 20, 
S&P/ASX 50, S&P/ASX 100, S&P/ASX 100 Industrials, S&P/ASX 100 Resources, 
S&P/ASX 200, S&P/ASX 200 Resources, S&P/ASX 200 Industrials, S&P/ASX 300, 
S&P/ASX 300 Resources, S&P/ASX 300 Industrials, S&P/ASX All Ordinaries, 
S&P/ASX Small Ordinaries, S&P/ASX Small Resources, S&P/ASX Small Industrials 
and the S&P/ASX MidCap 50, and the eight passive investable style indices (Value, 
Growth, Large-Value, Large-Growth, Small-Value, Small-Growth, Small-Core and 
Large-Core) that are described in section 2.4.d.21,22 A fund’s best-suited benchmark is 
identified from the index that produces the lowest tracking error volatility: 
𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡  =  𝑚𝑖𝑛[𝑇𝐸𝑖,1, … , 𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝐾] ,                (2.8)          
where 𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 is the tracking error volatility of fund i measured relative to its ‘best-
suited’ benchmark, best.23 A Levene (1960) test for multiple population variances 
                                                 
21  For further information on the S&P/ASX indices used in this chapter, please see 
http://www.asx.com.au/products/indices.htm.   
22 The six alternative value/growth style indices, constructed using an alternative method (described in 
footnote 16) are used as a robustness measure when identifying a funds best-suited index. The results 
are identical to those that are found when using the original passive value/growth-constructed style 
indices.  
23 It is possible that funds will change their benchmarks over time (howbeit unlikely given that managers 
will typically introduce a new fund instead). Nevertheless, given that time-series benchmark data is not 
accessible, a limitation to the analysis undertaken in this chapter is presented. Whilst time-series 
analysis may still have been implemented (in terms of estimating TE across rolling windows), this 
approach may incorrectly identify a fund as possessing a mismatched benchmark over certain periods 
of time. This issue is raised in Wermers (2012), whereby fund managers may temporarily deviate their 
portfolios away from their stated investment styles over the short run to capture the expected 
outperformance of a particular style, then an alternative style over the subsequent period. Yet, over 
extended periods of time these deviations, on average, may balance out such that they correctly 
correspond to the reported style of the fund. As such, Wermers (2012) stresses the importance of 
differentiate between, what they refer to as, ‘static’ and ‘dynamic’ factor allocation. Subsequently, to 
ensure that the static factor allocation of a fund is captured, and is not biased by its dynamic allocation, 
this chapter refrains from estimating tracking-error volatilities across a time-series when identifying a 
fund’s appropriate benchmark. 
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being equal (homogeneity of variance) is then applied to determine if the tracking error 
volatility of fund i (when benchmarked against its best-suited index) is significantly 
lower than the TE of fund i when benchmarked against its self-reported index24.  
Suppose a variable Y, with sample size 𝑁, divided into 𝑘 subgroups, where 𝑁𝑖 
is the sample size of the i-th subgroup, the Levene (1960) test statistic, W, is defined 
as: 
𝑊 =
(𝑁−𝑘)
(𝑘−1)
∑ 𝑁𝑖(𝑍𝑖.−𝑍..)
2𝑘
𝑖=1
∑ ∑ (𝑍𝑖,𝑗−𝑍𝑖.)
2𝑁𝑖
𝑗=1
𝑘
𝑖=1
 , 
where,      
𝑍𝑖,𝑗 = |𝑌𝑖,𝑗 − ?̅?𝑖|. 
?̅?𝑖 is the mean of the i-th sub-group. ?̅?𝑖. is the group mean of ?̅?𝑖,𝑗 and ?̅?.. is the overall 
mean of the 𝑍𝑖,𝑗.
25  For the purpose of this analysis, k is set equal to two, where the 
first sub-group (𝑖 = 1) is the self-reported benchmark-excess return series of a fund 
and the second sub-group (𝑖 = 2) is the benchmark-excess return series of the same 
fund when benchmarked against its best-suited index. 𝑁𝑖 is the number of monthly 
benchmark-excess return observations for each subgroup, i. The null hypothesis tests 
whether the TE of a fund when benchmarked against its self-reported index is equal to 
the TE when benchmarked against its best-suited index: 
H0:     𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑  =  𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 , 
H1:    𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑  >  𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 . 
                                                 
24 Fong, Gallagher, and Lee (2008) similarly rely on the Levene (1960) test to identify differences in 
the tracking-error volatilities between funds and multiple benchmarks. 
25 Variations of the Levene (1960) test use median or trimmed mean values of the i-th subgroup when 
defining ?̅?𝑖  depending on the shape of the distribution. This chapter applies mean values which is 
considered most appropriate when testing for homogeneity of variance of Gaussian distributions 
[sourced from ‘Engineering Statistics Handbook’: http://www.itl.nist.gov/div898/handbook/eda/ 
section3/eda35a.htm]. 
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A fund is considered mismatched from its self-reported benchmark if the null 
hypothesis from the Levene (1960) test is rejected,  
𝑊 > 𝐹𝛼,𝑘−1,𝑁−𝑘, 
where 𝐹𝛼,𝑘−1,𝑁−𝑘is the upper critical value from an F distribution with 𝑘 − 1and 𝑁 −
𝑘 degrees of freedom at a significance level for 𝛼. Values of 𝛼 equal to 0.10, 0.05 and 
0.001 are used in this chapter when testing if funds are better matched to alternative 
benchmark indices26.  
2.5.b Four-Factor Style Characteristics Analysis  
There are various methods that can be used to accurately determine a managed 
fund’s investment style without having to rely on what is stated in its product disclosure 
statement. A returns-based approach is therefore applied to identify whether the style 
characteristics of Australian equity funds are adequately captured by their benchmark 
indices. The size and value/growth factors of Fama and French (1992), along with the 
market factor from the traditional CAPM, are said to explain a major proportion of the 
time-series variations in portfolio returns. Chan, et al. (2002) argue that these two 
factors can serve as useful characteristics when classifying the investment styles of 
portfolios. Chan, et al. (2002) further show that a model based on these factors (in 
addition to the market factor) will do just as well as more complicated high-
dimensional models when determining fund styles. Carhart (1997) in turn, shows that 
a stock-price momentum factor, developed in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), along with 
                                                 
26 Despite a potential “philosophical” issue surrounding the self-selection of fund benchmarks 
reported ex ante, this study recognises a fund’s “appropriate” benchmarks on an ex post basis. The 
rationale behind this approach is that: investors should be “getting what they paid for”. Even if a fund 
significantly outperformed its peers, as a result of following a style different to that reported by its 
benchmark, this fund, ex ante, is not what the investor expected. Hence it is appropriate to identify a 
fund’s correct benchmark on an ex post basis.  
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the three Fama and French (1992) factors do a better job of explaining time-series 
variations in stock returns than the three factor model. Whilst Chan, et al. (2002) find 
that the majority of U.S. mutual funds tend to closely mimic the styles of broad market 
indices such as the S&P 500 index, the funds that do deviate their style from the market 
index tend to lean towards growth stocks and momentum stocks. Applying these three 
factors (size, value/growth and momentum) along with the market factor, as style 
characteristics, a ‘benchmark-excess’ Carhart (1997) four-factor style regression 
approach is used to determine how the investment styles of funds compare to the styles 
of their self-reported benchmarks. This is achieved by estimating the following 
regression from the equation:  
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑏,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖−𝑏 + 𝛽1,𝑖−𝑏(𝑅𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽2,𝑖−𝑏𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3,𝑖−𝑏𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4,𝑖−𝑏𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 +
𝜀𝑖−𝑏,𝑡 ,                     (2.9)       
                          
where  𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑏,𝑖,𝑡 is the excess return of fund i above its self-reported benchmark at 
time t, 𝑅𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡  , 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 ,  𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  and  𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡  are the standard Carhart (1997) four 
factors, 𝛼𝑖−𝑏 is the intercept term, and 𝜀𝑖−𝑏,𝑡 is the random error term at time t. The 
factor loadings, 𝛽1,𝑖−𝑏 …  𝛽4,𝑖−𝑏 , represent the differences between fund i and fund i’s 
benchmark’s average exposure towards each of the respected style factors across the 
sample period and are estimated from the difference in the loadings from the two 
Carhart (1997) regressions, estimated from the following equations: 
 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1,𝑖(𝑅𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽2,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡+𝛽4,𝑖𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,    
                                         (2.10) 
and 
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𝑟𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ,𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑏 + 𝛽1,𝑏(𝑅𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽2,𝑏𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3,𝑏𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡+𝛽4,𝑏𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑏,𝑡 ,   
                             (2.11)          
such that, 
𝛼𝑖−𝑏 =  𝛼1,𝑖 − 𝛼1,𝑏, 
𝛽1,𝑖−𝑏 =  𝛽1,𝑖 − 𝛽1,𝑏, 
𝛽2,𝑖−𝑏 =  𝛽1,𝑖 − 𝛽1,𝑏, 
       𝛽3,𝑖−𝑏 =  𝛽1,𝑖 − 𝛽1,𝑏 , and 
          𝛽4,𝑖−𝑏 =  𝛽1,𝑖 − 𝛽1,𝑏.                      (2.12) 
 
The factor loadings, β1,i-b, β2,i-b, β3,i-b and β4,i-b are used to identify the deviation 
of fund i from its benchmark’s average systematic risk exposure towards; excess 
market sensitivity, size, value/growth and momentum style characteristics, 
respectively. The statistical significance of these factor loadings determine how well 
a fund’s style characteristics are able to be captured by its benchmark indices. The 
intercept term, 𝛼𝑖−𝑏 , represents the benchmark-excess abnormal return of fund i.    
2.5.c Characteristics of Mismatched Funds 
To determine the effect that specific fund characteristics have on the 
probability of a manager reporting a mismatched benchmark, probit regressions are 
estimated from the following model: 
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1,𝑖𝑊ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2,𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3,𝑖𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4,𝑖𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖 + 𝛽5,𝑖𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,                           (2.13)   
            
where 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖  is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if fund i is 
considered mismatched from its self-reported benchmark, or zero otherwise. Funds 
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are considered mismatched at ten, five and one percent significant levels as determined 
from the Levene (1960) for homogeneity of variance from fund tracking error 
volatilities, described in section 2.5.a. The explanatory variables include: a wholesale 
fund dummy, 𝑊ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖, which takes on a value of one for funds that are classified 
by Morningstar as being a wholesale fund, or zero for a retail fund.  The natural log of 
a fund’s size measured from its assets under management 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 , the natural log of 
the number of months since a fund’s inception date, 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 , fund expense ratio, 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 , and a vector of style dummies, Xi, that include; Large-Value, 
Mid/small-Value, Large-Growth, Mid/small-Growth, Large-Blend,  Mid/small-Blend 
and ‘Other’ investment styles (with Large-Value style being the reference variable) 
which take on values of one if fund i reports the respective style, or zero otherwise.  
2.5.d Performance Regression Analysis 
To investigate the effect that benchmark appropriateness has on fund 
performance, several multivariate performance regression models are estimated using 
monthly fund-level panel data over the period from 2000 to 2011. Specifically, the set 
of regressions identify whether funds with mismatched benchmarks differ in 
performance from funds with ‘appropriately-matched’ benchmarks after controlling 
for a range of characteristics that affect fund performance. The regression model is: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑚,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1,𝑚𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖 + 𝛽2,𝑚𝑊ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3,𝑚𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖 ∗
 𝑊ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽5,𝑚𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑚,𝑖,𝑡,                    (2.14) 
where 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑚,𝑖,𝑡 is the performance of fund i across time t measured using metric m, 
which include; fund excess-return, ri.t – rf, self-reported benchmark-excess return, ri - 
rb, CAPM alpha and Carhart alpha. The explanatory variable of interest is the 
benchmark mismatch dummy, 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖 , as previously defined. The regressions 
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also include a vector of control variables, 𝑍𝑖,𝑡, comprising; fund Size, fund Age, return 
Volatility, fund flows, and net flows into each investment style category. All control 
variables are lagged by one-month and all regressions are estimated with style-fixed 
effects, 𝑠𝑡, and time-fixed effects, 𝑣𝑡.  
2.5.d.i Justification of the Use of Factor Models to Evaluate Performance 
The existence of the size and value anomaly, along with momentum, and the 
application of the Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) models have been well 
documented using U.S. and international data. There is, however, considerably less 
examination of this topic across the Australian market. Consequently, conflicts over 
the validity of these models still remain due to the unconsolidated results that have 
been produced. Brown, Keim, Kleidon, and Marsh (1983), Beedles, Dodd, and Officer 
(1988), Gaunt, Gray, and McIvor (2000) and Durand, Juricev, and Smith (2007) find 
results consistent with the U.S. on the existence of a size premium in Australia, whilst 
Gaunt (2004),  Gharghori, Chan, and Faff (2006) and Halliwell, Heaney, and Sawicki 
(1999) show evidence of a value premium in Australian stock returns. The existence 
of a momentum anomaly however is less clear. Bird, Chin, and McCrae (1983) argue 
that superannuation funds do not exhibit performance persistence. These results are 
supported by Bilson, Frino, and Heaney (2005), who fail to find persistence in the 
performance of superannuation funds over 3 year periods after adjusting for risk. 
Hallahan (1999), however, argue that persistence only exists in fixed-interest funds, 
but not in any other type of fund. Sawicki and Ong (2000) are similarly unable to show 
evidence of long-term (three year) persistence whereas Humphrey and O’Brien (2010) 
do not to find persistence for any funds over any length of time once size, value and 
momentum factor are taken into account. Refuting these findings of the absence of 
performance persistence in the Australian market are the findings of Demir, et al. 
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(2004), Durand, et al. (2006), Gaunt and Gray (2003), Hurn and Pavlov (2003) and 
Brailsford and O'Brien (2008), who argue that stock return persistence does exist and 
is strongest across six months horizons. These findings suggest that similar to the U.S, 
these variables may proxy for systematic risk.  
The findings on the existence of anomalies in Australia has subsequently bought about 
tests of the validity of the Fama and French (1993) three factor model. Whilst earlier 
studies provide support for the CAPM (see, for example Ball, Brown, and Officer 
(1976), Halliwell, et al. (1999), and Durack, Durand, and Maller (2004) show that the 
Fama and French (1993) model provides marginal improvement over the CAPM in 
explaining the cross-section of Australian stock returns. However, they argue that this 
improvement is primarily due to the SMB factor, as the HML factor is insignificant in 
explaining cross-sectional returns. Faff (2001),  Faff (2004) and Gaunt (2004) produce 
similar findings, in that the Fama and French (1993) model provides an improvement 
over the CAPM, yet are unable to show that HML is a priced factor. Faff (2001) and 
Faff (2004) also show that the sign on the SMB factor is significantly negative, instead 
of the expected positive, as in U.S. studies.   However, he attributes this result to a 
reversal in the size premium over recent years. Whilst Gharghori, et al. (2006) also 
argue that the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model provides increased 
explanatory power over the CAPM, they conversely show that this is primarily due to 
the HML factor and that the explanatory power of the SMB factor is inconclusive. 
Durand, et al. (2006) and O’Brien (2007) provide the most convincing argument for 
the Fama and French (1993) model, showing that both SMB and HML factors are 
important in explaining the cross-section of portfolio returns in Australia and that the 
model provides significant improvement over the CAPM. Despite conflicting results 
concerning the validity of the use of these factor models in Australia, prevalent fund 
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performance literature has accepted, and applied, the Carhart (1997) four-factor model 
when evaluating the performance of Australian funds [see, for example Capocci and 
Hübner (2004), Bauer, Otten, and Rad (2006), Ainsworth, et al. (2008), and Ferreira, 
Keswani, Miguel, and Ramos (2012)].   
2.5.e Flow Regression Analysis 
To examine the effect that having a mismatched benchmark has on fund flows, 
flow-performance regressions are estimated using panel data from the equation: 
𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑊ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖 ∗
𝑊ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖, +  𝛽1 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡.         (2.15)
                     
The explanatory variable of interest is the dummy variable that identifies fund 
i as having a mismatched benchmark, 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖,𝑡. 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 is the net flow of assets 
under management of fund i at time t. This dummy is interacted with the wholesale 
dummy,  𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖 ∗ 𝑊ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖. The regression also includes a vector of controls, 
𝑋𝑖,𝑡, comprising; fund Size, Age, return Volatility, Lagged Flow, and the Net Style 
Category Flows.27 All control variables are lagged one-month and all regressions are 
estimated with time-fixed effects, 𝑣𝑡, and style-fixed effects, 𝑠𝑡. 
Whilst estimating panel regressions using lagged independent variables may 
give rise to estimation bias, or omitted-variable bias, as discussed in Flannery and 
Hankins (2013), I maintain to estimate flow-performance regressions using lagged 
independence variables so as to eliminate endogeneity resulting from potential look-
ahead bias. This approach to estimating panel regressions appears to be the standard 
                                                 
27 These control variable are commonly used throughout prevalent literature that examine the flow-
performance relationship of mutual funds [see, for example Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and 
Tufano (1998) and Barber, et al. (2005)]. 
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practise adopted by the prevalent fund flow-performance literature [see, for example 
Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998), Del Guercio and Tkac (2002), 
Barber, et al. (2005) and Cooper, Gulen, and Rau (2005)].    
Linear piecewise flow-performance regressions, following Sirri and Tufano 
(1998), are additionally estimated in this chapter. These regressions allow for different 
flow sensitivities to fund mining exposure across varying levels of performance and 
apply three fractional performance variables (Low Perfi,t, Mid Perfi,t and High Perfi,t) 
based on the percentile rank of the one-month lagged raw returns from the sample of 
funds.28 The asymmetric relationship shown to exist between fund performance and 
flows can therefore be captured from these piecewise regressions. The full regression 
model is:  
𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑊𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽4𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑠𝑖 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,      (2.16) 
where 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 , 𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1  and 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1  are fractional 
performance variables, defined as the percentile rank of fund i’s raw returns relative 
to the entire sample of funds for time t-1 for low-, middle- and high-performing funds, 
respectively. All other variables are as previously defined. 
2.6 Results 
This section presents and discusses the empirical findings from this chapter. 
Descriptive statistics of the key variables and benchmark indices used in the analysis 
are first reported in section 2.6.a. Section 2.6.b examines the performance of indices 
that are self-reported as benchmarks as well as the self-constructed style indices. This 
                                                 
28 Construction of the three fractional performance variables is described in detail in section 2.4.b. 
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section then determines whether funds are appropriately style-matched or mismatched 
from their self-reported benchmark indices. Section 2.2.c investigates the 
characteristics of funds that report mismatched benchmarks and identifies the indices 
that these mismatched funds are better suited to. The findings from this section assist 
in identifying whether benchmarking regulation should be made more stringent and 
whether passive style indices should be made publicly available for benchmarking. 
The performance of funds with mismatched benchmarks and correctly-matched 
benchmarks are then compared in section 2.6.d. The final component of the analysis, 
presented in section 2.5.e, examines the effect that benchmark mismatching has on 
fund flows, and subsequently identifies if managers have an incentive to self-report 
inappropriate benchmarks.     
2.6.a Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2.2 for the key variables used 
throughout the analysis of this chapter. The frequency of funds benchmarked to each 
index along with the investment styles of these funds are reported in Table 2.3. Table 
2.4 reports returns statistics for the eight passively constructed investable style indices 
as well as for the indices that are reported as benchmarks by the funds contained in the 
study sample.  
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis throughout Chapter 2 are reported in this table. Fund return, benchmark return, risk-
free return, market return, SMB, HML, UMD, CAPM alpha Carhart alpha, return volatility and net style return are all expressed as monthly 
percentages. Fund age is measured as the natural log of the number of months since a fund’s inception date. Fund size is measured as the natural 
log of to the dollar value of assets under management. Fund flows are measured as a percentage of fund assets under management. All data is 
measured at a monthly frequency from January 2000 to December 2011.  
                
  Mean  Min Median Max St. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Fund Return 0.799 -39.290 1.830 27.700 4.945 -1.017 5.690 
Benchmark Return 0.023 -26.406 -0.037 20.253 1.824 -0.344 16.899 
Risk-free Return 0.424 0.217 0.433 0.594 0.098 -0.273 2.386 
Market return 0.690 -13.113 1.755 7.603 4.114 -1.011 3.999 
SMB 0.697 -20.526 0.530 15.176 5.548 0.058 3.081 
HML 0.215 -8.822 0.747 5.939 2.945 -0.597 3.023 
UMD 0.326 -12.483 0.234 9.337 2.541 -0.663 5.852 
CAPM Alpha 0.020 -2.066 -0.028 4.038 0.422 1.069 9.270 
Carhart Alpha 0.047 -2.249 0.018 3.114 0.392 0.512 7.125 
Fund Size 18.248 7.626 18.397 23.107 1.923 -0.260 3.033 
Fund Age 4.073 0.000 4.234 6.363 0.971 -0.843 3.885 
Return Volatility 4.030 1.108 3.731 17.016 1.853 1.611 7.212 
Net Style Return -0.325 -5.552 -0.261 5.988 1.053 -0.096 6.448 
Fund Flow 0.506 -5.571 -0.092 9.765 3.462 0.939 4.102 
Expense Ratio 1.559 0.000 1.310 5.640 0.792 1.127 5.065 
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Table 2.3: Fund Investment Styles and Benchmark Indices  
The frequency of Australian actively managed equity funds contained in the study sample used throughout this chapter that subscribe to 
each investment style objective and benchmarked against each of the ten respected S&P/ASX accumulation index is reported in this table.    
                  
  
Large 
Value 
Mid/Small 
Value 
Large 
Growth 
Mid/Small 
Growth 
Large 
Blend 
Mid/Small 
Blend Other Total 
S&P/ASX 300  36 2 30 1 105 1 15 190 
S&P/ASX 200  20 0 29 0 76 1 15 141 
S&P/ASX Small 
Ordinaries 0 5 0 26 0 43 0 74 
S&P/ASX 100  0 0 2 13 0 0 12 27 
S&P/ASX 300 Industrials  9 0 1 0 0 0 0 10 
S&P/ASX All Ordinaries 2 1 1 1 3 1 1 10 
S&P/ASX 50  0 3 0 0 0 0 2 5 
S&P/ASX 200 Industrials 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
S&P/ASX 300 Resources  0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
S&P/ASX Small Resources  0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Total 68 11 63 41 184 46 47 460 
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A large portion of funds from the sample (40 percent) are shown in Table 2.3 
to possess a Large-Blend investment style. Almost all of these Large-blend funds are 
benchmarked against either the S&P/ASX 300 or the S&P/ASX 200 index. This result 
is as expected given that these two indices are considered broad market-based indices. 
As such, these indices serve as the two most popular benchmarks, from which 41 
percent and 31 percent of the 460 funds within the sample are benchmarked against, 
respectively. A substantial portion of funds that are benchmarked against these two 
broad-market indices however are classified as having either a value or growth 
investment style, suggesting that if these funds possess such style, then not all can be 
appropriately style-matched to their benchmarks. Table 2.3 additionally shows that a 
large proportion of the total sample of funds (about 40 percent) is classified as having 
some form of value or growth style. This finding is interesting given that none of their 
reported benchmark indices are considered to be of value or growth orientation. This 
result further supports the presumption that not all Australian equity funds will be 
appropriately style-matched to their benchmark indices. The analysis that follows 
seeks to identify if such fund benchmarks are in fact style-mismatched. 
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Table 2.4 Index Return Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the monthly returns of the S&P/ASX accumulation indices that serve as benchmarks for the Australian equity 
funds contained in the sample are reported in the following table along with six size/value-growth investable style indices. The sample 
period is from January 2000 to December 2011. 
         
Index Mean  Min Median Max St. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
S&P/ASX 100 0.746 -11.624 1.441 8.018 3.773 -0.753 0.605 
S&P/ASX 200 0.738 -12.605 1.563 8.007 3.83 -0.838 0.916 
S&P/ASX 200 Industrials 0.531 -11.73 1.165 9.345 3.824 -0.674 0.856 
S&P/ASX 300 0.741 -12.884 1.625 8.07 3.859 -0.856 0.992 
S&P/ASX 300 Industrial 0.525 -11.899 1.044 9.38 3.846 -0.688 0.917 
S&P/ASX 300 Resources 1.68 -20.626 1.832 15.306 5.947 -0.649 1.430 
S&P/ASX 50 0.72 -10.344 1.511 8.128 3.774 -0.637 0.211 
S&P/ASX All Ordinaries 0.749 -13.921 1.618 8.051 3.92 -0.971 1.391 
S&P/ASX Small Ordinaries 0.758 -24.811 1.753 13.519 5.421 -1.301 3.687 
S&P/ASX Small Resources 1.981 -31.756 2.222 16.684 7.537 -0.93 2.776 
Value 1.695 -21.103 2.384 18.563 5.274 -0.917 3.69 
Growth 0.468 -17.277 1.137 8.216 4.402 -1.191 2.418 
Large Value 1.754 -35.134 2.293 21.256 7.945 -0.642 2.806 
Large Growth 0.287 -15.204 1.193 13.055 4.86 -0.534 1.298 
Large Core 0.977 -16.269 1.826 14.724 4.653 -0.482 1.174 
Small Value 1.918 -22.705 2.637 21.136 5.754 -0.717 3.539 
Small Growth 0.011 -28.431 0.637 16.105 6.533 -0.901 2.814 
Small Core 1.128 -28.336 1.877 14.493 5.341 -1.602 7.150 
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2.6.b Benchmark Performance 
For a fund manager to be provided with an incentive to report an inappropriate 
benchmark, the performance difference between possible benchmarks must be 
significant. The performance of funds’ self-reported benchmark indices are therefore 
analysed in this section, along with the performance of the style-constructed indices, 
to identify potential advantages that benchmark mismatching can generate. The 
performance of these indices is examined in Table 2.5, Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 using 
raw and risk adjusted returns (Carhart alpha) to identify if holding passive portfolios 
can serve as an attractive investment strategy if benchmarked against an alternative 
index.  
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Table 2.5: Index Return Rankings 
The difference between the mean monthly raw returns for each of the S&P/ASX benchmark 
indices contained in the study sample (as well as for eight investable Australian style-
constructed size/value-growth indices) and the S&P/ASX 300 accumulation index are reported. 
The Benchmarks are sorted from highest to lowest in terms of their return difference and the 
sample period is from January 2000 to December 2011. T-statistics are displayed in 
parentheses and *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.   
        
Rank Index 
Mean 
Return 
Return Difference 
from S&P/ASX 300 
1 S&P/ASX Small Resources 1.981 1.24*** 
   (2.644) 
2 Small Value 1.918 1.178*** 
   (3.911) 
3 Large Value 1.754 1.024* 
   (1.724) 
4 Value 1.695 0.955*** 
   (3.561) 
5 S&P/ASX 300 Resources 1.680 0.94*** 
   (2.73) 
6 Small Core 1.128 0.388 
   (1.472) 
7 Large Core 0.977 0.237 
   (1.106) 
8 S&P/ASX Small Ordinaries 0.758 0.0175 
   (0.073) 
9 S&P/ASX All Ordinaries 0.749 0.008 
   (0.323) 
10 S&P/ASX 100 0.746 0.006 
   (0.246) 
11 S&P/ASX 200 0.738 -0.002 
   (-0.312) 
12 S&P/ASX 50 0.720 -0.020 
   (-0.44) 
13 S&P/ASX 200 Industrials 0.531 -0.209* 
   (-1.854) 
14 S&P/ASX 300 Industrials 0.525 -0.216* 
   (-1.931) 
15 Growth 0.468 -0.272 
   (-1.203) 
16 Large Growth 0.287 -0.454 
   (-1.453) 
17 Small Growth 0.011 -0.73* 
      (-1.862) 
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Mean monthly returns for four of the nine S&P/ASX indices and four of the 
eight style indices are reported in Table 2.5 to be significantly differ from the 
S&P/ASX 300. Index returns are compared to the S&P/ASX 300 as this is the most 
common benchmark used by Australian equity funds. The best performing index, the 
S&P/ASX Small Resources, is shown to significantly outperform the S&P/ASX 300 
at the one percent level (t-stat = 2.644) by an average of 1.24 percent per month.29 
This suggests that a passive Small-Resources fund style exposures that are 
benchmarked against the S&P/ASX 300, will achieve a benchmark-excess return of 
1.24 percent per month greater than if they were appropriately benchmarked. On the 
other hand, if funds with styles that suit the S&P/ASX 300 Industrials are 
benchmarked against the S&P/ASX 300, benchmark-excess return would be 
significantly lower, by 0.216 percent per month relative to its ‘correct’ benchmark-
excess return. These results demonstrate that benchmark-excess fund returns can vary 
substantially based on the selection of the benchmark.   
Investigating the return differences of the style-constructed indices shows that 
benchmark-excess performance can be greatly affected from the passive style 
exposures of a fund. Following a passive value style, whether it is Value, Large-Value 
or Small-Value, for example, is shown in Table 2.5 to significantly outperform the 
S&P/ASX 300. This result is further pronounced if funds were to be benchmarked 
against a passive growth benchmark given the underperformance of these indices 
relative to the S&P/ASX 300, as shown in Table 2.5. The returns of these indices 
conform with the well reported value premium, and to a lesser extent, the size 
                                                 
29 The outperformance of the S&P/ASX Industrials indices is likely a result of the mining boom, for 
which this index is largely constituted of mining-related firms. 
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premium.30 An alternative strategy would be to hold a broad-market passive portfolio 
yet be advertised as possessing an active strategy and be benchmarked against a 
passive growth index. This in turn would result in significantly positive mean 
benchmark-adjusted returns. These findings subsequently show that index selection 
can have a significant effect on the benchmark-excess return of a fund and if selected 
correctly can pose significant advantages, however if the incorrect index is reported, 
the effect on fund performance can be detrimental.  
The differences in returns of these indices are shown in Figure 2.1 below which 
illustrate the differences between the S&P/ASX Small Resources and the S&P/ASX 
300 Resources to be substantially greater than all other S&P/ASX indices across the 
sample period from January 2000 to December 2011. Passive style returns are 
illustrated below in Figure 2.2 for the style-constructed indices, where substantial 
differences between the three value indices relative to the three growth indices are 
observed across most of the sample period.31 
 
 
                                                 
30 See, for example Fama and French (1992), Davis, et al. (2000), Fama and French (2006), O’Brien, 
et al. (2010) and  Morey and O'Neal (2006) for a discussion on the value premium and Banz (1981), 
Roll (1983),  Gaunt (2004) and O’Brien, et al. (2010) on the size premium.  
31 Index prices for the six ‘alternative’ passive style-constructed indices, used in the robustness analysis, 
are displayed in Figure A.1 of Appendix A. Results are similar in that the value indices largely 
outperform the growth indices over the duration of the sample period.  
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Figure 2.1: S&P/ASX Index Prices 
Monthly prices from January 2000 to December 2011 for the S&P/ASX Accumulation indices that serve as benchmarks for the sample of Australian 
actively managed equity funds used throughout this chapter are displayed in the following chart. Each index has a base value of 100 points at the 
beginning of the period.  
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Figure 2.2: Style Index Prices 
Monthly prices from January 2000 to December 2011 for eight passively constructed investable size-value/growth equity style indices used throughout this 
chapter are displayed in the following chart. Each index has a base value of 100 points at the beginning of the period. Indices are constructed from the universe 
of the largest 300 Australian equity stocks by market capitalisation with book-to-market values of equity used to define the value/growth dimension and 
market capitalisation for the size dimension. The indices are also value-weighted and rebalanced monthly. The construction of these indices is described in 
detail in section 2.4.d.  
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Estimating Carhart four-factor regressions for the S&P/ASX indices used as 
fund benchmarks over the eleven year sample period provides an indication of the 
style exposures of these benchmarks and their risk-adjusted returns (Carhart alpha). It 
is expected that any difference in performance of the indices will be attributed to the 
difference in their style risk exposures and that the risk-adjusted returns of these 
indices will be zero. The findings presented in Table 2.6 however, reveal that half of 
the indices exhibit significant non-zero risk-adjusted returns, indicating that relative 
superior (and adverse) returns displayed by some of these indices are not entirely due 
to systematic style exposures. The S&P/ASX 300 Resources and the S&P/ASX Small 
Resources for example, display significantly positive alphas over this sample period 
(t-stat = 3.308 and 2.614, respectively). Subsequently, a manager that passively tracks 
this index may potentially be assessed as possessing active skill. Alternatively, the 
S&P/ASX 200 Industrials, S&P/ASX 300 Industrials and the S&P/ASX Small 
Ordinaries all exhibit significantly negative Carhart alphas, implying that passive 
funds that track these indices could be assessed as possessing inferior benchmark-
relative risk-adjusted returns. These preliminary findings illustrate the importance of 
being correctly benchmarked, as passively managed funds can appear to be exhibiting 
superior (or inferior) managerial skill if benchmarked against an inappropriate index. 
Ferris and Yan (2007) argue that fund performance should be evaluated relative to a 
benchmark, otherwise the value added by the manager will be either over- or 
underestimated. In this instance, the performance of funds that are mismatched to 
either the S&P/ASX 300 Resources or S&P/ASX Small Resources indices will be 
underestimated given the positive abnormal returns exhibited by these benchmarks.32 
                                                 
32 A possible explanation as to why these indices are exhibiting a non-zero alpha is argued by Cremers, 
et al. (2012) to be the result of an inappropriate method used to construct the Carhart (1997) factor 
portfolios used in the four-factor regression. This is considered to be the result of the disproportionate 
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Consequently, a proportion of the abnormal performance generated by these funds will 
simply be attributed to the abnormal return achieved by the passive style of the fund. 
These findings illustrate the importance of assigning appropriate benchmarks to funds 
and using benchmark-relative performance metrics in the evaluation process.  
It is widely acknowledged that alpha (from the Carhart (1997) 4-factor model) 
indicates manager skill, or ‘abnormal’ return. As such, if a portfolio, or in the case of 
table 2.6 and 2.7, a passive index, is estimated as having a significantly positive alpha, 
then it  would be widely accepted, prima facie, that this portfolio has exhibited 
abnormal return. Nevertheless, by definition, passive indices should have zero 
abnormal return. Consequently, any non-zero abnormal return, exhibited by these 
indices should only result due to a “bad model.” However, given that the Carhart 
(1997) model has been widely accepted in the literature and by practitioners [see, for 
example Demir, et al. (2004), Durand, et al. (2006), Gaunt and Gray (2003), Hurn and 
Pavlov (2003) and Brailsford and O'Brien (2008)], then such abnormal returns (alpha) 
generated by this “Bad” model may very well be “misinterpreted as a sign of skill.”
                                                 
weight the that the Fama-French factors place on small value stocks which have performed well, and 
from the value-weighted market index which is a downward-biased benchmark for U.S. stocks. 
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Table 2.6: Four-Factor S&P/ASX Index Exposures 
Carhart (1997) four-factor regressions are estimated for the S&P/ASX accumulation indices that are reported as benchmarks by the mangers of Australian 
actively managed equity funds that are contained in the sample used throughout this chapter. The regressions are estimated using monthly returns over the 
period from January 2000 to December 2011. The dependant variables are the excess-return of the respected indices over the risk-free rate. The Carhart (1997) 
regressions identify index risk-adjusted returns (alpha) and exposures towards the market-risk premium (Rm-Rf), the value factor (HML), the size factor (SMB) 
and the momentum factor (UMD). The market return is the return on the SIRCA SPPR value-weighted Australian share index.  Regressions are estimated with 
robust standard errors. T-statistics are displayed in parentheses and *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.   
                      
VARIABLES 
S&P/ASX 
50  
S&P/ASX 
100  
S&P/ASX 
200  
S&P/ASX 
300  
S&P/ASX 
All 
Ordinaries 
S&P/ASX 
200 
Industrials 
S&P/ASX 
300 
Industrials  
S&P/ASX 
300 
Resources  
S&P/ASX 
Small 
Ordinaries 
S&P/ASX 
Small 
Resources  
Alpha 0.0544 0.0456 0.0115 0.00692 0.00321 -0.261** -0.274** 1.097*** -0.298* 1.074** 
 (0.631) (0.696) (0.200) (0.124) (0.061) (-2.004) (-2.124) (3.308) (-1.779) (2.614) 
Rm-rf 0.988*** 1.001*** 1.020*** 1.026*** 1.036*** 0.983*** 0.990*** 1.163*** 1.261*** 1.424*** 
 (40.836) (56.947) (65.968) (68.576) (73.893) (28.210) (28.631) (13.102) (28.023) (12.903) 
SMB -0.0842*** -0.0657*** -0.0484*** -0.0395*** -0.0149 -0.0503** -0.0431* -0.0191 0.234*** 0.233*** 
 (-5.166) (-5.614) (-4.615) (-3.895) (-1.601) (-2.127) (-1.839) (-0.317) (7.815) (3.169) 
HML -0.0704** -0.0322 -0.0152 -0.0142 -0.0207 0.173*** 0.177*** -0.459*** 0.166*** -0.349** 
 (-2.219) (-1.339) (-0.717) (-0.692) (-1.078) (3.619) (3.734) (-3.763) (2.701) (-2.314) 
UMD 0.0165 0.00372 0.00249 0.00223 -0.00972 0.0255 0.0259 -0.0971 -0.0450 -0.316** 
 (0.470) (0.172) (0.124) (0.115) (-0.564) (0.562) (0.577) (-0.840) (-0.813) (-2.330) 
Observations 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 
R-squared 0.944 0.965 0.974 0.976 0.980 0.870 0.874 0.648 0.889 0.659 
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Considering the style exposures of these passive indices, if a manager is able 
to predict which investment styles will underperform, then selecting a benchmark with 
a corresponding style exposure is likely to improve benchmark-relative performance. 
The style characteristics of the ten S&P/ASX indices used as benchmarks by the 
sample of funds are subsequently identified from the factor loading estimated from the 
Carhart (1997) four-factor regressions reported in Table 2.6. The size exposures 
(represented by the SMB coefficient) are as expected, i.e., this coefficient for 
S&P/ASX 50 is significantly negative at the one percent level (t-stat = -5.166) 
Expressing its exposure to large cap stocks, whereas the coefficient of this factor for 
the S&P/ASX Small Ordinaries index is significantly positive at the one percent level 
(t-stat = 7.815), consistent with its exposure to small market capitalisation stocks. The 
exposures of these indices to the value (HML) factor, on the other hand, reveal 
somewhat more interesting results. Despite not specifically recognising value (or 
growth) dimensions, six of the ten S&P/ASX indices demonstrate significant 
exposures to either value or growth stocks instead of possessing a form of ‘blend’ style  
orientation. Specifically, the industrials indices and the S&P/ASX Small Ordinaries 
have significant exposure to value stocks as recognised from their significantly 
positive HML coefficients, whilst the resources and S&P/ASX50 indices are shown to 
have significant growth orientations, as illustrated by their significantly negative 
coefficients from the HML factor. These findings suggest that the publicly available 
S&P/ASX indices, from which funds are benchmarked against, have considerable 
exposure to typical value-growth/size style dimensions, hence potentially providing 
sufficient opportunity for style-orientated funds to be appropriately benchmarked 
against.  
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Table 2.7: Four-Factor Style Index Exposures 
Carhart (1997) four-factor regressions are estimated for each of the eight passively-constructed investable size-value/growth equity style 
indices that are used in the analysis throughout this chapter. The regressions are estimated using monthly returns over the period from 
January 2000 to December 2011. The dependant variables are the excess-return of the respected indices over the risk-free rate. The Carhart 
(1997) regressions identify index risk-adjusted returns (alpha) and exposures towards the market-risk premium (Rm-Rf), the value factor 
(HML), the size factor (SMB) and the momentum factor (UMD). Construction of these style indices are described in detail in section 2.4.d. 
Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors. T-statistics are displayed in parentheses and *, **, and *** denote significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.   
                  
VARIABLES Growth Value  
Large 
Value 
Large 
Growth 
Small 
Value 
Small 
Growth Large Core Small Core 
Alpha -0.233 0.710*** 0.771 -0.164 0.754*** -1.134*** 0.259 0.0921 
 (-1.044) (2.863) (1.303) (-0.558) (3.379) (-4.123) (1.167) (0.476) 
Rm-rf 0.954*** 1.251*** 1.247*** 0.880*** 1.277*** 1.206*** 1.088*** 1.190*** 
 (13.492) (18.779) (7.866) (11.142) (21.314) (16.329) (18.230) (22.900) 
SMB 0.0641* 0.0335 -0.0424 -0.0335 0.302*** 0.479*** -0.174*** 0.265*** 
 (1.828) (0.756) (-0.399) (-0.638) (7.584) (9.742) (-4.393) (7.662) 
HML -0.130 0.300*** 0.0239 -0.423*** 0.434*** 0.0921 -0.108 0.197*** 
 (-1.542) (3.297) (0.110) (-3.912) (5.292) (0.912) (-1.318) (2.766) 
UMD 0.127 -0.197** -0.205 -0.0341 -0.176** 0.0624 0.0406 -0.192*** 
 (1.287) (-2.405) (-1.049) (-0.351) (-2.391) (0.686) (0.552) (-2.997) 
Observations 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 
R-squared 0.752 0.753 0.351 0.577 0.828 0.793 0.741 0.849 
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Similar to the Carhart regression estimated for the S&P/ASX indices in Table 
2.6, not all of the passive investable style indices are found to exhibit zero risk-
adjusted return. The Value and Small-Value indices are found to produce positive 
Carhart alphas of 0.710 percent and 0.754 percent per month, respectively, over the 
sample period. These returns are significant at the one percent level (t-stat = 2.863 and 
3.379, respectively) which suggest that holding a passive portfolio that mimic such 
styles will appear to be managed more skilfully than other Australian passive style 
portfolios such as a Small-Growth or Large-Growth portfolio. The exposure of the 
style indices to size and Value/Growth characteristics, as indicated by the SMB and 
HML coefficients on the Carhart (1997) factors in Table 2.7 are somewhat consistent 
with their expressed investment styles. The Small-Value and Small-Growth indices for 
example, are the only style benchmarks that have significant exposure to small market 
capitalisation stocks (as expressed by their significantly negative SMB factor loadings). 
The Value and Large-Value indices exhibit positive exposures to the HML factor at 
the one percent significance level and the Small-Value index at the five percent 
significance level. The Large-Growth index is the only index with exposure to growth 
stocks according to its significantly negative HML factor exposure (t-stat = -3.912). 
Similar to the S&P/ASX indices, none of the style indices exhibit significant exposure 
to momentum stocks, as illustrated from the statistically insignificant coefficients on 
the UMD factor. The Carhart (1997) factor exposures of these style indices indicate 
that they may provide a closer match for funds with corresponding style objectives 
compared to the ‘broad-market’ based S&P/ASX indices previously discussed.33 
                                                 
33 Carhart (1997) four-factor regressions results, estimated for the six ‘alternative’ passively-
constructed investable size-value/growth style equity indices, are reported in Table A.3 in 
Appendix A. Results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 2.7.  
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Preliminary results from this chapter have so far revealed that benchmark-
excess returns can vary significantly for a fund based on the selected benchmark and 
that a fund can appear to perform substantially better (or worse) relative to its 
benchmark in terms of both raw and risk-adjusted benchmark-excess returns if the 
incorrect index is selected.  
2.6.c Benchmark Mismatching 
Whilst it can be advantageous for managers to report an inappropriate 
benchmark, in that if selected wisely, a fund will appear substantially more attractive 
when evaluated alongside its benchmark. The following set of analysis examines 
whether funds are in fact style-mismatched from their self-reported benchmark indices, 
and upon which indices these ‘mismatched’ funds should be appropriately 
benchmarked against. Differences in the tracking error volatility between ‘benchmark-
mismatched’ and ‘appropriately-matched’ funds are also examined, along with 
benchmark-relative style exposures of the mismatched funds to identify the style 
characteristics upon which these funds are most commonly mismatched. The 
characteristics of funds that are likely to affect the probability of having a mismatched 
benchmark is then lastly explored in the following set of analysis.  
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Table 2.8: Fund Benchmark Mismatches  
The quantity of Australian equity funds that are mismatched from each self-reported benchmark index, at 10%, 5%, and 1% significant levels are reported in 
the following table. Funds are considered mismatched from their self-reported benchmarks if the tracking-error volatility with respect to their self-reported 
benchmark is significantly greater than the tracking-error volatility relative to their best-suited index, as determined from a Levene (1960) test for homogeneity 
of variances. This table also reports the quantity of mismatched funds and the benchmark indices to which these funds are best suited to, at each respected level 
of mismatch significance.    
                                  
10% Significance Mismatched  5% Significance Mismatched  1% Significance Mismatched 
Original 
Benchmark 
No. 
Funds  
Revised 
Benchmark 
No. 
Funds  
Original 
Benchmark 
No. 
Funds  
Revised 
Benchmark 
No. 
Funds  
Original 
Benchmark 
No. 
Funds  
Revised 
Benchmark 
No. 
Funds 
ASX 50 3  ASX50 1  ASX 50 3  ASX All Ords 1  ASX50 2  ASX 300 Ind. 3 
ASX All Ords 
2  
ASX All Ords 
1  
ASX All Ords 
1  
ASX 100 
1  
ASX200 
4  
ASX Small 
Ind. 1 
ASX 100 
2  
ASX20 
1  
ASX200 
7  
ASX 300 Ind. 
9  
ASX300 
1  
ASX Small 
Ords 3 
ASX 200 
10  
ASX100 
1  
ASX300 
4  
ASX Midcap 
50 1       
ASX 300 
5  
ASX300 Ind. 
11  
Small Ords 
5  
ASX Small 
Ind. 4       
ASX Small 
Ords 5  
Midcap50 
1     
ASX Small 
Ords 3       
   
ASX Small 
Ind. 5     
ASX 100 
Indus. 1       
   
ASX Small 
Ords 4             
      ASX 100 Ind. 2                         
Total 27   27   20   20   7   7 
  5.6%     5.6%     4.2%     4.2%     1.5%     1.5% 
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Using a Levene (1960) test for homogeneity of variances amongst benchmark-
relative tracking error volatilities to identify funds that are ‘mismatched’ from their 
self-reported benchmark indices, Table 2.8 shows that 27 (5.6 percent) of the 460 
funds within the sample are considered mismatched from their benchmark at a ten 
percent significance level. The proportion of funds shown to be mismatched funds at 
the five percent and one percent  significance levels is even less, accounting for 20 
(4.2 percent) and seven (1.5 percent) of funds, respectively. These proportions are 
surprisingly small, considering the relatively large number of funds that subscribe to 
a specific style dimension yet are benchmarked against broad-market based indices 
(as shown in Table 2.3). Furthermore, all of the revised benchmarks (the indices for 
which the benchmark-mismatched funds are found to be best-suited to) are S&P/ASX 
indices, and none being the passively constructed value-growth/size style indices. This 
result is evident across all levels of mismatch significance. Furthermore, of the 27 
funds with benchmarks that are mismatched at the ten percent significance level, 
eleven are classified as being wholesale and the other 16 as retail funds. Similar 
proportions of wholesale and retail funds are also mismatched at the five and one 
percent significant levels. Specifically, nine of the 20 funds mismatched at the five 
percent level and three of the seven funds mismatched at the one percent level are 
wholesale. Given that approximately a third of the sample (157 funds) consist of 
wholesale funds, with the other two thirds (307 funds) being retail, wholesale 
managers are therefore almost twice as likely to have reported a mismatched 
benchmark compared to retail managers.    
This finding suggests that either these mismatched funds do not actually 
possess such style characteristics as described from their investment objectives, or 
alternatively, the style dimensions exhibited by the S&P/ASX indices are able to 
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sufficiently capture the style exposures of these funds.34 Nevertheless, these results 
demonstrate that style-specific indices are not necessarily required within the 
Australian funds market for benchmarking purposes.  
The next set of analysis undertaken in this section examines the tracking error 
volatility (TE) of funds to identify how the returns of mismatched funds deviate from 
their benchmark, relative to those that are considered ‘appropriately matched’. The TE 
of benchmark-mismatched funds with ‘revised’ benchmarks (i.e., mismatched funds 
whose benchmarks are respecified to the best-fit index) is also investigated.   
  
 
   
 
                                                 
34 Benchmark-relative style characteristics of funds are further investigated later in this chapter to 
identify the style dimensions upon which these funds are mismatched. 
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Table 2.9: Tracking Error Volatility Differences 
Mean tracking-error volatilities (TE) of funds with appropriate benchmarks, mismatched benchmarks and revised benchmarks, 
calculated from a sample of Australian actively managed equity funds over the period from January 2000 to December 2011 are 
reported in the following table. TE is measured at the fund-level over previous 24-month rolling windows. A fund’s benchmark 
is considered appropriate, mismatched or revised, at 10%, 5% and 1% significant levels as determined from a Levene (1960) 
test for homogeneity of variance on tracking error volatilities. The Differences in mean tracking-error volatilities between these 
groups of funds are also measured. T-statistics are displayed in parentheses and *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
                 
    Mean TE  Mean TE Difference 
Mismatch 
Significance   
Funds with 
Appropriate 
Benchmarks 
Funds with 
Revised 
Benchmarks 
Funds with 
Mismatched 
Benchmarks  
Appropriate - 
Mismatched 
Mismatched - 
Revised 
Appropriate - 
Revised 
10%  1.499 1.908 2.588  -1.089*** 0.68*** -0.409* 
      (-4.806) (9.373) (-1.82) 
5%  1.525 1.731 2.414  -0.889*** 0.683*** -0.21 
      (-3.364) (7.714) (-0.783) 
1%  1.550 1.521 2.416  -0.865* 0.895*** 0.029 
            (-1.949) (4.569) (0.066) 
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The average TE of funds with appropriately-matched benchmarks is shown in 
Table 2.9 to be significantly lower than the TE of mismatched funds across all levels 
of mismatch significance. This initially indicates that the returns of mismatched funds 
deviate significantly more from their benchmarks compared to funds with 
appropriately matched benchmarks, suggesting that mismatched funds, prima facie, 
are managed more actively. However, as expected, the average TE of funds drop 
significantly after the benchmarks of mismatched funds are revised to their best-suited 
indices such that average TE is almost indifferent to the TE of funds with 
appropriately-matched benchmarks. Subsequently, the apparent heightened activeness 
of mismatched funds can be almost entirely attributed to these funds having reported 
a mismatched benchmark.  
   The following set of analyses examines the specific style characteristics upon 
which funds deviate from their benchmarks and identify if benchmark-mismatched 
funds benefit from exploiting specific style premiums. The four Carhart (1997) factors 
are used as investment style characteristics such that benchmark-excess four-factor 
regressions, estimated at the fund level from the model described in equation 2.9, is 
able to determine the extent to which benchmarks are able to capture the style 
characteristics of their funds. The regression results are reported in Table 2.10.  
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Table 2.10: Benchmark-Excess Four-Factor Fund Exposures 
 
This table reports the number and percentage of funds with appropriate, mismatched and revised benchmarks that exhibit significantly positive, negative and 
zero coefficients from the factors of a benchmark-excess Carhart (1997) four-factor regressions, given by the equation; 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑏,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1,𝑖(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓)𝑡 +
𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑈𝑀𝐷,𝑖𝑈𝑀𝐷4 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. Factor loadings are considered different from zero at a five percent significance level. A fund’s benchmark 
is determined as being either appropriate or  mismatched using a Levene (1960) test for homogeneity of variance upon fund tracking-error volatility. Regressions 
are estimated at the fund-level using monthly returns over the period from January 2000 to December 2011 for a sample of Australian actively managed equity 
funds. Factor loadings that are significantly greater than zero indicates that a fund is overexposed to the respect factor relative to its respected benchmark, 
whereas a factor loadings significantly less than zero is considered relatively underexposed. The intercept term, 𝛼𝑖, is a fund’s benchmark-excess risk-adjusted 
return. 
                                    
  Benchmark-appropriate Funds   Benchmark-mismatched Funds   Funds with Revised Benchmarks 
Factor 
No. 
Funds 
% 
Funds 
Mean 
Factor 
Loading 
Mean 
T-stat 
Mean 
P-value     
No. 
Funds 
% 
Funds 
Mean 
Factor 
Loading 
Mean 
T-stat 
Mean 
P-value     
No. 
Funds 
% 
Funds 
Mean 
Factor 
Loading 
Mean 
T-stat 
Mean 
P-
value   
α < 0 39 9.0% -0.281 -2.691 0.016   0 0.0% 0.000 0.000 0.000   0 0.0% 0.000 0.000 0.000 
α = 0 375 86.6% -0.012 -0.120 0.483   26 96.3% 0.006 -0.068 0.621   27 100% 0.142 0.555 0.447 
α > 0 19 4.4% 0.630 3.027 0.018   1 3.7% 1.074 2.788 0.039   0 0.0% 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 βRm-rf < 0 156 36.0% -0.143 -3.912 0.009   15 55.6% -0.203 -3.185 0.010   10 37.0% -0.131 -2.882 0.014 
 βRm-rf =0 241 55.7% -0.008 -0.208 0.408   6 22.2% -0.021 -0.472 0.540   15 55.6% -0.038 -0.500 0.453 
 βRm-rf > 0 36 8.3% 0.604 9.747 0.008   6 22.2% 0.431 8.015 0.006   2 7.4% 0.636 7.925 0.000 
 βSMB < 0 6 1.4% -0.139 -3.654 0.029   1 3.7% -0.257 -4.045 0.010   1 3.7% -0.256 -3.152 0.003 
 βSMB =0 375 86.6% 0.016 0.333 0.517   21 77.8% 0.048 0.665 0.386   20 74.1% 0.019 0.472 0.354 
 βSMB > 0 52 12.0% 0.136 2.853 0.019   5 18.5% 0.291 4.384 0.007   6 22.2% 0.182 2.766 0.021 
 βHML < 0 66 15.2% -0.164 -3.254 0.011   1 3.7% -0.181 -2.908 0.033   6 22.2% -0.177 -2.942 0.006 
 βHML =0 279 64.4% 0.006 0.008 0.460   12 44.4% 0.124 1.045 0.315   20 74.1% 0.045 0.363 0.560 
 βHML > 0 88 20.3% 0.191 2.842 0.015   14 51.9% 0.319 3.155 0.011   1 3.7% 0.093 2.405 0.018 
 βUMD < 0 4 0.9% -0.304 -2.420 0.024   0 0.0% 0.000 0.000 0.000   0 0.0% 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 βUMD =0 413 95.4% 0.013 0.324 0.496   26 96.3% -0.007 -0.088 0.469   24 88.9% 0.038 0.354 0.603 
 βUMD > 0 16 3.7% 0.114 2.501 0.018   1 3.7% 0.302 2.098 0.039   3 11.1% 0.256 2.460 0.028 
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From the sample of 460 Australian actively managed equity funds, Table 2.10 
shows that a large proportion are exposed to one or more style characteristics that are 
not adequately captured by their self-reported benchmark. This is most evident for the 
market sensitivity (βRm-rf) of funds, with 8.3 percent (36 percent) of benchmark-
appropriate funds being significantly over (under) exposed to the market than that of 
their benchmark. In terms of the size characteristics of these funds, 1.4 percent (12 
percent) are significantly overexposed to large (small) capitalisation stocks relative to 
their benchmark, whereas 20.3 percent (15.2 percent) of these funds exhibit value 
(growth) style exposures that are unable to be captured by their benchmark. These 
results suggest that only a relatively small proportion of fund managers take advantage 
of the value or size premium that was observed in section 2.6.b, by actively tilting 
portfolio exposures towards small or value stocks in an attempt to achieve superior 
benchmark-relative performance. Table 2.10 also shows that 0.9 percent (3.7 percent) 
of benchmark-appropriate funds are found to be significantly overexposed to past 
winner (loser) stocks according to the average loading on the UMD factor relative to 
their benchmarks, indicating that it is uncommon for a manager to apply a momentum 
trading strategy in an attempt to outperform their benchmark.  
 The above results differ only marginally for benchmark-mismatched funds, 
with the exception of market sensitivity, whereby a substantially higher proportion (56 
percent) of funds are shown as having significantly less market exposure relative to 
their benchmark. Furthermore, 22.2 percent of these mismatched funds are also 
significantly more sensitive to the market than their self-reported benchmark. 
Similarly, a larger proportion of mismatched funds (52 percent) are found to be 
overexposed to value stocks relative to their benchmark. The difference in the 
proportion of mismatched and appropriately matched funds with momentum and size 
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characteristics that significantly differ from their self-reported benchmarks is also 
negligible. This finding suggests that the majority of funds with mismatched 
benchmarks do not attempt to strategically outperform their benchmarks by taking 
advantage of style characteristics that are not captured by their benchmark indices. 
Furthermore, after revising the benchmark of the mismatched funds to their ‘best-fit’ 
index, the differences in style-characteristic exposures largely disappear, however, 
slightly more of these mismatched funds become over-exposed to small capitalisation 
stocks, value stocks and momentum stocks relative to their ‘best-fit’ benchmark.  
Examination of the benchmark-adjusted Carhart alpha of funds with 
appropriately-matched benchmarks shows that only 4.4 percent (nine percent) of funds 
produce abnormal returns above (below) their benchmarks, compared to 3.7 percent 
(four percent) of funds with mismatched benchmarks. This implies that benchmark-
mismatched funds on average are slightly less successful than appropriately-matched 
funds at outperforming their benchmarks on a risk-adjusted basis. Consequently, any 
evidence that suggests that managers are able to consistently outperform their 
benchmarks may simply be a result of their portfolios being over exposed to systematic 
risk factors that are not captured by their benchmark indices.  The effect and extent to 
which specific characteristics have on the probability of a fund having a mismatched 
benchmark is next examined using the probit regression models described in equation 
2.13, with results reported in Table 2.11.  
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Table 2.11: Determinants of Benchmark-Mismatched Funds 
Probit regressions that describe the probability of a fund having a mismatched benchmark 
index are estimated in the following table. The dependant variable is a binomial variable which 
takes the value of one if a fund has a mismatched benchmark, or zero otherwise. A Levene 
(1960) test for homogeneity of variance of fund tracking-error volatilities is used to identify 
whether funds are appropriately matched or mismatched to their self-reported benchmarks at 
ten percent, five percent or one percent significance levels. The explanatory variables include; 
A wholesale dummy, Wholesalei, which takes on the value of one if fund i is classified as a 
wholesale fund or zero if it is a retail fund, the natural log of a fund’s total net assets, Sizei,t-1, 
the natural log of the number of months since fund i’s inception date, Aget-1, Style dummies 
are represent large value, mid/small value, large growth, mid/small growth, large blend and 
mid/small blend investment styles, respectively as classified by Morningstar. All regressions 
are estimated using monthly data from January 2000 to December 2011 for a sample of 
Australian actively managed equity funds. Z-statistics are displayed in parentheses and *, ** 
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
        
VARIABLES 
Benchmark-
mismatched  
(at 10% significance 
level) 
Benchmark-
mismatched  
(at 5% significance 
level) 
Benchmark-
mismatched  
(at 1% significance 
level) 
Constant -0.858*** -1.295*** -3.971*** 
 (-7.018) (-9.710) (-16.411) 
Wholesale  0.893*** 0.751*** 0.642*** 
 (24.978) (19.595) (16.450) 
Size -0.0824*** -0.0729*** 0.0930*** 
 (-11.231) (-8.860) (7.505) 
Age 0.0969*** 0.169*** -0.0238 
 (4.781) (7.305) (-0.783) 
Expense Ratio 0.440*** 0.364*** 0.0410** 
 (23.437) (18.820) (2.454) 
Mid/Small Value Style 0.873*** 0.995*** 1.556*** 
 (15.928) (18.521) (25.909) 
Large-Blend Style -1.279*** -1.268*** -0.668*** 
 (-35.015) (-30.744) (-12.648) 
Mid/Small-Blend Style -0.589*** -0.386*** -0.158*** 
 (-15.423) (-10.599) (-2.847) 
Other Style -1.432***   
 (-29.032)   
Observations 28,142 25,206 25,206 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2458 0.248 0.2707 
    
 
Identifying the characteristics of funds with mismatched benchmarks from the 
probit regression estimates reported in Table 2.11 shows that smaller, older, more 
expensive, wholesale funds with a mid/small value style tilt are observed as being 
more likely to report a benchmark index that is mismatched at the ten percent or five 
percent significant levels. Funds with a Large-blend style, Mid/small blend, or ‘Other’ 
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style tilt on the other hand are more likely to be appropriately matched to their 
benchmarks as indicated by the statistically significant coefficients on the respective 
factors from these probit regression estimates. Similar results are also found for fund’s 
that report benchmarks that are considered mismatched at the one percent significance 
level, except for the fund size, which is found to inversely relate to probability of a 
fund reporting a benchmark that is mismatched. Observing the style objectives of these 
funds reveal Large-blend, Mid/Small-blend or ‘Other-styles’ are the only style 
objectives that describe whether funds have mismatched benchmarks (mismatched at 
the 10 percent significance level). The Large-Value, Mid/Small Value, Large-Growth 
and Mid/Small-Growth style objectives on the other hand are shown to have 
insignificant explanatory power when determining if a fund has a mismatched 
benchmark.  
2.6.d Performance of Benchmark Mismatched Funds 
The following analysis examines whether managers who are observed as 
reporting a mismatched benchmark are successful at exploiting these performance 
differences by reporting underperforming benchmarks. Monthly average returns and 
benchmark-excess returns of funds with mismatched and appropriately-matched 
benchmarks are examined in Table 2.12  to identify any differences that may exist 
between these groups of funds. Multivariate regressions results are then reported in 
Table 2.13 which more formally identifies how benchmark-mismatching affects fund 
performance after controlling for common factors that are shown to influence fund 
performance.    
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Table 2.12 Appropriately Matched and Mismatched Return Comparisons   
The difference in mean monthly raw returns and benchmark-excess returns of funds with 
appropriately matched self-reported benchmarks, mismatched self-reported benchmarks and 
funds, whose mismatched benchmarks have been respecified to their best-suited benchmarks, 
are reported in the following table. Funds are considered mismatched from their benchmark 
at a five percent significance level as determined from a Levene (1960) test for homogeneity 
of variance on fund-benchmark tracking-error volatilities. Mean returns are calculated at the 
fund level from January 2000 to December 2011 for a sample of actively managed Australian 
equity funds. T-statistics are displayed in parentheses and *, **, and *** denote significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
          
  
Appropriately-
matched Funds 
Mismatched 
Funds 
Revised-
Benchmark 
Funds Difference 
Mean Raw Return 0.803 0.720  0.083 
    (0.579) 
Mean Benchmark-
excess Return 0.022 0.036  -0.014 
    (-0.205) 
 0.022  0.199 -0.176*** 
    (-3.387) 
  0.036 0.199 -0.163*** 
        (-3.083) 
 
The difference in average raw returns between appropriately-matched and 
mismatched benchmarked funds is shown in Table 2.12 to be statistically insignificant, 
suggesting that any difference in benchmark-excess return between these two types of 
funds is a result of their benchmarks and not a consequence of the inherent 
characteristics of the underlying funds. Monthly average benchmark-excess returns of 
mismatched and appropriately-matched funds are shown to be insignificantly different 
from one another, implying that managers with mismatched benchmarks do not (or 
are unable to) enhance the appearance of fund performance through the allocation of 
an underperforming ‘inappropriate’ benchmark.    
Revising the benchmarks of the mismatched funds to their ‘best-suited’ indices 
results in their benchmark-excess returns increasing by an average of 0.163 percent 
per month. This difference is statistically significant at the one per cent level (t-stat = 
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3.083), indicating that the performance of benchmark mismatched funds-funds, in 
terms of their benchmark-excess returns, is worse when benchmarked against their 
self-reported ‘mismatched’ index. Furthermore, once these benchmarks are revised, 
mismatched funds are shown to achieve benchmark-excess returns of 0.176 percent 
per month greater than the average appropriately-matched fund. This return difference 
is also statistically significantly at the one percent level (t-stat = -3.387). Consequently, 
by reporting a mismatched benchmark, managers are effectively placing themselves 
at a disadvantage in terms of their benchmark-excess returns than if they were to report 
their best-suited index as a benchmark. 
To more formally examine the effect that benchmark-mismatching has on fund 
performance, multivariate regressions, estimated from equation 2.14, using various 
fund performance metrics are conducted. The regression results are reported in Table 
2.13. The relationship between benchmark-mismatching an fund performance is 
identified in these regressions from the Mismatch dummy variable, which takes on a 
value of one if a fund is considered mismatched from its benchmark (at a ten percent 
significance level), or zero otherwise.35    
                                                 
35  Fund performance regressions applying mismatch dummy variables that consider funds to be 
mismatched from their benchmarks at one and five percent significant levels are reported in Table A.4 
in Appendix A. Results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 2.13.    
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Table 2.13: Fund Performance and Benchmark Mismatching 
The relationship between fund performance and benchmark mismatching are estimated using 
monthly panel data from January 2000 to December 2011 for a sample of Australian actively 
managed equity funds. The dependent fund performance variables include; Benchmark-excess 
returns, ri-rb, excess returns, ri-rf, CAPM Alpha and Carhart alpha. The explanatory variables 
include a binomial Mismatch variable which takes a value of one if a fund is considered 
mismatched from its benchmark (at a ten percent significance level as determined from a 
Levene (1960) test for homogeneity of variance on fund-benchmark tracking-error volatilities), 
or zero otherwise. A binomial wholesale variable that takes a value of one if a fund is classified 
as a wholesale fund, or zero for a retail fund is also included. A mismatch-wholesale 
interaction variable is additionally included. A vector of control variables which comprise of; 
the natural log of a fund’s total net assets, Size, the natural log of the number of months since 
a fund’s inception date, Age, return Volatility (measured as the historical standard deviation 
of monthly raw returns over the previous 12 months), lag flow of assets under management, 
Lag Flow, and the Net flow of assets under management into all funds with the same 
investment style, Net Style Flows, are contained in the regressions. All control variables are 
lagged one-month and regressions are estimated with time-fixed effects (month dummies) and 
style-fixed effects (style dummies). Robust standard errors are clustered at the fund level and 
t-statistics are displayed in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
          
 ri-rb ri-rf CAPM Alpha 
Carhart 
Alpha 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -0.657*** -1.599*** -0.283* -0.414*** 
 (-2.709) (-5.693) (-1.934) (-2.899) 
Mismatch -0.142 -0.185* -0.0557 0.0225 
 (-1.306) (-1.750) (-1.185) (0.345) 
Wholesale  0.0762*** 0.0764*** 0.0602*** 0.0658*** 
 (3.041) (2.823) (2.691) (2.834) 
Mismatch*Wholesale 0.207 0.282** 0.169* 0.107 
 (1.334) (1.969) (1.750) (0.875) 
Size -0.0227*** -0.0230*** -0.00295 0.00331 
 (-2.817) (-2.601) (-0.542) (0.604) 
Age 0.0455** 0.0348 0.0514** 0.0262 
 (1.973) (1.405) (2.489) (1.231) 
Volatility 0.130*** 0.128*** -0.00906 0.0124 
 (4.395) (4.153) (-0.496) (0.741) 
Lag Flow 0.00491 0.00457 0.0178*** 0.0169*** 
 (1.423) (1.112) (6.245) (6.287) 
Net Style Flow 0.101*** 0.00955 0.0210*** 0.0111* 
 (4.291) (0.419) (2.662) (1.664) 
Style Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time-fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15,824 15,824 12,468 12,468 
R-squared 0.081 0.867 0.284 0.217 
    
 The regression results presented in Table 2.13 show that reporting a 
mismatched benchmark has mostly a negligible effect on the performance of both 
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wholesale and retail funds. This result is illustrated, for retail funds (with the exception 
of the excess-returns performance regression) by the statistically insignificant 
coefficients on the Mismatch dummy variable. Similar results are observed for 
wholesale funds, as demonstrated from the statistically insignificant coefficients from 
the linear combination of the Mismatch dummy and Mismatch*Wholesale interaction 
variables, which are insignificant at the ten percent level (t-stats = 0.56, 0.91, 1.29 and 
1.20) for benchmark-excess returns, excess-returns, CAPM alpha and Carhart alpha 
performance regressions, respectively. Retail funds with mismatched benchmarks, on 
the other hand, are shown to produce excess returns that are on average 0.185 percent 
per month less than funds that are considered appropriately matched to their 
benchmarks. This result is significant at the ten per cent level (t-stat = -1.750), 
suggesting that retail managers with mismatched benchmarks perform worse than 
managers of appropriate-matched funds. This performance difference, however, 
disappears after returns are risk-adjusted, as shown by the insignificant coefficients on 
the Mismatch dummy from regressions three and four. These results further confirm 
that managers who report inappropriate benchmarks fail to select indices that 
underperform and hence are unsuccessful at enhancing benchmark-excess 
performance. The results also show that the performance ability of managers who 
report mismatched benchmarks is largely indifferent from funds with appropriately-
matched benchmarks.  
2.6.e Flow-Performance of Benchmark Mismatched Fund 
The final component of analysis undertaken in this chapter investigates how 
benchmark mismatching affects investor decisions to allocate assets across funds, and 
subsequently identifies if managers are able to benefit (through increased fund flows) 
from reporting a mismatched benchmark. The findings from this chapter have so far 
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revealed that benchmark-mismatched managers do not select indices that 
underperform and that they are unable to outperform relative to benchmark-
appropriate funds. Consequently, it is expected that benchmark-mismatched funds 
should not rationally attract excess flows. Preliminary examination reveals that the 
average flow to funds with mismatched benchmarks is 0.254 percent of assets under 
management per month compared to 0.037 percent for funds with appropriate 
benchmarks. This difference is statistically significant at the five percent level (t-stat 
= 2.526).36 This flow difference is largely attributed to wholesale funds, which exhibit 
a difference of 0.327 percent per month between mismatched and appropriately 
matched benchmarks, significant at the five percent level (t-stat = 2.260). The 
difference in mean flows between mismatched retail funds and appropriately matched 
retail funds on the other hand is 0.144 percent per month and is statistically 
insignificant at the ten percent level (t-stat = 1.342). These finding initially suggests 
that wholesale funds that have mismatched benchmarks are successful at attracting 
relatively more investor funds. Retail-investor flows however are indifferent to the 
appropriateness of the benchmark. The following analysis more formally examines if 
benchmark-mismatched funds attract greater fund flows by estimating multivariate 
flow-performance regressions that control for common fund flow factors, as described 
in equations 2.15 and 2.16.  
  
                                                 
36 Funds are considered mismatched at the 10% level. The difference in mean flow between mismatched 
and appropriate funds is also statistically significant when funds are considered mismatched at the five 
percent level (t-stat = 2.00). 
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Table 2.14: Fund Flows and Benchmark Mismatching 
 
Regressions that describe the relationship between fund benchmark mismatching and flows are 
estimated in the following table using monthly panel data for a sample of Australian actively 
managed equity funds over the period from January 2000 to December 2011. The dependent 
variable is fund-level percentage flow of assets under management, Flow. The explanatory 
variables are fund-level include a binomial benchmark mismatching variable, Mismatch, as well 
as a wholesale-mismatch interaction variable, Mismatch*Wholesale. The mismatch dummy takes 
on a value of one if the fund is mismatched from its self-reported benchmark, or zero otherwise. 
Wholesale, is a binomial variable that takes on a value of one if a fund is classified as a wholesale 
fund or zero if it is a retail fund. Funds are considered mismatched from their benchmarks at a ten 
percent significance level as determined from a Levene (1960) test for homogeneity of variance 
from fund benchmark-relative tracking-error volatilities. Performance control variables include; 
raw fund returns, Return, as well as three fractional performance controls (LowPerfi,t MidPerfi,t 
and HighPerfi,t) based on the percentile ranks of monthly lagged raw fund returns and constructed 
using fractional 33%-33%-33% breakpoints used to define the Low, Mid and High fractile ranks. 
These performance measures are also interacted with the Mismatch variable. The regressions also 
include a vector of control variables, comprising; the natural log of a fund’s total net assets, Size, 
the natural log of the number of months since a fund’s inception date, Age, return Volatility, 
measured as the historical standard deviation of monthly raw returns over the previous 12 months 
for each fund, flow of assets under management during the previous month, Lag Flow, and the net 
flow of assets under management into all funds with the same investment style, Net Style Flow. 
All independent variables are lagged by one-month and regressions are estimated with time-fixed 
effects (month dummies) and style-fixed effects (style dummies). Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the fund level and t-statistics are displayed in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  
     
VARIABLES Flow Flow Flow Flow 
Constant 4.674*** 4.695*** 4.557*** 4.577*** 
 (8.319) (8.389) (8.073) (8.145) 
Mismatch  -0.179 -0.145 -0.172 -0.143 
 (-1.087) (-1.039) (-1.046) (-1.021) 
Wholesale   0.0480  0.0433 
  (0.445)  (0.404) 
Mismatch*Wholesale  -0.0946  -0.0825 
  (-0.260)  (-0.227) 
Return  0.0210* 0.0208*   
 (1.755) (1.749)   
Low Return Rank   0.855** 0.848** 
   (2.579) (2.554) 
Mid Return Rank   -0.172 -0.178 
   (-0.681) (-0.707) 
High Return Rank   -0.0144 -0.00107 
   (-0.032) (-0.002) 
Size -0.0652** -0.0669** -0.0655** -0.0671** 
 (-2.283) (-2.309) (-2.298) (-2.321) 
Age -0.712*** -0.711*** -0.714*** -0.713*** 
 (-9.367) (-9.267) (-9.386) (-9.284) 
Volatility 0.0554 0.0539 0.0623 0.0608 
 (1.263) (1.225) (1.416) (1.379) 
Lag Flow 0.221*** 0.221*** 0.221*** 0.221*** 
 (8.927) (8.934) (8.915) (8.922) 
Net Style Category Flow 0.565*** 0.565*** 0.566*** 0.566*** 
 (9.893) (9.915) (9.905) (9.927) 
Style Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time-fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21,797 21,797 21,797 21,797 
R-squared 0.187 0.187 0.187 0.187 
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Conflicting with initial findings, the appropriateness of a fund’s benchmark is 
shown to have a negligible effect on fund flows. This relationship, or lack thereof, is 
identified from the statistically insignificant factor loadings from the Mismatch and 
Mismatch*Wholesale interaction variables that are introduced into the flow-
performance regressions. This finding is robust across flows regression models that 
capture linear and the asymmetric relationship between returns and flows for both 
wholesale and retail funds. Specifically, asset flows into retail funds are shown to be 
unaffected, regardless of the fund having a mismatched benchmark or not. This is 
indicated by insignificant coefficients by the Mismatch variable from the regressions 
in columns two and four of Table 2.14 (t-stats = -1.087 and -1.046). The effect that 
benchmark appropriateness has on the asset flows of wholesale funds is similarly 
shown to be negligible. This is determined from the statistical insignificant linear 
combination of coefficients from the Mismatch and Mismatch*Wholesale interaction 
variables from columns two and four of the regression estimates (t-stats = -0.70 and -
0.66, respectively). These findings suggest that managers (of both wholesale and retail 
funds) who report mismatched benchmarks, are unable to attract additional fund flows, 
and subsequently do not benefit from increased revenue generated by the fees obtained 
from managing these funds. This result is consistent with benchmark-mismatched 
funds being unable to outperform appropriately-matched funds.37   
2.7 Conclusion 
An appropriate benchmark is one that can evaluate a manager’s ability to 
generate returns beyond that of her passive investment style, and not one that can be 
                                                 
37 Fund flow-performance regressions applying mismatch dummy variables that consider funds to be 
mismatched from their benchmarks at one and five percent significant levels are reported in Table A.5 
in Appendix A. Results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 2.14.    
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easily outperformed due to a mismatch from what the she is actually invested in 
(Anderson, 2009). Due to the absence of publicly available style equity indices within 
Australia, this chapter has investigated whether the investment styles of actively 
managed Australian equity funds adequately capture the style characteristics of their 
self-reported benchmark indices, and whether managers take advantage of the lack of 
regulations surrounding benchmark reporting by selecting inappropriate benchmark 
indices. Despite a large majority of ‘style-orientated’ funds reporting broad-market 
based indices as their benchmark, none are significantly better matched to passive 
value/growth–size style indices, and that all ‘benchmark-mismatched’ funds are found 
to better matched to an alternative S&P/ASX index. Subsequently, this chapter does 
not advocate the necessity of publicly available passive style indices for the Australian 
funds market, and as such fund investors should remain confident when relying on a 
fund’s self-reported benchmark to adequately capture passive style returns. Investors, 
however, should be cautious if relying on a fund’s reported investment styles when 
making investment decisions. 
Examining the characteristics of funds reveals that managers of small, 
inexpensive, wholesale funds are more likely to report a mismatched benchmark. 
Furthermore, the majority of benchmark indices are unable to adequately capture fund 
investment styles as characterised by market-risk, value/growth and size style factors, 
regardless of having appropriately-matched or mismatched benchmark indices. 
Nevertheless, only a minority of these funds tilt their portfolio exposures away from 
the style characteristics of their benchmarks in attempts to exploit documented style 
premiums.  
This chapter has further shown that managers who report mismatched 
benchmarks are unable to outperform ‘appropriately-matched’ funds in terms of raw, 
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risk-adjusted, or benchmark adjusted performance, thus implying that attempts to 
make fund performance appear more attractive through the misallocation of 
benchmarks go unrewarded. Despite prevalent literature showing the benefits of 
benchmark outperformance, those funds with mismatched benchmarks are also 
unsuccessful at attracting excess fund flows relative to appropriately-benchmarked 
funds. This finding is evident for both wholesale and retail funds. The findings from 
this chapter therefore refute those from previous studies that suggest that benchmark 
mismatching will be prevalent amongst funds in industries where regulations 
concerning benchmarking are not stringent.       
  
82 
 
 
Chapter 3. Prospecting for Alpha: Equity Fund 
Performance, Flows and the Mining 
Boom in Australia 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The top-down approach to investment management suggests that if fund 
managers are able to identify industries that will outperform in the future then they 
should earn higher returns. The ability to identify industries that will experience a 
boom in the future should yield even higher returns. Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng 
(2005) find that funds with higher industry concentrations are capable of 
outperforming funds with lower industry concentrations. However, identifying 
economic settings where hypotheses about the effect of an industry boom on funds 
management can be tested are relatively rare. One such natural experimental setting 
was the IT bubble experienced in the U.S. during the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
Brunnermeier and Nagel (2005), Dass, Massa, and Patgiri (2008), Greenwood and 
Nagel (2009) and Griffin, Harris, Shu, and Topaloglu (2011) provide confilicting 
results concerning the performance and the exposure to IT stock of U.S funds during 
this bubble. Using the sample of Australian equity managed fund data described in 
Chapter 2, this chapter examines an independent sample from the recent mining boom 
in the Australian equity market. This chapter provides an opportunity to strengthen 
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our understanding of whether funds can capture industry outperformance and what 
effect exposures to booming industries have on managed fund investors.  
The stocks in the mining industry experienced average monthly returns of 1.16 
percent between 2003 and 2012, compared to the average monthly market return of 
0.60 percent. It is anticipated that funds with higher mining exposure are able to 
capture some of the return benefits. In addition, the question of how investors respond 
to differences in mining exposures across funds is addressed. If funds are able to earn 
abnormal returns through their industry allocations then a rational response from 
investors would be to increase their investments into funds with high mining exposure. 
Alternatively, funds may be attracted by the industry returns of a ‘hot’ industry (i.e., 
an industry that is experiencing prolonged high abnormal return relative to other 
industries). Frazzini and Lamont (2008) argue that fund investors are attracted to past 
style returns, however, basing investment decisions on past style returns is shown to 
lead to an erosion of wealth. Cooper, et al. (2005) find that fund flows are affected by 
funds that change names to reflect the current ‘hot’ investment style. In a market with 
a dominant, booming industry, investors could potentially over-expose themselves to 
this industry, without considering any rational performance-motivated factors in their 
investment decision. 
A returns-based approach is applied to measure fund-level mining industry 
exposures using monthly data from January 2003 to January 2012. This approach finds 
that significant differences in mining industry allocations exist amongst equity funds. 
In contrast to expectations, no evidence is found that funds with a higher exposure to 
the mining industry outperform over this period. The findings indicate that investors 
misinterpret industry allocation decisions by fund managers as representing skill and 
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increase investments in those funds with a high exposure to this ‘hot’ industry. Flows 
are significantly higher for funds that have a higher exposure to the mining industry, 
despite the fact that there are no performance benefits that accrue to investors.  
This chapter relates to studies that have examined the IT bubble in the U.S.. 
The results support the findings of Greenwood and Nagel (2009) in that fund managers 
are not able to extract abnormal returns from industry outperformance. Similarly, 
those funds with the highest exposure to the booming industry receive increased 
inflows. By contrast, Brunnermeier and Nagel (2005) show that hedge fund managers 
were able to capture most of the upside of the IT bubble. This chapter does not find 
evidence to suggest that long-only fund managers exhibit skill with respect to industry 
allocation. The implications of these findings are that investors should not misinterpret 
fund allocations to ‘popular’ assets as representing skill and instead other factors 
should be examined when attempting to select funds that will outperform in the future. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 provides an 
overview of the Australian mining boom. Section 3.3 reviews the current literature 
relating to industry booms on fund performance and flows. Section 3.4 develops the 
hypotheses that are empirically tested. Section 3.5 reports the data and describes the 
construction of key variables used in the empirical analysis throughout this chapter. 
Section 3.6 explains the methodology used to measure fund exposures to mining 
stocks and the approach used to measure the effect that that this exposure has on fund 
performance and flows. Section 3.7 presents the empirical results and section 3.8 
concludes.    
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3.2 Background to the Australian Mining Boom  
The reliance on the extraction of natural resources and lack of investment in 
the IT and communications industries throughout the 1990s had previously caused 
concern for the Australian economy due to falling relative prices of commodities and 
weak potential productivity gains. Yet, by the end of the 2000s Australia was 
experiencing economic growth backed by the largest mining boom since European 
settlement of Australia during the 18th century (Battellino, 2010). Up until the middle 
of the 2000s, business investment in non-mining sectors was the main driver of 
economic growth as the real price of Australia’s key export commodities stagnated 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s being at their lowest in more than a century (Kearns 
and Lowe, 2011). Despite increased demand for raw commodities by China during the 
early 2000s, low commodity prices largely discouraged investment in the mining 
sector and as a result many Australian mining companies merged with multinationals 
in attempts to offset diminishing profitability (Connolly and Orsmond, 2011). 38 
However, the rapid industrialisation and urbanisation of emerging economies in Asia, 
particularly in China and India over the last decade, resulted in Asia’s (excluding 
Japan) share of world GDP increasing from ten percent in 2000 to 17 percent in 2010. 
This growth eventuated in substantial investment in infrastructure, buildings and 
machinery, with China alone accounting for almost half of the world’s production of 
steel and half of the world’s coal consumption in 2010 (Kearns and Lowe, 2011). 
Subsequently, their demand for raw commodities, especially coal and iron ore, which 
are the primary resources used in the production of steel, saw a sharp rise during the 
mid-2000s. This benefitted Australia not only because of its abundance of these 
                                                 
38 Of the top 20 mining companies listed on the Australian securities exchange (ASX) in 2000, 
only seven of were still listed by the end of 2005 (Connolly and Orsmond, 2011).  
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resources but also because of its relatively close proximity to China and the subsequent 
lower shipping costs associated with exportation (Connolly and Orsmond, 2011). 
Demand for these commodities, especially iron ore and coal saw an increase from 
three percent of the value of Australia’s exports in 2003 to 17 percent by 2010. 
Similarly, the contribution of coal as a percentage of net exports increased from seven 
percent in 2003 to ten percent in 2010, representing a significant contribution of the 
nearly 60 percent rise in Australia’s terms of trade over the same period. Much of the 
increase in these resource exports can be directly attributed to China. By 2009, China 
accounted for over 55 percent of Australia’s exports of ores and metals, up from 13.3 
percent in 2000 (Huang and Wang, 2011). 39       
The inability of the mining industry to initially meet the demand for these 
resources, due to a lack of investment, exacerbated the surge in commodity prices. 
This subsequently led to heightened growth in production and investment not only in 
iron ore and coal mining but across a broad range of mining-related sectors such as oil 
and thermal coal (Battellino, 2010). Since 2000, mining investment increased from 
$10 billion to about $58 billion by the end of the decade, representing over a two fold 
increase in mining investment as a percentage of both total private business investment 
and as a percentage of GDP (Connolly and Orsmond, 2011). Mining revenue also 
increased from six percent of GDP in 2000 to 14 percent by the end of the decade 
(Connolly and Orsmond, 2011). In relation to the market value of mining companies, 
relative to the Australian stock market (ASX), the price of mining equities increased 
by around 180 percent over the 2000s. Based on the behaviour of commodity prices 
                                                 
39 Figure B.1 in Appendix B displays a time-series chart of the number of Top 300 constituent 
stocks belonging to each industry over the period from January 2000 to December 2011. This figure 
shows the proportion of mining stocks contained in the Top 300 increasing drastically over this period. 
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and the change in the level mining investment, the current mining boom is said to be 
dated from about 2005 onwards (Battellino, 2010).   
The onset of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) during the latter half of 2008, 
however, resulted in a steep decline in global commodity prices. By May of 2009 the 
Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) commodity price index fell by over 30 percent from 
its October 2008 level (Kearns and Lowe, 2011). However, sustained growth by 
emerging economies such as China, and their continued demand for bulk commodities, 
maintained Australia’s export volumes. These volumes continued to grow from late 
2008 onwards despite global trade volumes falling by about 20 percent over the same 
period. Within 18 months, commodity prices had returned to their pre-GFC levels, 
assisting Australia in experiencing a milder downturn than many other developed 
economies (Kearns and Lowe, 2011). The economic slowdown in China in recent 
years however, has seen a decline in mining industry-related asset prices from about 
2012 onwards, thus being viewed as the beginning of the end of the boom.  
3.3 Literature Review 
3.3.a Introduction 
Despite the economic and financial impact that the mining boom has had on 
Australia, its effect on the funds management industry has not yet been investigated 
in the portfolio management literature. There are however numerous studies that 
examine concepts that are likely to explain fund manager and investor behaviour 
during industry booms. Specifically, the IT bubble and bust in the U.S. during the late 
1990s/early 2000s which has been extensively studied, provides insight into the asset 
allocations and performance during abnormal periods of high industry-specific 
performance. Whilst the mining industry did not witness a bust in asset prices similar 
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to that of the U.S. IT industry towards the end of the boom, there are a variety of 
studies that investigate the effects of industry allocations and performance allocations 
to funds during industry outperformance.     
3.3.b Fund Industry Analysis 
Barberis and Shleifer (2003) show that many investors chase past style returns. 
If investors allocate assets across industries in the same manner as they do across style 
groups, then it is likely that investors will rely on a fund’s industry exposure in order 
to incorporate past industry performance into their investment decisions. Such an 
argument is supported by Frazzini and Lamont (2008), who show that investors not 
only chase past fund returns but also utilise past style returns when selecting funds. 
Frazzini and Lamont (2008) also argue that retail investors effectively destroy wealth 
when actively reallocating assets across funds, for which they coin the ‘dumb-money’ 
effect. Kacperczyk, et al. (2005) on the other hand, find that there are substantial 
differences between mutual funds that are industry-concentrated and those that are 
well diversified across industries. They show that funds with concentrated holdings 
tend to have positive active weights to growth and small cap stocks, and outperform 
funds that are more diversified at the industry level. This performance difference is 
argued to be the result of managers possessing the ability to successfully recognise 
when industries move in and out of favour and to advantageously adjust their portfolio 
positions accordingly.  
Hoberg and Phillips (2010) investigate industry-level effects on stock 
performance after industry booms and busts. They examine whether factors that 
influence stock returns differ between competitive or concentrated industries and 
whether these factors differ between value and growth industries. They provide strong 
evidence suggesting that stocks from competitive industries, especially competitive 
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growth industries, when in a booming phase (measured using ex-ante industry-level 
valuation) will likely be followed by a subsequent decline in risk-adjusted returns and 
cash flows. This is particularly evident when the industry is experiencing extensive 
new financing and investing. Hoberg and Phillips (2010), however, fail to find similar 
evidence amongst stocks from concentrated industries.  
3.3.c The IT Bubble 
Greenwood and Nagel (2009) examine the portfolio decisions of mutual fund 
managers during the IT bubble and argue that inexperienced managers are more likely 
to exhibit trend chasing tendencies. They show that inexperienced managers increased 
their exposure to IT stocks following quarters in which the IT industry experienced 
heightened returns. IT exposure was particularly shown to increase around the peak of 
the bubble during the early 2000s, then shown to subsequently decrease after the peak 
in March of 2000. More experienced fund managers on the other hand were shown by 
Greenwood and Nagel (2009) to maintain constant holdings of technology stocks 
throughout the duration of the bubble. Despite the high exposure to technology stocks 
by less experienced fund managers relative to their style benchmarks during the run-
up of the bubble, along with their large associated abnormal fund inflows, these 
managers were unable to outperform more experienced managers, who maintained 
consistent levels of IT exposure throughout the duration of the bubble and bust 
(Greenwood and Nagel, 2009). In light of significant losses incurred by less 
experienced managers after the collapse of the IT industry, Greenwood and Nagel 
(2009) show that outflows of assets under management from these funds were not 
significantly large in relation to their peers. Consequently, due to the large abnormal 
returns and inflows of assets under management achieved during the run up of the 
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bubble, the relative costs to these funds in terms of their asset outflows after the crash 
was much less severe than expected.  
Cooper, et al. (2005) argue that many mutual fund managers changed the name 
of their fund around the time of the IT bubble, to sound more ‘IT’ orientated in an 
attempt to improve fund inflows. Whilst they find that those funds that changed names 
were successful in improving fund flows, their name changes, and subsequent inflows 
were argued to be unrelated to any change in actual portfolio holdings exhibited by 
these funds. Greenwood and Nagel (2009) further consider window dressing by fund 
managers as a means of increasing inflows during the IT bubble, however, they find 
little evidence to suggest that inexperienced managers achieved higher abnormal 
inflows by ‘dressing up’ their portfolios with IT stocks around reporting dates.40    
Other studies that investigate the behaviour of investor groups during the IT 
bubble include Griffin, et al. (2011), who suggest that institutional investors, mainly 
hedge funds, participated in trend-chasing of NASDAQ 100 stocks on a daily and 
weekly basis during the run-up of the bubble. They argue that these investors were 
responsible for driving up the prices of IT stocks, particularly large stocks, during the 
months leading to the peak of the bubble by aggressively investing in technology 
stocks before reversing their positions in March of 2000. This ‘sophisticated’ 
behaviour of hedge fund managers is argued to have exacerbated the crash of the IT 
industry. Individual investors on the other hand are shown to have demonstrated 
relatively unsophisticated behaviour by actively buying during the run-up and 
especially after the peak of the bubble.   
                                                 
40 See, for example Haugen and Lakonishok (1988), Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler, and Vishny (1991), 
Meier and Schaumburg (2004), Griffiths and Winters (2005) and Morey and O'Neal (2006) for a 
discussion about window dressing. 
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Brunnermeier and Nagel (2005) find similar results to that of Griffin, et al. 
(2011) in terms of hedge fund managers when looking at the role they played 
throughout the IT bubble. They find that hedge funds also adjusted their exposure to 
technology stocks throughout the bubble. Brunnermeier and Nagel (2005) argue that 
hedge fund managers were able to capture most of the upside of the bubble by 
overexposing their portfolios’ to the IT sector relative to the market. This relative 
exposure was at its greatest up until about six month before the peak of the bubble, 
when hedge fund managers then began reducing portfolio exposures to this sector on 
a stock-by-stock basis before prices began to collapse. At the peak of the bubble in 
March 2000, 31 percent of hedge fund holdings consisted of IT stocks, whereas only 
21 percent of the market portfolio was comprised of these stocks at that time. However, 
by the end of 2000, the weighted portfolio holdings of IT stocks for hedge funds were 
much closer to the weight of the market portfolio. Consequently, hedge fund managers 
were able to successfully adjust their holdings so as to capture the upturn of this bubble 
whilst avoiding much of the downturn. 
 Dass, et al. (2008) argue that mutual fund exposure to ‘bubble-stocks’ can be 
largely explained by a fund manager’s contractual incentives. If a manager has lower 
performance incentives contained in his or her advisory contract, then they will be 
more likely to exhibit herding behaviour during a bubble by following other managers. 
Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995) and Wermers (1999) show that it is 
commonplace for herding to exist amongst fund managers. Herding is also shown by 
Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Zwiebel (1995) to arise in funds where managers are 
concerned about their reputation and are uncertain of their own ability, whereas those 
managers who are more concerned with seeking profits rather than preserving their 
reputations are less likely to exhibit such herding behaviour. Consequently, Dass, et 
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al. (2008) argue that the degree of herding is ultimately influenced by the 
compensation structure of the fund during the IT bubble, mutual fund managers with 
low incentive contracts were more likely to herd by investing in bubble stocks given 
their lack of incentive to deviate from the crowd. Those funds with larger contractual 
incentives however were shown to hold fewer IT stocks during the bubble as it is 
argued to be more advantageous for them to invest in ‘old economy’ stocks in an 
attempt to outperform the ‘herding’ funds. The smaller the holdings in technology 
stocks of these ‘high-incentive’ funds, the poorer they performed relative to ‘low-
incentive’ funds during the run up of the bubble and vice-versa after the peak.   
3.3.d Conclusion  
 A variety of studies have argued that the industry-exposures of managed funds 
are likely to be sensitive to industry outperformance, and that these exposures will 
influence fund performance and flows. Whilst mixed evidence has been produced 
relating to this topic, this research largely stems from the U.S. technology industry 
during the IT bubble of the late 1990s/early 2000s. The recent Australian mining boom 
therefore affords us a rare opportunity to further explore, in a natural experimental 
setting, the effects that industry booms have on the funds management industry.  
3.4 Hypothesis Development 
There are key differences between the IT bubble in the U.S. and the mining 
boom in Australia. The rapid rise, and subsequent decline, in the prices of IT stocks in 
the U.S. has since been termed a bubble, whereas the rise in prices of mining stocks 
in Australia was based on economic fundamentals, resulting largely from the rapid 
increase in demand of bulk commodities from emerging Asian economies such as 
China and India. The effect that this increase in demand had on the value of mining 
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companies can be illustrated from the mining industry-relative sector returns displayed 
in Figure 3.1. This chart shows how the mining industry significantly outperforms all 
other nine industries over the latter part of the sample period. Despite the rapid decline 
in this industry around the market crash of August 2008, the mining industry still 
manages to outperform all other industries over the remainder of the decade based on 
its initial outperformance prior to the crash. For example, the mining industry, on 
average, outperformed the market index by 0.559 percent per month while 
outperforming the Materials sector by 0.278 percent per month, Industrials by 0.704 
percent, Consumer Discretionary by 1.006 percent, Consumer Staples by 0.350 
percent, Health Care by 0.386 percent, Financials by 0.494 percent, Information 
Technology by 1.435 percent, Telecommunications by 1.233 percent and Utilities by 
0.204 percent per month.41    
                                                 
41 Refer to Figure B.2 in Appendix B for a time-series chart of monthly industry index prices across 
period from January 2000 to December 2011.  
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Figure 3.1: Mining-Relative Industry Index Prices 
Monthly industry index prices relative to the price of a mining industry index are displayed across period from January 2000 to December 2011. The 
indices are constructed from the top 300 Australian stocks by market capitalisation using tier one and two GICS categories to group stocks into one of 
nine industries. The industries include Materials (excluding Metals-and-mining), Consumer Staples, Consumer Discretionary, Industrials, 
Telecommunications, Utilities, Information Technology and Health Care. A market index is also included that is constructed from the largest 300 
Australian stocks by market capitalisation. All indices are value-weighted and rebalanced monthly and begin with a base price of 100 points at the 
start of the sample period.     
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This chapter primarily examines whether fund managers possess skill in 
generating abnormal returns from industry expansions. Greenwood and Nagel (2009) 
argue that inexperienced managers were more likely to exhibit trend chasing 
tendencies during the IT boom in the late 1990s/early 2000s in the U.S.. More 
experienced fund managers on the other hand are shown to maintain their holdings of 
IT stocks throughout the duration of the bubble. Inexperienced managers 
underperformed their more experienced counterparts indicating an absence of superior 
stock selection skill (Greenwood and Nagel, 2009). Brunnermeier and Nagel (2005) 
show that hedge fund managers are able to capture most of the upside of the IT bubble. 
Consequently, this chapter contributes to these studies by examining whether funds 
with higher exposures to the mining industry are able to outperform funds with lower 
exposures during a defined period of mining industry outperformance. 
This chapter also explores the effects that fund exposures to a booming 
industry have on flows of assets under management. It is expected that investors will 
be attracted to funds that have higher exposures to booming industries regardless of 
how well they perform. This is based on the presumption that a booming industry will 
continue to outperform other industries and that funds with higher exposure to this 
industry will also be expected to continually outperform funds that are less exposed 
until such time that the boom subsides. As equity funds are largely defined by their 
investment styles, investors are likely to, at least partially, form investment decisions 
based on the fund style classifications. Frazzini and Lamont (2008) find that 
individuals will chase the past returns of funds as well as past style returns. However, 
retail investors are shown to effectively destroy wealth when actively reallocating 
assets across managed funds. If the boom in the stock prices of mining companies can 
arguably represent an investment style in the Australian market, then investors may be 
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enticed to reallocate assets into funds with high exposures to this industry. Cooper, et 
al. (2005) show that many mutual fund managers merely changed the name of their 
fund around the time of the bubble in an attempt to attract asset inflows. They also 
find that the effect of these name changes on asset flows is unrelated to the change in 
holdings of the funds. It is therefore expected that fund flows will be related to the 
booming industry, with those funds observed as having higher exposures to the mining 
industry experiencing relatively higher fund inflows.    
I incorporate the clients that each fund services into the analysis to identify 
whether retail or wholesale funds, or the investors in these funds, lead to differences 
in the performance and flow relationship. In contrast to retail investors, wholesale 
investors are often well-informed professionals who make use of consultancy services 
that provide extensive performance monitoring and advice on selecting fund managers 
(Sawicki, 2001). James and Karceski (2006) argue that wholesale and retail investors 
use different criteria when allocating assets between funds. They show that wholesale 
fund clients do not chase past raw returns in the same manner as retail investors, but 
instead use more sophisticated, risk-adjusted, performance metrics when selecting 
funds. Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) reach a similar conclusion when examining the 
behaviour of pension and retail mutual fund investors. If wholesale and retail fund 
investors differ in terms of their sophistication, then it can be argued that these two 
types of investors could allocate funds differently based on the industry exposure of a 
fund during an industry boom. A more sophisticated wholesale investor, for example, 
regardless of their preference towards mining-boom stocks, may be more capable of 
identifying funds with high exposures to mining stocks and thus allocate their funds 
accordingly. Less sophisticated (retail) investors, on the other hand, are more likely to 
be unaware of the industry concentration of funds. Nevertheless, wholesale investors 
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may not be swayed by funds that are simply overexposed to ‘hot’ stocks from booming 
industries but instead may use more sophisticated performance metrics when selecting 
funds. Consequently, if the sophistication of a fund’s clients is considered an indicator 
of the relationship between a fund’s exposure to mining stocks and its asset flows, 
then such relationship may be largely affected by the wholesale/retail classification of 
the fund.  
3.5 Data 
3.5.a Industry Index Construction   
Ten industry-classified indices are constructed from the monthly returns of the 
largest 300 stocks by market capitalisation listed on the Australian Securities 
Exchange (hereinafter referred to as the Top 300). These indices are primarily used as 
factors in a Sharpe (1992) constrained regression analysis described in section 3.6.a to 
identify fund-level industry exposures. The construction of the indices initially 
involves sorting the Top 300 into ten industry groups according to their Tier one 
Global Industry Classification Standards (GICS) codes each month. The Tier one 
GICS codes classify stocks belonging to either one of; Energy, Materials, Consumer 
Staples, Consumer Discretionary, Industrials, Telecommunications, Utilities, 
Information Technology, Financials or Health Care industries.  To accurately capture 
a fund’s exposure to stocks that are directly influenced by the Australian mining boom, 
a ‘Mining’ index is constructed by adjusting both the Energy and Materials industry 
groups. This is attained by extracting the tier two ‘Metals and Mining’ stocks from the 
tier one, Materials industry, and including them within the tier one Energy group. As 
a result, the constituent stocks of this index include only those that are considered to 
be directly affected by the mining boom. The eight remaining tier one industry groups 
remain unchanged. The ten industry indices used throughout this study are therefore 
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constructed using stocks classified as Mining (including Metals and Energy), 
Materials (excluding Metals and Mining), Consumer Staples, Consumer Discretionary, 
Industrials, Telecommunications, Utilities, Information Technology, Financials and 
Health Care.42  
The sum of the holdings of the ten industry indices is equal to the holdings of 
the Top 300. This is to ensure that the Sharpe (1992) constrained regressions are able 
to wholly capture fund return exposure to each industry in the market.43 Furthermore, 
in order for the constrained regression to accurately estimate industry exposures, the 
industry index returns must not be highly correlated.44 Monthly returns for these ten 
industry indices are determined by summing the value-weighted returns from the 
constituent stocks in each industry index using one-month lagged market capitalisation 
values and rebalancing monthly. Descriptive return statistics for these ten industry 
indices are presented in Figure 3.1. All other data and data sources used throughout 
this chapter are listed and described in Chapter 2.4.  
 
 
                                                 
42 The industries and sub-industries contained in each tier one GICS sector category can be found at 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/gics/en/au. 
43 Industry indices are constructed using the largest 300 stocks by market capitalisation as this is the 
universe in which Australian equity fund managers are generally benchmarked against (Ainsworth, et 
al., 2008). 
44 Correlation coefficients of the monthly returns between each of the ten industry indices are reported 
in Table B.1 in Appendix B. 
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Table 3.1: Industry Index Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the monthly returns of ten accumulation industry indices across the period from January 2000 to 
December 2011 are reported in this table. The indices are constructed from the top 300 Australian listed stocks by market 
capitalisation using tier one and two GICS categories to group stocks into one of ten industries. The industries include Mining, 
Materials (excluding Metals-and-mining), Consumer Staples, Consumer Discretionary, Industrials, Telecommunications, 
Utilities, Information Technology and Health Care. A market index is also included (Top 300 Market) that is constructed from 
the largest 300 Australian stocks by market capitalisation. All indices are value-weighted and rebalanced monthly. 
                
Industry Index Mean Min Median Max St. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Mining 1.403 -20.438 2.163 20.621 5.790 -0.349 4.642 
Materials 1.031 -22.536 0.891 12.909 5.839 -0.708 4.548 
Utilities 0.923 -12.435 1.322 10.152 3.910 -0.783 4.492 
Consumer Staples 0.881 -12.325 1.194 12.909 3.430 -0.492 5.136 
Financials 0.653 -13.182 1.473 12.797 4.379 -0.510 4.077 
Health Care 0.639 -10.601 0.607 16.510 4.525 0.228 4.115 
Industrials 0.455 -20.541 0.726 13.308 5.038 -0.923 5.443 
Consumer Discretionary 0.189 -16.492 0.524 17.055 5.853 -0.214 3.447 
Telecommunications -0.070 -10.896 0.461 10.965 4.597 -0.271 2.675 
Information Technology -0.421 -34.673 -0.185 24.494 7.867 -0.227 5.543 
Top 300 Market 0.586 -13.089 1.348 7.593 3.713 -0.858 4.100 
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3.6 Methodology 
3.6.a Time-varying Mining-Industry Fund Exposures   
To identify fund exposures to mining boom stocks, returns-based constrained 
regressions, following Sharpe (1992), are estimated from the equation: 
    𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = α𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖,𝑡,𝑗𝑅𝑗,𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 ,       (3.1) 
𝑠. 𝑡.  ∑ 𝛽𝑖,𝑗 = 1 ,
𝑁
𝑗=1  and 
 𝛽𝑖,𝑡,𝑗 ≥ 0,    j = 1, … , 𝑁      
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the return on fund i at time t, 𝑅𝑗,𝑡 is the return on industry index j at time 
t, 𝛽𝑖,𝑡,𝑗 is the coefficient on the industry index return factor, 𝑅𝑗,𝑡, of industry j at time 
t, constrained to be greater than or equal to zero and that 𝛽𝑖,𝑡,1 to 𝛽𝑖,𝑡,𝑁 sum to equal 
one, which can be interpreted as the fraction of fund i’s portfolio that is exposed to 
industry i at time t.  
Horst, Nijman, and de Roon (2004) refer to the application of both constraints 
in the Sharpe style regression as being a strong form of the returns-based style analysis 
(RBSA). The relaxing of the short selling constraint (i.e., when short selling is 
permitted) is referred to semi-strong RBSA, whereas omitting both constraints is 
referred to as weak RBSA. In weak RBSA, the style exposures are estimated from the 
factor loading using least squares regression. However, when the equality constraint 
(all coefficients sum to one) and the short-sale constraint (all coefficients are non-
negative) is included, ordinary least squares regression is unable to estimate the factor 
exposures, 𝛽𝑖,𝑡,1,… , 𝛽𝑖,𝑡,𝑁, and instead quadratic programming algorithms are necessary 
to obtain these estimates [see Sharpe (1987)]. A strong version of RBSA is applied 
throughout this chapter given that Australian equity fund managers are largely 
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prohibited in their use of short selling. 45  When the coefficients of the RBSA 
regressions are constrained to sum to one, the exposures can be interpreted as portfolio 
holdings (Horst, et al., 2004; Swinkels and Van Der Sluis, 2006). Nevertheless, the 
objective of the RBSA is not to identify the actual holdings of the funds, but to identify 
the exposure to the specific risks associated with each of the factors included in the 
model (Sharpe, 1992). In the case of this chapter, it is the fund exposure to the risks 
associated with mining stocks that are of interest. The fund-level factor exposures to 
the mining industry index obtained from these regressions are therefore used 
throughout this chapter as a measure for fund mining stock exposure. 
An inherent problem of the Sharpe (1992) RBSA model is that it unrealistically 
assumes that portfolio exposures remain constant over the sample period. To address 
this issue, regressions are estimated over rolling windows (sub-samples) to obtain 
time-varying factor exposures. Subsequently, the constrained regressions described in 
equation 3.1 are estimated over 36-month windows using monthly return data to obtain 
a time-series of fund-level industry exposures.  Returns data used in these regressions 
begin in January 2000, and as such the first factor exposures are observed at January 
2003 and extend until December 2012. The length of the rolling windows used to 
identify time-varying factor exposures from Sharpe (1992) constrained regressions in 
previous studies range from 18 months (McGuire, Remolona and Tsatsaronis, 2005) 
to 60 months (Drew and Stanford, 2003). Lucas and Riepe (1996) recommend a 36-
month rolling window as it is short enough to capture significant style movements yet 
long enough to avoid excessive noise. This window length is commonly used 
throughout related studies when estimating time-series style exposures [see, for 
                                                 
45 For regulations concerning short selling by Australian managed funds see, ‘Australian Securities & 
Investment Commission (ASIC) Regulatory Guide 196: Short Selling’, April 2011.   
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example Bateman and Thorp (2007), Bryan, Ham, Rafferty, and Yoon (2009), Lesseig, 
Long, and Smythe (2002) and Papadamou and Siriopoulos (2004)].  
Time-varying industry exposures of the Top 300 market index, estimated 
across 18, 24, 30, 36 and 42-month rolling windows, are compared against the industry 
weights of this index to test which window length best suits the data. The correlation 
between the actual and ‘implied’ weights, when estimated using a 36-month window 
length is about 0.90 for the mining industry, with tracking-error volatilities averaging 
2.8 percent across all industries. The mean absolute differences between the implied 
and actual weights of the Top 300 index is also shown to be around 2.3 percent, which 
produced the closest fit when compared to the exposures estimated across the other 
window lengths. As such, a 36-month rolling window is selected as it is considered 
the most appropriate at predicting industry exposures as it balances timely shifts in 
portfolios exposures whilst retaining sufficient degrees of freedom. The correlations 
between implied and actual industry weights for estimated using different rolling 
lengths in reported in Table 3.2. Time-series plots of implied mining industry weights 
against the actual market weight of the mining industry are reported in Figure 3.3. 
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Table 3.2: Industry Index Correlations of Actual and Implied Market Weights  
Correlation coefficients between the industry weights of the Top 300 Market index, measured monthly across the period from January 2003 to December 2011, 
and the respected implied industry weights, estimated from Sharpe (1992) constrained regressions over 18-, 24-, 30-, 36- and 42-month rolling windows, are 
reported.   
             
  Rolling Window Length (Months) 
Industry Index   18 24 30 36 42 
Mining  0.899 0.901 0.899 0.889 0.869 
Materials  0.083 0.003 -0.252 -0.471 -0.598 
Industrials  0.197 0.413 0.443 0.487 0.609 
Consumer Discretionary  0.688 0.751 0.761 0.740 0.688 
Consumer Staples  0.144 0.200 0.309 0.357 0.322 
Health Care  -0.050 0.021 0.026 0.003 -0.154 
Financials  0.397 0.544 0.629 0.704 0.737 
Information Technology  0.422 0.380 0.395 0.355 0.311 
Telecommunications  0.849 0.783 0.682 0.640 0.622 
Utilities   -0.232 -0.149 -0.070 -0.123 -0.213 
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Figure 3.2: Actual and Implied Mining Industry Market Weights 
Actual monthly market capitalisation weights of the mining index relative to the Top 300 market index are displayed alongside implied monthly 
mining index weights of the Top 300. Implied weights are estimated using a Sharpe (1992) constrained regression framework over 18-, 24-, 30-, 
36- and 42-month rolling windows from January 2000 to December 2011. 
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3.6.b Portfolio Analysis 
To investigate the performance, flows and characteristics of funds with 
different mining-boom exposures, fund portfolio analysis is conducted. The sample of 
actively managed Australian equity funds are first sorted into decile portfolios 
according to their one-month lagged mining index exposures, with decile one  
containing funds with the highest exposure to mining stocks and decile ten containing 
the lowest mining-exposed funds. Portfolios are equally-weighted and are rebalanced 
monthly. Two long-short portfolio are also constructed that are long decile one and 
short decile ten, and long deciles one and two and short deciles nine and ten. Average 
monthly fund mining exposure, raw return, flow, size and age for funds contained in 
each decile (and long-short portfolios) are pooled across the sample period from 
January 2000 to December 2011. 
Style factor exposures and risk-adjusted performance of fund with varying 
levels mining exposure are investigated by estimating Carhart (1997) four-factor 
regressions, from the decile fund portfolios across the sample. The Carhart (1997) 
regressions are estimated from the equation: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽1,𝑝(𝑟𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽2,𝑝𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡+𝛽3,𝑝𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡+𝛽4,𝑝𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡 ,  
                  (3.2) 
where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡 is the excess return of portfolio p at time t. 𝛼𝑝 is the Carhart alpha of 
portfolio p. Rm-rf, SMB, HML and UMD are the monthly returns from the standard 
Carhart (1997) factors at time t, 𝛽1,𝑖,𝑡…𝛽4,𝑖,𝑡 are the estimated coefficients on each of 
the respected four factors and 𝜀𝑝,𝑡 is the error term of portfolio p at time t. 
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3.6.c Regression Analysis 
Whilst the portfolio analysis approach is used to provide a preliminary 
indication of the effect that fund mining exposure has on performance and flows, this 
approach does not control for other fund-specific characteristics that may influence 
fund performance or flows. To provide more rigorous statistical evidence in support 
of the hypothesis, the relationship between mining exposure, performance and flows 
is examined using multivariate regressions models that are estimated from fund-level 
monthly panel data for the sample of Australian equity funds across the period from 
January 2003 to December 2011.  
3.6.c.i Mining Exposure-Performance Relationship 
Regressing various fund performance metrics against fund mining exposure 
and a vector of control variables using monthly fund-level panel data, the effect that a 
fund’s exposure to mining stocks has on its performance during the mining-boom is 
examined. This regression is described from the equation:       
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑚,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑚,𝑖 + 𝛽1,𝑚𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2,𝑚𝑊𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3,𝑚𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 ∗  𝑊𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 +
𝛽5,𝑚𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑠𝑖 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝜀𝑚,𝑖,𝑡,              (3.3) 
where 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 is the performance of fund i during period t using metric m, 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 
is the percentage exposure of fund i to the mining index time t, 𝑊𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 is a binary 
dummy variable that is equal to one if a fund is classified as wholesale fund, or zero 
if it is a retail fund. 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑊𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 is an interaction term between fund i’s mining 
exposure and its wholesale dummy value at time t. This interaction is used to control 
for differences that could exist in the fund flow-mining exposure relationship between 
wholesale and retail funds. The vector of control variables, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡, includes Age, Size, 
Volatility and Flow. All control variables are lagged one month. 𝑠𝑖 are fund style-fixed 
107 
 
effects and 𝑣𝑡 are month-fixed effects. The performance metrics, m, include; market-
excess returns (ri-rm), CAPM alpha and Carhart alpha. Construction of these metrics 
and explanatory variable are described in detail in Chapter 2.4.b. 
3.6.c.ii Mining Exposure-Flow Relationship 
The portfolio analysis framework described in the previous section provides a 
means of identifying the flows of funds with different levels of mining exposure. 
However, to identify the relationship between these two variables during the mining 
boom, multivariate regression analysis is conducted. The regression model is 
estimated from the following equation: 
𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑊𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑊𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 +
𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,                     
  (3.4) 
where 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡  is the net percentage flow of assets under management into fund i 
during month t. A mining industry dummy, MinDumi,t, is created that is equal to one 
for fund i at time t if its exposure to mining stocks, MinExpi,t, is above the median 
level of mining exposure for all funds in the sample during month t, or zero otherwise. 
This variable is also interacted with lagged fund return, 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1. 
All other variables are as previously defined.  
Linear piecewise flow-performance regression are also incorporated into this 
fund flow model to allow for different flow sensitivities to fund mining exposure 
across varying levels of performance. These piecewise regression apply the same three 
fractional performance variables (Low Perfi,t, Mid Perfi,t and High Perfi,t) that are 
based on the percentile rank of the one-month lagged raw returns from the sample of 
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funds.46 These fractional performance variables are also each interacted with a lagged 
fund mining exposure dummy variable, 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1, to capture the nonlinearity of 
the flow-performance relationship when explaining the effect that fund mining 
exposure has on fund flows. The full regression model is:  
𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑊𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑊𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽7𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,              (3.5) 
where 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 , 𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1  and 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1  are fractional performance 
variables, defined as the percentile rank of fund i’s raw returns relative to the entire 
sample of funds at time t-1 for low, middle and high return ranking funds, respectively. 
All other variables are as previously defined.  
3.7 Results  
3.7.a Descriptive Statistics 
The market weight of mining stocks relative to other industry weights increases 
substantially over the period from January 2000 to January 2012 (Figure 3.3). The 
market weights of the other industries has either remained stable or declined over the 
same period, whereas mining stocks have increased from 13 percent in January 2000 
to 27 percent of the total weight of the Top 300 in December 2011, peaking in June of 
2008 with an index weight of 36 percent. The total number of mining stocks contained 
in the Top 300 has increased from 41 to 87 over the same period, with a maximum of 
100 stocks contained in the Top 300 during January 2011.   
                                                 
46 Construction of the three fractional performance variables is described in detail in section 2.4.b. 
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Figure 3.3: Industry Index Market Weights  
A time-series of market capitalisation weights as a percentage of the Top 300 market index for each industry index is displayed at a monthly 
frequency from January 2000 to December 2011. The industries are Mining, Materials (excluding Metals-and-mining), Consumer Staples, 
Consumer Discretionary, Industrials, Telecommunications, Utilities, Information Technology, Health Care and Other.47 The indices are constructed 
from the top 300 Australian listed stocks by market capitalisation using tier one and two GICS categories to group stocks into one of ten industries. 
All indices are value-weighted and rebalanced monthly.  
 
                                                 
47 The “Other” industry category consists of stocks not classed in any of the other Tier one or two GICS categories and is likely to consist mainly of exchange traded 
funds. 
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The number of open-ended Australian equity managed funds included in the 
study sample increases from 343 at the beginning of the sample in January 2003 to 
712 funds by the end of the sample in December 2011. The average fund size decreases 
over time from $393 million at the beginning of the sample to $236 million by the end 
of the sample, reflecting new entrants with smaller amounts of assets under 
management. Descriptive statistics for the other key variables used in the analysis 
throughout this study are reported in Table 3.3. The expansion of the mining industry 
as a result of the boom has influenced managers’ portfolio allocations such that the 
portfolio exposure to mining stocks for the average fund increases from 10.5 percent 
in January 2003, to a peak of 28 percent in December of                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
2011. The average exposure to mining across the full sample is just over 21 percent.48 
                                                 
48 Descriptive monthly return statistics for these industry indices and the market index (Top 300) are 
reported across mining-boom, non-mining boom and global financial crisis (GFC) sub-periods from 
January 2000 to December 2011 in Table B.6 within Appendix B. Mining-boom and non-boom sub-
periods are also defined in Appendix B.  
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Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics are reported for all variables used in the analysis throughout Chapter 3. The statistics are measured using monthly 
data at the fund level for the sample of actively managed Australian equity funds over the period from December 2003 to December 
2011. Mining Exposure is the fund level percentage exposure of a fund’s portfolio to mining-related stocks, calculated using a returns-
based constrained regression approach over a 36-month rolling windows, Return, Market-Excess Returns, CAPM Alpha and Carhart 
Alpha are fund-level performance metrics. The two alpha metrics are calculated over a 24-month rolling window. Size, is the value of 
the Total Net Assets under management for a fund and Age is the number of month since a fund’s inception date. Volatility is measured 
as the historical standard deviation of fund monthly raw returns over the previous 12 months. Net Style Flow is the net flow of assets 
under management into all funds with the same investment style category. Flow is the net monthly flows of assets under management 
into each fund. The market return is the SIRCA SPPR value-weighted share index and the Risk-free rate is the 13-week Treasury Note 
rate. SMB, HML and UMD are the returns from the standard size, value and momentum Carhart (1997) factors, respectively.  
        
Variable Mean Min Median Max Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Mining Exposure  21.049 0.000 21.262 100.000 13.101 1.268 8.593 
Return 0.781 -39.290 1.810 27.700 4.931 -1.010 5.762 
Market-Excess Return  0.067 -26.177 0.005 25.432 2.013 -0.361 15.519 
CAPM Alpha  0.003 -2.281 -0.040 4.038 0.413 0.993 9.611 
Carhart Alpha  0.027 -3.440 0.003 4.890 0.389 0.399 9.063 
Size ($ million) 345 0.00 80.50 10,800 811.00 6.015 52.487 
Age (months) 84 0 68 580 72.780 1.691 8.170 
Volatility  4.020 1.076 3.733 17.016 1.831 1.641 7.552 
Net Style Category Flow -0.332 -5.552 -0.274 5.988 1.054 -0.077 6.578 
Flow   0.551 -5.571 -0.069 9.765 3.499 0.921 4.002 
Market Return   0.691 -13.113 1.755 8.000 4.108 -1.004 3.987 
Risk-free Rate 0.423 0.217 0.432 1.364 0.098 -0.129 3.260 
SMB   0.709 -20.526 0.530 22.365 5.557 0.059 3.082 
HML   0.227 -9.456 0.747 14.953 2.944 -0.590 3.056 
UMD   0.325 -12.483 0.234 11.561 2.542 -0.664 5.888 
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3.7.b Fund Mining Exposure and Fund Characteristics: Portfolio Analysis 
The portfolio analysis results, reported in Table 3.4, shows a significant 
dispersion in the average mining exposure between the most and least exposed 
portfolios. The difference between the highest and lowest mining-exposed portfolios 
each month is on average 42 percent, with the high mining-exposed portfolios having 
an average exposure of 43 percent and the low mining-exposed having an average 
mining exposure of one percent. Time-varying mining exposures of these decile 
portfolios are illustrated in Figure 3.4.  
The performance of funds measured from monthly raw returns is 
insignificantly different between the two extreme decile portfolios. The high decile 
portfolio does not significantly outperform the low decile portfolio, on average. This 
result also holds when looking at the difference in average returns between the top two 
and bottom two deciles, which is further illustrated in Figure 3.5. Given the sizeable 
appreciation in the relative value of the mining industry, this result indicates that funds 
are unable to capture the returns to the mining industry in a meaningful way that yields 
outperformance relative to their peers. These results, however, do not control for fund 
risk-exposures or other fund-specific factors that influence performance. More 
rigorous fund-level performance analysis is therefore conducted later in this chapter. 
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Table 3.4: Mining-Exposed Decile Fund Portfolios  
Average monthly Mining Exposure, Returns, Flows, fund Size, and fund Age, for equal-
weighted decile portfolios constructed from a sample of Australian actively managed equity 
funds over the period from January 2003 to December 2011 are reported. Funds are sorted 
equally into decile portfolios each month based on their one-month lagged mining-exposure 
and rebalanced monthly. Decile one (ten) contains funds with the highest (lowest) exposure 
to mining stocks. Differences in average Mining Exposure, Returns, Flows, fund Size, and 
fund Age, between the High and Low and average of top two and bottom two portfolios over 
the sample period are also reported. Fund-level mining exposure is measured from a Sharpe 
(1992) constrained regression approach across 36-month rolling windows and expressed as a 
percentage, Return is average raw fund return in percentage per month, Flow is the net 
monthly percentage flow of assets under management, Size is the net value of assets under 
management in $millions and Age is the number of months since inception date. T-statistics 
are displayed in parentheses and *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
            
Decile 
Mining 
Exposure Return  Flow  Size Age 
1 [High] 43.193 0.730 1.061 204.040 78.577 
2 30.362 0.650 0.829 238.798 87.842 
3 26.822 0.565 0.483 276.388 95.433 
4 24.705 0.588 0.485 340.032 99.805 
5 22.948 0.537 0.571 374.561 97.544 
6 21.096 0.585 0.242 398.211 98.599 
7 18.523 0.514 0.391 374.415 87.851 
8 13.969 0.582 0.541 292.323 85.223 
9 8.001 0.597 0.479 343.637 84.363 
10 [Low] 1.367 0.648 0.424 602.928 79.938 
Decile Average 21.094 0.599 0.551 344.533 89.518 
Av. (1 +  2) 36.778 0.690 0.945 221.419 83.209 
Av.  ( 9 + 10) 4.662 0.623 0.451 473.283 82.150 
High - Low 41.826*** 0.082 0.637*** -398.888*** -1.361 
 (170.739) (0.757) (8.29) (-16.3) (-0.99) 
Av.(1+2) - 
Av.(9+10) 32.115*** 0.067 0.493*** -251.864*** 1.059 
  (210.798) (0.917) (9.387) (-17.6) (1.079) 
      
 
The difference between the average monthly fund flows for the high and low 
mining exposure deciles is positive and significant. Although flows do not change 
monotonically as fund mining exposure changes, the two high mining exposure 
portfolios experience substantially higher average flows relative to the remaining eight 
decile portfolios. Fund in the highest decile experience, on average, a 0.637 percent 
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greater inflow of assets per month than funds contained in the lowest mining exposures 
decile. This finding suggests that during the mining boom period, investors were 
significantly attracted to funds that exhibited high levels of exposure to mining stocks, 
despite these funds being unable to outperform their peers. This result is consistent 
with Cooper et al. (2005) and Greenwood and Nagel (2009), who show that increased 
investor assets flowed to funds with high IT exposure during the U.S. IT boom. 
Similarly, the result that high mining-exposed funds attract higher flows also supports 
the findings of Frazzini and Lamont (2008), who show that investors chase past style 
returns.     
The portfolio analysis shows that fund size is inversely related to mining 
exposure. The difference between the top and bottom deciles indicates that funds with 
the highest exposure to mining boom stocks, over the period from 2003 to 2011, are 
on average $399 million smaller than the least mining-exposed funds. A similar 
conclusion can be drawn when examining the difference between the average size of 
the top two and bottom two deciles. This result is largely driven by the lowest mining-
exposure portfolio (decile ten), which contains funds that are much larger, on average, 
than the funds in all other decile portfolios. This size of funds in this decile is on 
average about $205 million larger than the funds in the next largest portfolio (decile 
six). Differences in average fund age across the portfolios are also reported in Table 
3.4 with no clear pattern emerging. That is, fund age does not appear to affect a fund 
manager’s preference for mining-boom stocks.49, 50 
                                                 
49  Average monthly fund mining exposure, returns, flows and size, for the equal-weighted decile 
portfolios are reported across calendar-year sub-periods from January 2003 to December 2011 in Table 
B.2, Table B.3, Table B.4 and Table B.5, respectively, within Appendix B. 
50 Average monthly fund mining exposure, returns, flows, size, and age, for the equal-weighted decile 
portfolios across mining-boom and non-mining boom sub-periods are reported within Table B.7 in 
Appendix B. 
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Figure 3.4: Mining Exposures of Decile Fund Portfolios  
A time series of average mining exposures of funds contained in decile portfolios from January 2003 to December 2011 is displayed in this figure. Decile 
portfolios are constructed from sorting a sample of Australian actively managed equity funds equally into groups each month based on their one-month lagged 
mining-exposure and rebalanced monthly. Decile one (ten) contains funds with the highest (lowest) exposure to mining stocks. Fund-level mining exposure is 
measured from a Sharpe (1992) constrained regression approach across 36-month rolling windows and expressed as a percentage.  
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Figure 3.5: Decile Fund Portfolio Prices 
Time series plots of monthly prices for the highest and lowest equal-weighted decile portfolio of funds (decile one and decile 10) and the average for the top 
and bottom five portfolios (Av. Top 5 and Av. Bottom 5) are displayed from January 2003 to December 2011. Decile portfolios are constructed from a sample 
of Australian actively managed equity funds sorted equally according to their one-month lagged mining-exposure and rebalanced monthly. Fund-level mining 
exposure is measured from a Sharpe (1992) constrained regression approach across 36-month rolling windows. All portfolios begin with a base value price of 
1000 points at the beginning of the sample period.   
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To better understand the relationship between performance, risk and fund 
mining exposure, Carhart (1997) four-factor regressions are estimated from the 
monthly returns for each of the decile portfolios along with the portfolio that is long 
‘high mining-exposed’ funds and short ‘low mining-exposed’ funds. The regression 
results, presented in Table 3.5, show a near monotonic relationship between the decile 
portfolios’ market beta and exposure to mining stocks. I.e., funds in the highest mining 
exposure decile on average have the highest market beta. The highest mining decile 
(Decile one) is on average slightly overexposed to the market relative to the market 
(βRm-Rf =1.185), whereas Decile 10 is slightly underexposed to the market (βRm-Rf 
=0.949). The difference in the market factor between the High and Low deciles is 
therefore shown as being significantly different at the one percent level (t-stat = 
2.656).This result suggests that the higher mining-exposed funds hold stocks that are, 
on average, more exposed to the market than the stocks held by the “less mining-
exposed” funds. This finding may be attributed to the mining industry being more 
sensitive to the market during the mining boom relative to the remaining industries.  
The loadings on the size factor, are shown to exhibit a U-shape pattern across 
the deciles as both the High and Low mining-exposure portfolios have significantly 
positive loadings whilst the mid deciles have statistically insignificant loadings. This 
indicates that the two extreme deciles (and decile nine) are significantly overexposed 
to small-sized stocks, whereas the remaining deciles contained mid-sized stocks, or a 
blend of both large and small stocks. This finding suggests that during the mining 
boom, mining-concentrated funds may have been confident of the growth potential of 
small stocks in this industry and as such were adventurous in holding a higher 
proportion of these stocks. Similarly, deciles nine and ten may have been concentrated 
amongst industries other than mining, and subsequently contained the ability to 
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identify mispriced stocks, which were also evidently small stocks.  The significantly 
negative SMB factor exposure for the High-Low portfolio (t-statistic = -2.947) 
indicates that this long-short portfolio is relatively overexposed to large firms.  
The portfolios of funds with lower mining exposures (deciles seven, eight, nine 
and ten) are shown to have a significant value tilt, as indicated by the statistically 
significant loadings on the HML factor. This suggests that the stocks held by funds 
with the least mining exposure were value orientated. Conversely, portfolios of high 
mining–exposed funds did not, on average, have a significant net exposure to value or 
growth stocks as shown by the statistically insignificant loadings on the HML factors. 
This result is surprising given that the HML loadings of the High–Low portfolio is 
significantly negative, indicating that high mining-exposed funds tend to be more 
growth orientated relative to the least mining-concentrated funds..  
The statistically insignificant coefficients on the UMD factor for each of the 
decile portfolios reported in Table 3.5 suggest that funds of all levels of mining-
exposure, on average, do not implement momentum strategies. Furthermore, there 
does not appear to be a net difference in momentum exposure between funds with high 
mining exposure and low mining exposure as indicated by the statistically 
insignificant coefficients on the two long-short portfolios.    
The Carhart alphas reported for each decile portfolio in Table 3.5 are 
statistically insignificant. This indicates that long-only portfolios of funds, constructed 
according to level of mining-exposure, on average, were unable to produce significant 
abnormal returns over the mining boom. In other words, funds with high (or low) 
exposure to mining stocks, on average, did not achieve significantly positive risk-
adjusted returns. The Carhart alphas of the two long-short portfolios in Table 3.5, 
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however, shows a more interesting result. The High-Low portfolio suggests that 
constructing a portfolio that is long funds with high mining-exposure and short fund 
with low mining exposure will produce an average risk-adjusted return of 24 basis 
points per month (significant at the one-percent level). However, the second long-short 
portfolio [Av. (1 and 2) - Av. (9 and 10)] indicates that such a strategy will result in a negative 
risk adjusted return of 54 basis point per month (also significant at the one percent level). 51 
Subsequently, Carhart alpha does appear to be systematic across levels of fund mining-
exposure. This result provides initial indication that fund managers who held relatively higher 
proportions of mining stocks in their portfolios throughout the mining boom were unable to 
outperform their peers.             
  
                                                 
51 Table B.8 in Appendix B reports Carhart (1997) four-factor regressions estimated for the equal-
weighted decile portfolios across mining boom and non-boom defined sub-periods. Results are 
qualitatively similar to the full-period regressions reported in Table 3.5. 
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Table 3.5: Four-Factor Decile Fund Portfolio Exposures 
Carhart (1997) four-factor regressions are estimated for equal-weighted decile portfolios 
constructed from a sample of Australian actively managed equity funds over the period from 
January 2003 to December 2011. Funds are sorted equally into decile portfolios each month 
based on their one-month lagged mining-exposure and rebalanced monthly, with decile one 
(ten) containing funds with the highest (lowest) exposure to mining stocks. Equal weighted 
monthly portfolio returns are then calculated for each decile over the sample period. Fund-
level mining exposure is measured from a Sharpe (1992) constrained regression approach 
across 36-month rolling windows. Carhart (1997) regressions are also estimated for long-short 
portfolios constructed from decile one and decile ten, as well as for a portfolio that is long 
deciles one and two and short deciles nine and ten. T-statistics are displayed in parentheses 
and *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
            
Decile βRm-Rf βSMB βHML βUMD 
Carhart 
Alpha 
1 [High] 1.185*** 0.086*** -0.045 -0.009 0.008 
 (34.43) (3.787) (-0.91) (-0.165) (0.078) 
2 1.113*** 0.018 -0.014 0.031 0.02 
 (46.84) (1.333) (-0.443) (0.872) (0.263) 
3 1.082*** -0.015 0.03 -0.06 0.024 
 (38.946) (-1.316) (0.924) (-1.614) (0.372) 
4 1.04*** -0.012 0.021 0.002 0.028 
 (67.804) (-1.119) (1.087) (0.072) (0.502) 
5 1.017*** -0.006 0.022 -0.004 -0.005 
 (82.643) (-0.656) (0.973) (-0.168) (-0.083) 
6 1.005*** -0.015 0.024 0.022 0.04 
 (44.975) (-1.282) (0.907) (0.694) (0.667) 
7 1.057*** 0.003 0.061** -0.05* -0.06 
 (61.205) (0.281) (2.481) (-1.857) (-0.995) 
8 1.05*** 0.025* 0.131*** -0.063* 0.062 
 (56.664) (1.834) (5.205) (-1.894) (0.937) 
9 0.963*** 0.052*** 0.158*** -0.026 0.104 
 (24.526) (2.714) (3.628) (-0.441) (1.005) 
10 [Low] 0.949*** 0.054** 0.204*** -0.011 0.128 
  (19.586) (2.566) (3.53) (-0.144) (0.944) 
High - Low 0.242*** -0.559*** 0.037 0.009 0.24*** 
 (2.656) (-2.947) (1.067) (0.076) (3.394) 
Av. (1 and 2) -           
Av. (9 and 10) 0.197*** 0.004 -0.204*** 0.036 -0.541*** 
  (3.211) (0.153) (-2.707) (0.373) (-3.356) 
 
Preliminary investigation into the difference between wholesale and retail 
funds in relation to their portfolio exposures to mining stocks reveals a statistically 
significant difference at the one percent level (t-stat = -6.018), with the average mining 
exposure of wholesale funds being 20.59 percent compared to 21.62 percent for retail 
funds. This result, however, appears to be economically insignificant, suggesting that 
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these two types of managers do not differ greatly from one another in terms of their 
preference for mining stock. Despite having lower exposure to mining stocks, 
wholesale funds on average outperform retail funds across the sample period in terms 
of raw returns (by 0.14 percent per month), CAPM alpha (by 0.054 percent per month) 
and Carhart alpha (by 0.0664 percent per month). These performance differences are 
statistically different at the ten, one and one percent significance level, respectively (t-
stats = 1.875, 8.454 and 10.797, respectively). Fund flows are on average 0.375 
percent of assets under management per month for wholesale funds and 0.365 percent 
per month for retail funds. This difference is statistically insignificant (t-stat = 0.200). 
The effect that mining stock exposure has on the performance and flows of 
wholesale/retail funds is examined in further detail in the following section through 
the application of regression analysis.  
3.7.c Performance and Mining Exposure: Regression Analysis 
Multivariate regression models that examine the relationship between fund 
exposure to mining stocks and fund performance during the mining boom are 
estimated in Table 3.6. Initial results show that the level of exposure to mining stocks 
does not affect fund perfomance across the mining boom (when performance is 
measured using market-excess returns, CAPM alpha or Carhart alpha). This is 
demonstrated from the statistically insignificant coefficients on the MiningExposure 
variables from the regressions in colums one, three and five. Examining this 
performance-mining exposure relationship closer, by separating funds into their 
wholesale and retail categories, reveals more interesting findings.    
The effect that mining exposure has specifically on retail funds is identified 
from the coefficients on the MiningExposure variables from the regressions in 
 122 
 
columns two, four and six of Table 3.6. The linear combination of the MiningExposure 
and MiningExposure*Wholesale variables in these regressions subsequently identifies 
the relationship between mining exposure and wholesale fund performance during the 
mining boom. The statistically insignificant coefficient on the mining exposure 
variable from the regression in column two suggests that a retail fund’s exposure to 
mining stocks does not significantly influence its market-excess returns. The lack of 
relationship between mining exposure and this performance metric is also observed 
for wholesale funds, as indicated by the statistically insignificant coefficient from the 
linear combination of respective variables (t-statistic = -0.83) in regression two. 
The regression from column four in Table 3.6 shows that when adjusting for 
market risk, a retail fund’s exposure to mining stocks is able to positively influence its 
returns (as measured from CAPM alpha). This is demonstrated from the significance 
of the MiningExposure coefficient at the five percent level (t-statistic = 2.384). 
Consequently, when the exposure to mining stocks of a retail fund increases by one 
standard deviation (12.53 percent) its CAPM alpha is expected to increase by an 
average of 4.74 basis points per month. This relationship, however, is not observed for 
wholesale funds, as indicated by the insignificant coefficient from the linear 
combinations of the respected variables, equalling -0.00207 (t-statistic = -0.94) in 
regression four.       
Adjusting the CAPM alpha for additional risk factors not included in the 
CAPM, the Carhart alpha is able to further identify if increased exposures to mining 
stocks by funds during the mining boom results in superior performance. The 
significantly positive relationship between abnormal returns and mining exposure, 
observed for retail funds when measured using CAPM alpha, disappears when 
performance is measured using Carhart alpha. This is shown from the insignificant 
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MiningExposure coefficient in regression six (t-statistic = -0.972). This finding 
implies that the premium resulting from increased exposure to mining stocks was a 
consequence of retail funds capturing risk factors that are absent from the CAPM. As 
such, solely increasing portfolio exposure to mining stocks during the boom is unlikely 
to result in improved performance for retail funds.  
When performance is measured using Carhart alpha, the insignificant 
relationship observed for wholesale funds between their level of mining exposure and 
performance is shown in regression six, from the linear combination of the 
MiningExposure and MiningExposure*Wholesale variables, to be significantly 
negative at the ten percent level (t-statistic = -1.85). This counterintuitive result 
implies that wholesale funds were adversely affected, in terms of their risk-adjusted 
returns, when mining exposure increased during the mining boom. A one standard 
deviation increase in a wholesale fund’s exposure to mining stocks (10.49 percent) for 
example, is therefore expected to decrease its Carhart-adjusted return by an average 
of 4.37 basis points per month.   
The regression estimates for each of the control variables are also consistent 
across each of the regressions in Table 3.6, in that small, older, more volatile funds, 
with past positive flows achieve significantly better performance than their counterpart 
funds. Accordingly, the findings from these performance regressions suggest that for 
Australian equity mutual funds, in general, that have increased expoures to mining 
stocks during the Australian mining boom are unable to generate enhanced 
performance. Whilst mining exposure seems to be positivly related to a retail fund’s 
risk–adjusted returns, this relationship is observed as being a result of their mining 
exposure picking up some unboserved risk factor that is not priced in the CAPM. The 
performance of wholesale funds during the mining boom however, is shown to be 
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adversly affected from an increase in the expoure to mining stocks after controling for 
Carhart risk-factors. These results are robust to controlling for factors that are shown 
to influence fund performance. Subsequently, these findings suggest that attempts by 
managers to outperform by exploiting the mining boom go unrewarded for retail funds 
and, are in fact, detrimental for wholesale funds. 
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Table 3.6: Fund Mining-Exposure Performance Relationship 
 
Regressions are estimated using monthly panel data from January 2003 to December 2011 for a sample of Australian actively managed equity funds to describe the 
relationship between fund performance and fund mining exposure. The dependent fund performance variables include; market-excess fund return, where the monthly 
market return is the return on the CRSP value weighted share index, CAPM alpha and Carhart alpha, measured across prior 24-month rolling windows. The explanatory 
variables are fund-level mining-stock exposure, MiningExposure, determined as the percentage exposure of a fund’s portfolio to mining-related stocks, calculated using 
a Sharpe (1992) returns-based constrained regression approach across 36-month rolling windows, a wholesale fund dummy, Wholesale, which takes on a value of one 
if a fund is classified as a wholesale fund, or zero if it is a retail fund, and a wholesale-mining exposure interaction variable, MiningExposure*Wholesale. A vector of 
control variables which comprise of; the natural log of a fund’s total net assets, Size, the natural log of the number of months since a fund’s inception date, Age, return 
Volatility (measured as the historical standard deviation of monthly raw returns over the previous 12 months) and lag flow of assets under management, Lag Flow, are 
contained in the regressions. All control variables are lagged one-month and regressions are estimated with time-fixed effects (month dummies) and style-fixed effects 
(style dummies). Robust standard errors are clustered at the fund level and t-statistics are displayed in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 Market-Excess Return   CAPM Alpha   Carhart Alpha 
Variables (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Constant -0.278 -0.296  -0.246** -0.276***  -0.317*** -0.321*** 
 (-1.291) (-1.342)  (-2.305) (-2.618)  (-3.110) (-3.258) 
Mining Exposure 0.000783 0.00246  0.00216 0.00378**  -0.00216 -0.00128 
 (0.377) (1.148)  (1.431) (2.384)  (-1.617) (-0.927) 
Wholesale  0.202**   0.202***   0.137** 
  (2.357)   (3.558)   (2.482) 
Mining Exposure* Wholesale  -0.00574   -0.00586**   -0.00289 
  (-1.371)   (-2.367)   (-1.229) 
Size -0.0165** -0.0209***  0.00193 -0.00195  0.00526 0.00146 
 (-2.134) (-2.606)  (0.412) (-0.412)  (1.112) (0.309) 
Age 0.0366 0.0426**  0.0523*** 0.0584***  0.0356* 0.0414** 
 (1.643) (1.964)  (2.645) (3.143)  (1.782) (2.167) 
Volatility 0.111*** 0.110***  0.00531 0.00452  0.0299** 0.0285** 
 (3.485) (3.465)  (0.306) (0.263)  (2.060) (1.976) 
Lag Flow 0.00919** 0.00965**  0.0142*** 0.0144***  0.0140*** 0.0140*** 
 (2.429) (2.550)  (5.774) (5.918)  (6.032) (6.079) 
Style fixed-effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Month fixed-effects Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Observations 19,739 19,739  15,569 15,569  15,569 15,569 
R-squared 0.084 0.085   0.257 0.271   0.203 0.214 
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3.7.d Fund Flows and Mining Exposure: Regression Analysis 
Funds with higher exposures to mining stocks during the mining boom are 
anticipated to attract greater inflows of assets under management, and that the flow-
performance relationship will be strongest amongst high mining-exposed funds. 
Estimating multivariate flow-performance regressions to investigate the relationship 
between fund mining exposure and flows, illustrated in Table 3.7, identifies a strong 
positive relationship between these two variables. This relationship is robust across 
linear and asymmetric flow-performance regression models. Separating funds 
according to the clients they service, namely wholesale and retail investors, the 
preference for mining-exposed funds by these investors are also examined in this 
analysis.    
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Table 3.7: Fund Mining-Exposure Flow Relationship 
Regressions are estimated using monthly panel data from January 2003 to December 2011 for a sample 
of Australian actively managed equity funds to describe the relationship between fund flows and fund 
mining exposure. The dependent variable is fund-level percentage flow of assets under management, 
Flow. The explanatory variables are fund-level mining-stock exposure, MiningExposure, determined 
as the percentage exposure of a fund’s portfolio to mining-related stocks and calculated using a Sharpe 
(1992) returns-based constrained regression approach across 36-month rolling windows, a wholesale 
fund dummy, Wholesale, which takes on a value of one if a fund is classified as a wholesale fund, or 
zero if it is a retail fund, and a wholesale-mining exposure interaction variable, 
MiningExposure*Wholesale. Performance control variables include; raw fund returns, Return, as well 
as three fractional performance controls (LowPerfi,t MidPerfi,t and HighPerfi,t) based on the percentile 
ranks of monthly lagged raw fund returns and constructed using fractional 33%-33%-33% breakpoints 
used to define the Low, Mid and High fractile ranks. All performance measures are interacted with a 
fund mining exposure dummy, Mining Dummy, which takes a value of one if the mining exposure of a 
fund is greater than the median mining exposure for the sample of funds in that month, or zero otherwise. 
The regressions also include a vector of control variables, comprising; the natural log of a fund’s total 
net assets, Size, the natural log of the number of months since a fund’s inception date, Age, return 
Volatility, measured as the historical standard deviation of monthly raw returns over the previous 12 
months for each fund, flow of assets under management during the previous month, Lag Flow, and the 
net flow of assets under management into all funds with the same investment style, Net Style Flow. All 
independent variables are lagged by one-month and regressions are estimated with time-fixed effects 
(month dummies) and style-fixed effects (style dummies). Robust standard errors are clustered at the 
fund level and t-statistics are displayed in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
VARIABLES Flow [1] Flow [2] Flow [3] Flow [4] 
Constant 6.083*** 6.229*** 5.792*** 5.926*** 
 (9.779) (10.158) (9.170) (9.525) 
Mining Exposure 0.0127*** 0.00771* 0.00906** 0.00534 
 (2.883) (1.821) (2.012) (1.269) 
Lag Return 0.0199 0.0213   
 (1.470) (1.572)   
Mining Dummy*Lag Return -0.0110 -0.0117   
 (-1.115) (-1.185)   
Wholesale  -0.341*  -0.319* 
  (-1.776)  (-1.678) 
Mining Exposure* Wholesale  0.0187**  0.0167** 
  (2.271)  (2.078) 
Low Return Rank   1.239*** 1.227*** 
   (3.073) (3.033) 
Mid Return Rank   -0.375 -0.356 
   (-1.084) (-1.032) 
High Return Rank   -0.399 -0.292 
   (-0.459) (-0.337) 
Low Return Rank*Mining Dummy   0.384 0.303 
   (0.921) (0.744) 
Mid Return Rank*Mining Dummy   0.298 0.266 
   (0.555) (0.497) 
High Return Rank*Mining Dummy   -1.896 -1.875 
   (-1.465) (-1.465) 
Size -0.0991*** -0.101*** -0.0991*** -0.100*** 
 (-3.152) (-3.157) (-3.173) (-3.149) 
Age -0.864*** -0.864*** -0.874*** -0.875*** 
 (-10.486) (-10.378) (-10.614) (-10.478) 
Volatility -0.0242 -0.0240 0.0151 0.0132 
 (-0.686) (-0.696) (0.433) (0.384) 
Lag Flow 0.173*** 0.172*** 0.171*** 0.170*** 
 (6.495) (6.458) (6.400) (6.368) 
Net Style Flow 0.540*** 0.538*** 0.539*** 0.538*** 
 (9.430) (9.354) (9.457) (9.395) 
Time-fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 19,739 19,739 19,739 19,739 
R-squared 0.155 0.156 0.157 0.158 
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The relationship between a fund’s mining exposure and flows, shown in 
regression one of Table 3.7, indicates that a one standard deviation (12.02 percent) 
increase in a fund’s mining exposure will result, on average, in a 0.153 percent per 
month increase in its asset flows. The sensitivity of mining exposure to fund flows is 
greater for wholesale funds than retail funds, as shown by the significantly positive 
coefficients from the mining exposure-wholesale interaction variables presented in 
regressions two and four of Table 3.7. From regression two, a one standard deviation 
increase in a retail fund’s mining exposure is shown to increase flows by an average 
of 9.3 basis points per month. Whereas the same increase in a wholesale fund’s mining 
exposure results result in a 31.7 basis point increase per month (t-statistic = 2.88) when 
combining the wholesale and wholesale-mining exposure interaction variables. This 
indicates that wholesale fund investors have a preference towards investing in funds 
with higher exposures to mining stocks and are sophisticated enough to identify the 
level of mining exposures for such funds. Retail investors on the other hand, are either 
less influenced by a fund’s level of mining exposure or alternatively do have a 
preference for such funds but are less successful at identifying those that are either 
over- or underexposed to mining stocks. This result conflicts with the findings of Del 
Guercio and Tkac (2002) and James and Karceski (2006), who suggest that wholesale 
investors use sophisticated ‘risk-adjusted’ performance measures when allocating 
assets across funds. Nevertheless, despite high-mining funds having been shown (in 
section 3.7.c) to be unable to outperform, wholesale investors still appear to be 
attracted to such funds. The significantly negative coefficients on the wholesale 
dummy variable (in regressions two and four), on the other hand, suggest that 
wholesale funds, on average, attract about 2 percent less in flows (per month) than 
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their retail counterparts after controlling for other fund characteristics. This finding is 
robust across all regressions. 
Regressions one and two in Table 3.7 show that the flow-performance 
sensitivity of funds is not significantly influenced by their mining exposure, as 
indicated by the coefficients for the fund Mining Dummy-Return interaction, 
MiningDummyi,t-1*LagReturni,t-1, variable. These findings are robust across different 
model specifications. The fractional performance variables (𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 ,
𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 and  𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1) shown in regressions three and four of Table 3.7 
indicate that only the lowest performing funds will benefit from improved fund flows 
from increased returns. For example, in regression three, a one percent increase in the 
performance rank of the bottom performing funds results in a 1.623 percent expected 
increase in flows per month. Flows to mid and high performing funds however are 
insignificantly different after experiencing a change in performance. The interactions 
between these fractional performance variables and the mining dummy, 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1, 
are all statistically insignificant. This result indicates that fund mining exposure does 
not influence the flow-performance relationship of funds at any levels of performance. 
This finding suggests that despite achieving potentially higher inflows as a result of 
having a relatively higher exposure to mining stocks, an improvement in relative fund 
performance does attract new assets under management. These findings add to our 
understanding of the behaviour of managed fund investors by highlighting how 
portfolio exposure to industry-booming stocks affects the fund flow-performance 
relationship.  
The coefficients on fund size, age, return volatility, lagged fund flow and net 
flows to style groups are all significant and in the direction that is expected, with the 
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exception of lagged fund flows, which has no significant effect on current period fund 
flows. This relationship is consistent across all regression, indicating that smaller, 
younger, less risky funds that experienced high net flows to their respected style 
groups will attract greater flows than their counterparts. Lagged net flows to a fund’s 
investment style group is shown to have the greatest effect on fund flow, 
demonstrating that a one percent increase in the net flow to each style group per month 
will result, on average, in about a 0.54 percent per month increase in fund flows. The 
direction and significance of these control variables in the flow-performance 
regression are consistent with results from Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and 
Tufano (1998), Del Guercio and Tkac (2002), Barber, et al. (2005) and Cooper, et al. 
(2005).   
3.8 Conclusion  
A unique setting is identified to provide further evidence on how industry 
booms impact fund performance and fund flows. A returns-based approach to measure 
fund-level mining industry exposures is used to measure Australian equity funds’ 
exposures to the mining industry in Australia. The mining industry has experienced a 
boom during the last decade, more than doubling the average monthly returns of the 
market. This chapter shows that equity funds that have a higher exposure to the mining 
industry are not able to outperform funds that have a lower exposure to this industry 
on a risk-adjusted basis. The results also indicate that funds with higher exposures to 
the mining industry are able to attract relatively more inflow. This is more pervasive 
amongst wholesale funds relative to retail funds, despite increased mining exposure 
being detrimental to the performance of wholesale funds.  
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This inflow may be attributed to investors mistaking industry allocation for 
fund skill and that they are attracted to invest in the ‘hot’ industry [see Cooper, et al. 
(2005) and Frazzini and Lamont (2008)]. The results support the findings of 
Greenwood and Nagel (2009) on the IT bubble as fund managers are not able to extract 
abnormal returns from industry outperformance and funds with the highest exposure 
to the booming industry receive increased inflows. This chapter suggests that investors 
should be wary during times of industry expansions as industry allocation is not a 
substitute for stock selection skill. 
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Chapter 4.  Psychic Dividends of Socially Responsible 
Investors  
 
4.1 Introduction 
The increased demand for socially responsible investments (SRI) in recent 
years has resulted in a shift towards greater environmental and social governance 
(ESG) by firms throughout global markets, and more noticeably, a rise in the number 
of managed funds that incorporate SRI mandates into their investment strategies. As 
SRI extends to include an increasing range of products across a variety of asset classes, 
its popularity is illustrated by the $3.74 trillion of institutional funds under 
management in the U.S. that are managed using at least one or more ESG screens. 
These funds represent 11 percent of total institutional assets under management in the 
U.S. as of 2012. This value has grown from $161.8 billion in 1995,  demonstrating 
both a relative and absolute increase compared to the growth in aggregate institutional 
assets under management over the same period (USSIF, 2012). The rise in popularity 
of SRI is also illustrated by the increased number of managed funds subscribing to 
particular ESG objectives, increasing from 55 funds with $12 billion in assets under 
management in 1995 to 333 with $640.5 billion in assets under management as of 
2012 (U.S. Social Investment Forum, 2012). The growth in alternative investment 
funds (also referred to as social venture capital, double or triple bottom line private 
equity, hedge, and property funds) that incorporate some form of ESG screen has also 
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outgrown all other non-SRI alternative investment funds, increasing from 177 funds 
with total assets of $37.8 billion under management in 2010, to 301 fund in 2012 and 
$132 billion in assets under management (USSIF, 2012).  
The growth in global SRI is a likely consequence of increased awareness of 
environmental and social issues by investors along with heightened social 
consciousness that is exhibited by society as a result of becoming wealthier (Joseph, 
1989). If individuals are able to derive non-financial utility from investing in SRI, then 
they may be content with accepting suboptimal returns in exchange for being socially 
responsible. This chapter subsequently provides a measure of what I term “psychic 
dividends” to socially responsible investors. The broadest definition of psychic returns 
covers any asset whereby there is a stream of positive (or negative) benefits conferred 
by ownership of a non-material kind. Other definitions are contextual. In the context 
of employment, psychic income is defined as the level of satisfaction derived from a 
job rather than the salary earned from doing it.52 An alternative definition, relating to 
an activity, is the subjective value of the nonmonetary satisfaction gained from 
undertaking the activity.53 The psychic dividend accruing to an SRI investor can be 
assumed to stem from a sense of satisfaction derived by the individual from knowing 
they are contributing to the preservation of the environment or to the legitimacy of 
society. Or alternatively, this dividend may eventuate for an individual from the ‘clear 
conscience’ of having not supported a firm that is destructive to the environment or to 
society. Previous work by Srivastava, Pownall, and Satchell (2013) illustrates how 
psychic dividends can be calculated in an heterogeneous capital asset pricing 
framework where the equilibrium asset class weights are known. In the work that 
                                                 
52 This definition of psychic dividend is sourced from http://www.qfinance.com. 
53 This definition of psychic dividend is sourced from; Economic Essays, University of North Carolina. 
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follows, the proportion of investible wealth held in SRI is unknown, and as such, an 
alternative approach is followed.  
This chapter follows the work of Geczy, et al. (2005), who considers the cost 
to mutual fund investors for being socially responsible as the difference in certainty 
equivalent returns between an optimal portfolio of an unconstrained universe of 
mutual funds and an optimal SRI-constrained portfolio of mutual funds. This chapter, 
however, extends the definition of certainty equivalence from the limiting case of 
exponential utility to more general cases that include constant relative risk aversion 
and loss aversion. Geczy, et al. (2005)’s concept of ‘cost’ can therefore be interpreted 
as our concept of psychic dividend. Subsequently, this chapter shows that non-SRI 
portfolios are unable to outperform SRI on a raw or risk-adjusted basis. However, the 
psychic dividend to SRI is measured as being at least four basis points per month for 
a long-only portfolio of socially responsible stocks and at least 85 basis points per 
month for a portfolio that is long socially-responsible stocks and short socially-
irresponsible stocks. This psychic dividend is also shown to increase with investor risk 
aversion and also during economic recessions. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 defines 
socially responsible investing, section 4.3 reviews the literature on the financial cost 
and benefit SRI, section 4.4 develops the hypothesis and section 4.5 describes the data 
and method used to examine the performance of SRI portfolios and outlines the 
approach used to measure psychic dividend. Section 4.6 presents the empirical 
findings and section 4.7 concludes.   
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4.2 Socially Responsible Investment 
The Social Investment Forum considers SRI to be “an investment process that 
considers the social and environmental consequences of investments, both positive 
and negative, within the context of rigorous financial analysis” (USSIF, 2012). SRI is 
also more generally regarded in other contexts as being the process of incorporating 
any non-financial criteria into the investment process that seek to encourage 
environmental or social good. This may include the investment in assets that promote 
human rights or consumer protection, or alternatively, avoids investments in assets 
that are associated with practices considered unethical, anti-social, or damaging to the 
environment  (i.e., investments in firms or industries related to alcohol, tobacco, 
gambling, pornography or weapons) (Sparkes and Cowton, 2004). Whilst historic, 
religious, cultural and moral beliefs largely influence what asset managers and 
individuals consider SRI, the constant evolution and lack of consensus amongst its 
interpretation has led to a degree of ambiguity surrounding its definition. SRI is 
therefore often used synonymously with terms such as ‘green’, ‘clean’, ‘ethical’, 
‘sustainable’, ‘socially conscious’ or ‘triple-bottom-line’ investing. Subsequently, 
many SRI-screens adopted by institutions and individuals may either complement one 
another or remain mutually exclusive to one another.   
Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini, Research and Analysis Inc. (KLD), a third-
party provider of firm-level quantitative SRI classification data, profile companies 
using positive and negative SRI criteria to provide ESG ratings for over 3000 of the 
largest publicly listed U.S. firms. The positive SRI criteria assess firm based on their 
involvement in practices that promote or sustain environmental or corporate 
responsibility, whereas negative SRI criteria assess firms based on practices that 
adversely affect the environment or society. These criteria are based on several major 
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ESG dimensions including; employee relations, diversity, community relationships, 
human rights, environment, governance, and controversial issues. Each indicator 
within the major dimensions is assigned a binary score, and the sum of scores across 
all ESG dimensions provides the company with its final ESG rating. Subsequently, no 
firms are considered ‘perfectly’ socially responsible or irresponsible. Furthermore, 
firms with the same overall ESG rating may differ substantially from one another in 
terms of their individual ESG characteristics, thereby being perceived differently from 
one another in terms of their social responsibility (Chen and Delmas, 2011). KLD are 
also responsible for maintaining the MSCI KLD 400 Social Index, a market 
capitalisation-weighted index constructed from the universe of the MSCI USA 
Investable Market Index and constitutes the highest 400 ESG-screened companies 
according to KLD’s ESG ratings. The ESG ratings are based on a culmination of five 
key categories, including; environment, community and society, employees and 
supply chain, customers, and governance and ethics, while also excluding companies 
involved in the production and distribution of alcohol, tobacco, firearms, gambling, 
nuclear power or military weapons. This index is designed to assist investors track the 
performance of socially responsible portfolios.  
The difficulty of classifying an investor as being ‘socially responsible’ is 
demonstrated in Geczy, et al. (2005). To identify such investors, Geczy, et al. (2005) 
construct SRI portfolios of mutual funds using information sourced from the current 
literature as well as from the asset management industry. These sources include, the 
Social Investment Forum (2001), Morningstar, newspapers, magazines and journals, 
fund prospectuses and websites, as well as from direct contact with fund managers. 
Geczy, et al. (2005) use this information to identify 20 positive and 20 negative 
screens in which to categorise mutual funds. The positive screens are; Renewable 
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Energy, Community Involvement/Investment, Human Rights, Environment, Diversity 
and Animal Rights. The negative screens consist of; alcohol, tobacco, gambling, 
nuclear power, firearms, defence contracting (military) weapons, irresponsible foreign 
operations (i.e., investment in oppressive regimes such as Burma or China and 
mistreatment of indigenous peoples), abortion/birth control, usury (i.e., predatory 
lending, bonds, fixed-income securities) and pornography. To measure the psychic 
dividend earned by SRI investors, this chapter defines SRI in a broad sense that does 
not impose a specific definition, but incorporates all general screens commonly used 
throughout the prevalent literature that characterise a firm’s environmental or social 
governance mandates. The specific approach used to construct a portfolio that is 
representative of SRI and non-SRI investors is described in detail in section 4.5.a.  
4.3 Background Literature    
4.3.a Introduction  
An abundance of studies have emerged that seek to examine the effect that SRI 
has on stock portfolio performance. A large proportion of these studies investigate the 
financial cost of SRI by comparing SRI-screened portfolio performance against the 
performance of unscreened of ‘non-SRI’ screened portfolios. The findings from these 
studies, however, remain largely unconsolidated as the literature proposes two 
competing hypotheses concerning the effect that SRI has on performance. The first 
suggests that by constraining the investment opportunity set to contain only SRI stocks, 
a portfolio will fail to be mean-variance efficient, and through the incurrence of higher 
costs structures, to remain socially responsible, these portfolios will ultimately 
underperform non-SRI portfolios. The opposing hypotheses suggests that in the long 
run, socially responsible stocks are able to outperform non-SRI stocks due to the 
avoidance of potential costs associated with reputation loss, corporate social crisis or 
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from potential litigation costs that may arise from ignoring socially responsible 
practises (Renneboog, Ter Horst and Zhang, 2008). The following literature discusses 
the extent to which this financial cost (or benefit) impacts investors who are socially 
responsible.   
4.3.b Financial cost from SRI 
Traditionally, SRI-constrained portfolios are typically expected to 
underperform in the long-run. This argument has largely been supported by a body of 
literature using a variety of screens to evaluate the performance of SRI-constrained 
portfolios. Geczy, et al. (2005) find that the cost imposed by constraining a portfolio 
based on SRI criterion depends on the investors’ prior beliefs about pricing models, 
managerial skill, as well as their proportion of wealth that is invested in SRI. They 
show that the cost of SRI to investors who strongly believe in the CAPM and whose 
portfolio is minimally invested in SRI can be as little as one to two basis points per 
month. However, for those with a belief in multi-factor asset pricing models, such as 
the Fama and French (1993) or Carhart (1997) models, or who believe that managers 
possess skill based on past returns, then the cost of an SRI-constrained portfolio can 
become economically significant. This is argued to be especially true for investors 
who hold a large proportion of their total portfolio wealth in socially responsible funds. 
Geczy, et al. (2005) further argue that this cost of engaging in SRI is offset by the 
utility derived by socially responsible investors for ‘doing good’. However, they 
recognise that this mean-variance measure of cost does not incorporate the non-
financial utility extracted by socially responsible investors that is associated with SRI 
investing. Consequently, the certainty equivalent cost imposed on the SRI fund 
portfolios is considered an overestimate of the total net cost to investors who have 
such investment preferences.  
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Using the MSCI KLD 400 Social index as an SRI indictor, Becchetti and 
Ciciretti (2009) examine the variance and performance of socially responsible stocks 
using daily data in an event study across a 14 year horizon. They show that the raw 
returns and unconditional volatility of SRI stocks are significantly lower than 
conventional stocks after controlling for industry effects, however, conditional 
abnormal returns of SRI stocks are found to be statistically indifferent. Becchetti and 
Ciciretti (2009) further argue that passive SRI stock portfolios exhibit significantly 
lower systematic risk. 
Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) examine the performance of ‘sin’ (alcohol, 
tobacco and gaming) stocks, using time-series regressions over the period from 1965 
to 2006 and find that a portfolio that is long sin stocks and short ‘non-sin’ stocks, of 
similar characteristics, produces a significantly positive Carhart alpha (of about 26 
basis points per month). They also find that sin stocks have higher book-to-market 
value, are under-priced, have less analyst coverage and are held less by institutions, 
relative to non-sin stocks. Using cross-sectional regression analysis and controlling 
for firm characteristics including size, past returns, and market-to-book ratio, Hong 
and Kacperczyk (2009) also show that sin stocks are able to significantly outperform 
their counterparts by about 29 basis points per month. These results are also found to 
be robust for stocks outside of the U.S. market over the period from 1985 to 2006 for 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom. Adler and Kritzman (2008) apply Monte Carlo simulation to estimate the 
cost of socially responsible investing. They show that this cost (when measured as the 
difference in raw returns between an SRI constrained portfolio and an unconstrained 
portfolio) is substantial, even for moderately skilled investors. Adler and Kritzman 
(2008) also argue that this cost increases with investor skill, cross-sectional dispersion 
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of the fraction of the universe that is restricted, and the number of securities held in 
the portfolio. 
4.3.c Financial benefit from SRI  
The previous literature commonly argues that there is a trade-off between 
social responsibility and financial gain when it comes to investing. However, there is 
also a large body of literature suggesting that SRI is able to outperform non-SRI. This 
implies that investors not only benefit socially from such investments, but are also 
financially better off. Investigating the relationship between corporate social 
responsibility and corporate financial performance by conducting a meta-analysis on 
52 studies, Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes (2003) find that the two are positively related 
to each other. Their results indicate that this relationship is strongest amongst 
backward-looking performance measures (accounting returns) rather than with 
forward-looking indicators (such as shareholder returns). Derwall, Guenster, Bauer, 
and Koedijk (2005) support the findings of Orlitzky et al. (2003) when examining the 
performance of U.S. large-cap ‘eco-efficient’ stock portfolios constructed using eco-
efficiency scores from Innovest Strategic Value Advisors over the period from 1995 
to 2003. Derwall, et al. (2005) show that the highest eco-efficient portfolio produce a 
Carhart alpha significantly greater than the lowest eco-efficient portfolio (by about 6 
percent per annum) after controlling for industry effects. These findings confirm those 
of Blank and Daniel (2002), who also argue that eco-efficient portfolios are able to 
outperform the S&P500 index in terms of their Sharpe ratio over the period of 1997 
to 2001. Derwall, et al. (2005) suggest that the reason as to why SRI stocks outperform 
non-SRI stocks is because markets are either undervaluing environmental information, 
or, that SRI portfolios are capturing the premium of some risk factors that are absent 
in prevalent asset pricing models. 
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 Thomas (2001) and Ziegler, Rennings, and Schröder (2002) show that the 
stocks of environmentally-conscious firms in UK and European markets outperform 
after adjusting for Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) risk factors. These 
studies however, focus only upon the environmental aspect of SRI. Statman (2008b), 
on the other hand, examines the performance of SRI stocks more broadly by 
comparing the MSCI KLD 400 Social Index, against the S&P 500. He shows that over 
the period from 1990 to 2004, the KLD 400 outperformed the S&P500 in terms of raw 
returns, although slightly underperformed after returns are risk-adjusted. Kempf and 
Osthoff (2007), on the other hand, use SRI stock ratings from KLD to construct long-
short SRI portfolios from the highest and lowest ten percent of SRI-scored stocks from 
within each industry. They show that this strategy produces a significantly positive 
Carhart alpha (up to 8.7 percent per annum) over the period from 1992 to 2004. In 
contrast to Derwall, et al. (2005), Kempf and Osthoff (2007) find this relationship to 
be insignificant for the environmental component of the SRI portfolio. Chan and 
Walter (2014) support Derwall, et al. (2005)’s findings when investigating the 
performance of 372 environmentally-friendly firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ during the period of 1990 to 2007. They show that portfolios of 
environmentally friendly firms produce significantly positive Carhart alpha of about 
7 percent p.a. However, unlike Derwall, et al. (2005), Chan and Walter (2014) use the 
same environmental classifications as KLD to construct portfolios from publicly 
available information based on the argument of reducing search costs for 
environmentally-conscience investors.  
4.3.d Financial Indifference from SRI 
Galema, Plantinga, and Scholtens (2008) examine the Carhart alphas of 
socially responsible portfolios constructed according to the scores of stocks from six 
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different social screens monitored by KLD over the period from 1992 to 2006. Galema 
et al. (2008) confirm the findings from earlier studies that the highest SRI-scored 
stocks do not significantly differ in terms of performance from the lowest scored-SRI 
stocks. They argue that SRI eventuates in lower book-to-market ratios, and as a result, 
the alphas do not capture SRI effects. 
Nelling and Webb (2009) argue that the relationship between SRI and 
performance found by previous studies is a result of methodological limitations. They 
therefore examine the existence and direction of causality between stock performance 
and SRI, using SRI scores from the KLD Socrates database. Nelling and Webb (2009) 
subsequently show that this positive relationship between stock performance and SRI-
classification disappears once time-fixed effects and tobit models are introduced to 
conventional OLS regression analysis. This argument is further supported when using 
Granger causality models, such that no causality from SRI score to performance is 
found and only weak evidence of causality running from stock performance to SRI 
score. 
Brzeszczyński and McIntosh (2013) analyse the performance of individual SRI 
investors by constructing SRI portfolios using freely available information from the 
Global-100 list of UK SRI stocks rather than from private databases such as KLD. 
They similarly fail to find any evidence that these portfolios significantly outperform 
the FTSE100 or FTSE4GOOD indices from 2000 to 2010 when using either raw or 
risk-adjusted returns. Applying a proprietary dataset from the Sustainability Asset 
Management Group, GmbH, Humphrey, Lee, and Shen (2012) examine the effect that 
SRI has on the performance and risk of a broad sample of UK firms. They similarly 
find no evidence of a difference in the risk-adjusted performance of high and low SRI 
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rated portfolios after controlling for industry and idiosyncratic risk factors. Humphrey, 
et al. (2012) further show that SRI does not affect idiosyncratic risk, though they do 
find some evidence that high SRI firms are larger and have lower systematic risk. 
Lee, Faff, and Langfield-Smith (2009) argue that methodological limitation of 
past studies that examine the SRI-performance relationships of individual stocks is the 
cause of inconsistent findings. Such limitations are said to include a lack of relevant 
controls factors, the inclusion of a limited number of accounting and market 
performance variables, small sample sizes, short analysis periods and an over-reliance 
on negative screening processes to establish the sample. To account for these 
limitations, Lee, et al. (2009) employ an alternative SRI metric to rank stocks that does 
not preclude entire industries but includes companies perceived to be industry leaders 
with respect to environmental, social and economic performance. These metrics are 
constructed from data sourced from the Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes Group, 
representing stocks from across all industries and regional segments. Using cross-
sectional panel analysis across a five year horizon and controlling for industry, country, 
size, style, risk, financial slack, R&D intensity, and liquidity, Lee, et al. (2009) find 
no evidence of a relationship between SRI and stock performance.  
In addition to the above studies that focus on SRI at the stock level, there is an 
extensive body of literature that examines the performance of SRI at the fund level. 
Renneboog, et al. (2008) provide a review of this literature, concluding that “the 
existing studies hint but do not unequivocally demonstrate that SRI investors are 
willing to accept suboptimal financial performance to pursue social or ethical 
objectives” (p.1740). Based on this SRI performance literature, it cannot be said with 
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certainty that mutual fund investors are financially punished (or rewarded) for being 
socially responsible. 
4.3.e Non-financial Benefit from SRI 
Investment decisions of individuals are not considered to be made solely on 
financial grounds. Webley, Lewis, and Mackenzie (2001), Schueth (2003), Michelson, 
Wailes, Van Der Laan, and Frost (2004) and Williams (2007) show that certain 
investors consider ethical and personal values when making investment decisions. 
Hostede and Hofstede (1991) Katz, Swanson, and Nelson (2001) and Williams and 
Zinkin (2005) argue that the behaviour to invest in such a manner stems from 
sociocultural influences on perceptions of corporate responsibility. Naber (2001) 
Brammer, Williams, and Zinkin (2007) and Williams and Zinkin (2008) similarly 
argue that religious beliefs are also responsible for investors’ choice to hold SRI assets. 
A plethora of studies subsequently examine the characteristics of investors that make 
them likely to consider the ESG aspects of investments in additional to merely 
financial aspects [see, for example Beal and Goyen (1998), Tippet and Leung (2001), 
McLachlan and Gardner (2004), Williams (2007), Haigh (2008), Owen and Qian 
(2008) Junkus and Berry (2010) and Pérez-Gladish, Benson, and Faff (2012)]. These 
studies report conflicting results that demographic factors (age, gender, education, 
income, etc.), life style and emotional factors amongst other characteristics affect 
investors’ level of social responsibility, and the extent to which their invested wealth 
is allocated to ‘SRI’ assets.  
 Statman (2004), Statman (2008a) and Sparkes (2010) argue that the motivation 
behind investors selecting SRI extends beyond that of solely achieving financial 
benefit to obtain some other benefit, of a non-financial nature, that relates to the 
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environmental and social considerations of the investment. Knoll (2002) however, 
highlights that SRI is not simply achieving ESG goals, i.e. it is not about charity or 
giving money away, but must also require the generation of some financial return for 
the practise to be considered an “investment.” Hence to be considered SRI, the practise 
must satisfy two main criteria; one) generating a positive expected financial return, 
and two) be able uphold a level of ESG responsibility. Lewis and Mackenzie (2000) 
argue that SRI investors may care more about the social responsibility aspect of their 
investment than the financial benefit, and as such, may be willing to forgo some 
financial return in exchange for holding social responsible assets. Beal, Goyen, and 
Phillips (2005) subsequently refer to this non-financial benefit as a “psychic return”. 
Beal, et al. (2005) similarly argue that some investors will trade-off financial returns 
for psychic returns due to the increased utility gained from the fact that their 
investments possess such SRI characteristics. Beal, et al. (2005) also suggests that this 
psychic return can also be viewed as an increase in happiness and may be derived from 
the desire of investors for social change and hence could be linked to the knowledge 
that their investments do not support unethical or controversial products or practises. 
Webley, et al. (2001) support Beal, et al. (2005)’s concept of psychic returns by 
showing that socially responsible investors maintain or increase SRI holdings after the 
underperformance of such investments, thus suggesting that SRI investors make 
investment decisions based on ideology more so than financial principles. 
4.3.f Conclusion 
The variety of approaches used throughout the current literature that explore 
the cost to investors from being socially responsible generally measures this ‘cost’ in 
terms of financial loss (or gain) from either raw or risk adjusted-returns of SRI-
constrained portfolios relative to some other ‘non-SRI’ benchmark. This literature 
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fails to reach consensus, and as such, there is conflict as to whether investors who are 
socially responsible are financially better or worse off than ‘non-responsible’ investors. 
Geczy, et al. (2005) however, use certainty equivalent returns to measure the cost of 
being socially responsible. They show that there is a financial cost when investing in 
a socially responsible manner, yet argue that this is an overestimate of the net cost to 
investors for being socially responsible, as this financial cost is offset by the non-
financial utility derived by investors for being socially responsible. This chapter 
expands the work of Geczy, et al. (2005) by measuring the value of this non-financial 
satisfaction that socially responsible investors derive from investing in such a manner, 
for which this chapter refers to as the “psychic dividend” of SRI.    
4.4 Hypothesis development 
4.4.a Psychic Returns and Dividends 
The existing literature, at least in art economics, addresses estimates of psychic 
returns to art using a number of procedures which are discussed in Srivastava, et al. 
(2013). These include the rental value of art, Hedonic modelling and inferences based 
on the intercept of the CAPM. Whilst each of these methods seems quite plausible, 
they typically provide estimates of psychic returns in the order of ten to thirty percent. 
Taking this range of estimates together with information concerning expected capital 
gains for art and expected total returns for equity, Srivastava, et al. (2013) construct 
optimal portfolios for investors by allowing the psychic return parameter to vary, 
hence obtaining some notion as to what a plausible range of values might be. 
Individual psychic dividends however, which may be very high due to extreme 
pleasures gained from heightened aesthetic sensitivity, are likely to be much lower in 
an equilibrium framework when all investors are considered and whereby some of 
whom may not be influenced by aesthetic considerations. Likewise, SRI investors may 
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have vastly different preferences from other investors, and without additional 
information, our “representative” investor will be an amalgam of the two groups. 
Psychic dividends calculated from such an approach are therefore likely to under-
estimate the psychic dividend enjoyed by SRI investors.  
4.5 Data and Method 
4.5.a SRI Portfolio Construction 
To measure the psychic dividend earned by SRI investors, the performance of 
two portfolios representative of a socially responsible investor (Good portfolio) and a 
socially irresponsible investor (Bad portfolio) are required. These two portfolios are 
constructed from the universe of the 500 largest U.S. stocks by market capitalisation. 
Stocks are first classified as Good, Bad or ‘Other’, according to their tier one Standard 
Industry Classification (SIC) industry category. SIC categorises U.S. stocks into one 
of 99 tier one industries.54 These industries are therefore categorised into either one of 
these three groups. The socially responsible (Good) category contains 21 industries 
groups, which include;  
Health Services, Educational Services, Social Services, Justice Public 
Order & Safety, Museums Art Galleries & Gardens, Administration-
Human Resource Programs, Measuring & Analysing Instruments 
Manufacturers, Insurance Carriers, Insurance Agents Brokers & Service, 
Admin-Environmental Quality Programs, Local/Suburban Transit & 
Highway Passenger, Agricultural Production-Crops, Communications, 
Miscellaneous Repair Services, Public Finance & Taxation Policy, 
                                                 
54 SIC classifications are sourced from: http://www.melissadata.com/lookups/sic.asp.  
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Administration Of Economic Programs, Business Services and Personal 
Services.  
The socially irresponsible (Bad) category comprises of 14 industries groups, which 
include;   
Metal Mining, Coal Mining, Oil & Gas Extraction, Mining & 
Quarrying/Non-metallic Minerals, Tobacco Products Manufacturers, 
Lumber & Wood Products ex-Furniture Manufacturers, Chemicals & 
Allied Products Manufacturers, Petroleum Refining & Related Industrial 
Manufacturers, Leather & Leather Products Manufacturers, Pipelines 
Except Natural Gas, Amusement & Recreation Services (casinos and 
gaming), Agricultural Production/Livestock, Wholesale Trade-
Nondurable Goods, Forestry, as well as Tobacco and Meat & Fish Markets 
Sub-industries.  
The remaining 64 industries are classified as belonging to the ‘Other’ category. The 
smallest ten stocks, by one-month lagged market capitalisation from the Bad industry 
category are used to construct an equal-weighted Bad portfolio. The portfolio is limited 
to ten stocks from each industry so that it is not overweighted toward any one industry 
relative to the industry weights of the market index. The smallest stocks from each 
industry (contained in the top 500 universe) are selected based on the assumption that 
smaller firms are less in the ‘spotlight’ and as such are under less pressure to operate 
in a socially responsible manner. The Good portfolio on the other hand is constructed 
in the same manner, yet using the largest ten stocks from each of the Good industries 
(based on the assumption that larger firms are under more pressure to behave in a more 
socially responsible manner). This approach is considered a ‘worst-of-worst’ industries 
and a ‘best-of-best’ industries approach when allocating stocks to the SRI portfolios. 
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The Good and Bad portfolios are readjusted monthly using one-month lagged market 
capitalisation values.  
4.5.b Data 
Monthly stock-return, market capitalisation and SIC data for all U.S. stocks 
from January 1990 to December 2013 are sourced from the Centre for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) database. The three Fama and French (1993) factors and 
Carhart (1997) momentum factor, along with the risk-free return for the U.S. market 
is sourced from Ken French’s website. 55  The market-excess return is the value-
weighted return of all CRSP firms incorporated in the U.S. and listed on the NYSE, 
AMEX, or NASDAQ that have a CRSP share code of ten or eleven at the beginning 
of month minus the one-month Treasury bill rate. The Fama-French factors are 
constructed using six value-weighted portfolios formed on market capitalisation and 
book-to-market value of equity. Specifically, SMB (Small Minus Big) is the average 
return on the three small portfolios minus the average return on the three big portfolios, 
given by:  
𝑆𝑀𝐵 =
1
3
[(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 + 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ) − (𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 +
𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ)]. 
HML (High Minus Low) is the average return on the two value portfolios minus the 
average return on the two growth portfolios: 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 =
1
2
[(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒) − (𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ)]. 
                                                 
55  Factor returns are sourced from the Ken French website; http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/ 
pages/faculty/ken.french/. 
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The momentum factor (UMD) is constructed from six value-weighted 
portfolios formed on size and prior two to twelve month returns. The portfolios, which 
are formed monthly, are the intersections of two portfolios formed on size (market 
capitalisation) and three portfolios formed on prior two to twelve month returns. The 
monthly size breakpoint is the median NYSE market equity. The monthly prior return 
breakpoints are the 30thand 70th NYSE percentiles. UMD is the average return on the 
two high prior return portfolios minus the average return on the two low prior return 
portfolios,  
𝑈𝑀𝐷 =
1
2
[(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ) − (𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐿𝑜𝑤 + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝐿𝑜𝑤)]. 
The six portfolios used to construct UMD each month include NYSE, AMEX, 
and NASDAQ stocks with prior return data. Index prices for the MSCI KLD Social 
400 Index is sourced from Datastream. This index is used as a robustness check for 
the socially responsible portfolio constructed in section 4.5.a. 
4.5.c NBER Economic Cycle 
SRI portfolio performance and psychic dividends of SRI investors are 
measured over the sample period from January 1990 to December 2013 as well as 
across National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) recessionary and 
expansionary dates from this period.56 Of the 287 months between January 1990 and 
December 2013, 255 were expansionary months and the remaining 32 were 
recessionary months. The performance of the Good and Bad Portfolios are also 
measured separately over months with positive market returns (up-market months) 
                                                 
56 NBER business cycle dates are sourced from; http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html.  
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and months with negative market return (down-market months) according to the return 
of the market portfolio.57    
Table 4.1: NBER Business Cycle Dates 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) turning point (peak and trough) dates for the 
U.S. economic cycle over the period from January 1990 to December 2013 are reported in this 
table along with the duration of the economic phase (in month) since the previous turning 
point.   
 
Date Peak / Trough Duration (months)   
1/01/1990 - -   
1/07/1990 Peak 7   
1/03/1991 Trough 8   
1/03/2001 Peak 12   
1/11/2001 Trough 8   
1/12/2007 Peak 73   
1/06/2009 Trough 18   
30/12/2013 - 55   
 
4.5.d Performance Evaluation 
The performance of the Good, Bad and a long-short (Good–Bad) portfolios are 
measured from the intercept term, α, of the standard CAPM and Carhart (1997) four-
factor models in equations 4.1 and 4.2, respectively, using ordinary least squares 
regressions: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1,𝑖,𝑡(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                     (4.1) 
and 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1,𝑖,𝑡(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽2,𝑖,𝑡𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡+𝛽3,𝑖,𝑡𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡+𝛽4,𝑖,𝑡𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,    
                     (4.2) 
where 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 is the excess return of portfolio i at time t. 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 is CAPM or Carhart 
alpha of portfolio i. Rm-Rf, SMB, HML and UMD are the monthly returns from the 
                                                 
57 The returns from the CRSP value-weighted market index is used to identify up-market and down-
market months from the market. 
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standard Carhart (1997) factors at time t,  𝛽1,𝑖,𝑡…𝛽4,𝑖,𝑡  are the estimated coefficients 
on each of the four factors, respectively, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term of portfolio i at time 
t. 
4.5.e Calculation of Psychic Dividends 
Given a utility function, U, and initial wealth, 𝑊0 , and SRI returns, 𝑟, the 
certainty-equivalence, 𝑐𝑒, of SRI returns can be defined additively or multiplicatively, 
i.e.: 
𝐸[𝑈(𝑊0(1 + 𝑟))] = 𝑈(𝑊0(1 + 𝑐𝑒)), and 
𝐸[𝑈(𝑊0(𝑒
𝑟))] = 𝑈(𝑊0𝑒
𝑐𝑒), respectively. 
To separate the value of 𝑐𝑒  from the level of  𝑊0  (which seems practical, if only 
because of data limitations), homogeneous (in wealth) utility functions are proposed, 
such as power utility. If we let, 
𝑈(𝑊) =  




1
1W , 
using the additive form, investible wealth can be set equal to one. This framework 
considers long-only strategies, which avoids the consideration of bankruptcy issues. 
4.5.e.i The Long – only Strategy 
Consider the function: 
𝑉𝑇
1−𝛼
=
1
𝑇
∑
(1+𝑟𝑖,𝑡)
1−𝛼
1−𝛼
𝑇
𝑡=1 , 
where 𝑉𝑇  is the sample estimate of expected utility. 𝑟𝑖,1 … 𝑟𝑖,𝑇, are the sample returns 
to portfolio i from time t=1 to T, and 𝛼 is the risk-aversion coefficient that takes a 
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value of 3, 5 or 7, which correspond to typical values used in the current literature58. 
When expressed in terms of certainty equivalent returns, ce, this function becomes,   
(1+𝑐𝑒)1−𝛼
1−𝛼
=
𝑉𝑇
1−𝛼
 . 
We then simplify to arrive at an expression for ce, 
(1 + 𝑐𝑒)1−𝛼 = 𝑉𝑇, 
(1 + 𝑐𝑒) = 𝑉𝑇
1
1−𝛼, 
rearranging yields: 
        𝑐𝑒 = 𝑉𝑇
1
1−𝛼 − 1.            (4.3) 
It is therefore evident that ce depends only upon 𝑉𝑇 and 𝛼. 
To compute implied psychic returns, it is necessary that the portfolios 
considered are indistinguishable bar this unobservable dividend, d, that accrues with 
certainty to the SRI investor. This would imply, using population moments, that: 
𝑉 = 𝐸[(1 + 𝑟)1−𝛼], 
and that the expected utility of the SRI investor is,  
                                                 
58  Despite the importance that the coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) plays in many 
microeconomic and macroeconomic models, experimental research has provided little guidance as to 
how risk aversion should be modelled. Subsequently, this difficulty in empirically estimating CRRA 
has resulted in its value being largely disputed. Whilst CRRA is typically estimated to be around one 
to five, earlier studies, such as Arrow (1971), argues on a theoretically ground that it should be 
approximately one, Altug (1983) estimates it to be near zero. Epstein and Zin (1991) and Giovannini 
and Weil (1989) also empirically support this value being closer to one. Maitel (1973) suggests an 
estimate of CRRA of approximately 1.5. Similarly, Kydland and Prescott (1982), find that a value 
between one and two is required to observe the relative variability of consumption and investment 
whereas Friend and Blume (1975) suggest that the parameter should be around two. Recent studies, 
however, argue even higher aversion to risk with values in the order of five to ten being reasonable 
(Kaplow, 2005). Mehra and Prescott (1985) for example, impose an upper bound CRRA of ten, whereas 
values up to 30 are argued by Kandel and Stambaugh (1991) to be possible. Recent empirical work in 
the area of financial economics, indicate estimates of CRRA to be greater than two. Those that 
attempting to reconcile the equity risk premium with rational behaviour, indicates that individuals’ 
CRRA’s may be above 10 [See, for example Blake (1996), Brav, Constantinides, and Geczy (2002), 
Campbell (1996, 2003), Kocherlakota (1996), Mankiw and Zeldes (1991), and Palsson (1996)]. 
Similarly high estimates of CARR are also reported in studies of risk-taking behaviour in other markets 
[see, for example Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro (1997)]. 
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𝑉𝑠 = 𝐸[(1 + 𝑟)
1−𝛼](1 + 𝑑)1−𝛼 . 
It follows that, if 𝑐𝑒𝑠 is the certainty equivalence of the SRI investor, then, 
𝑑 =
1+𝑐𝑒𝑠
1+𝑐𝑒
− 1 =
𝑐𝑒𝑠−𝑐𝑒
1+𝑐𝑒
. 
For small values of 𝑐𝑒, 𝑑 can be accurately approximated by 𝑐𝑒𝑠 − 𝑐𝑒. 
4.5.e.ii The Long–Short Strategy and Loss Aversion 
In the following section, psychic dividends to SRI from long-only portfolios are 
computed from loss-aversion utility functions, which have been argued by numerous 
scholars to provide a more accurate representation of investor preferences. 59 
Furthermore, these utility functions are defined over rates of return rather than wealth 
so as to avoid wealth measurement issues. Defining: 
𝑈(𝑟𝑡) = { 
(𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡)
𝛼1
,               𝑖𝑓 𝑟𝑡 ≥ 𝑟𝑓,𝑡            
−λ(𝑟𝑓,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡)
𝛼2
 ,      𝑖𝑓 𝑟𝑡  < 𝑟𝑓,𝑡          
. 
This function can then be expressed as: 
𝑈(𝑟𝑡) = 𝑑𝑡(𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡)
𝛼1
− (1 − 𝑑𝑡)𝜆(𝑟𝑓,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡)
𝛼2
, 
and thus 𝑈(𝑟𝑡)̂  is calculated from the following equation: 
𝑈(𝑟𝑡)̂ =
1
𝑇
∑ [𝑑𝑡(𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡)
𝛼1
− (1 − 𝑑𝑡)𝜆(𝑟𝑓,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡)
𝛼2
]𝑇𝑡=1 , 
where, 
𝑑𝑡 = {
 1, 𝑖𝑓    𝑟𝑡 ≥ 𝑟𝑓,𝑡  
0, 𝑖𝑓     𝑟𝑡  < 𝑟𝑓,𝑡
, 
                                                 
59 See Kahneman and Tversky (1979) for a discussion on the rival merits of loss aversion utility and 
utility that includes relative risk aversion.   
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       𝑈 = { 
(𝑐𝑒 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡)
𝛼1
,               𝑖𝑓 𝑈(𝑟𝑡) ̂ ≥ 0            
−λ(𝑟𝑓,𝑡 − 𝑐𝑒)
𝛼2
 ,       𝑖𝑓 𝑈(𝑟𝑡) ̂ < 0          
.              (4.4) 
Defining CE as excess certainty equivalent return:  
𝐶𝐸 ≡  𝑐𝑒 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡, 
then CE can be calculated as, 
         𝐶𝐸 = { 
𝑈
1
𝛼1 ,                  𝑖𝑓 𝑈 ≥ 0            
− (
−𝑈
λ
)
1
𝛼2 ,     𝑖𝑓 𝑈 < 0          
                  (4.5) 
where 𝛼1and 𝛼2 are coefficients that govern the attitude to upside and downside risk, 
respectively, and λ is the coefficient of loss aversion. This chapter considers 𝛼1 =
𝛼2 = 0.88  and λ = 2.25,  which has become the consensus amongst the finance 
literature [see, for example Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Neilson and Stowe (2002), 
Barberis and Huang (2001) and Ang, Bekaert, and Liu (2005)]. 
One of the strengths of the loss-aversion approach is that it allows us to model 
long-short portfolios easily. Suppose a strategy is considered where we hold 100 in 
cash and  𝜃 × 100 in a long–short position, then,  
𝑟𝑡 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝜃(𝑟𝑡
+ − 𝑟𝑡
−), 
𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓  = 𝜃(𝑟𝑡
+ − 𝑟𝑡
−), 
The utility function can then be expressed as: 
𝑈(𝑟𝑡) = 𝑑𝑡[𝜃(𝑟𝑡
+ − 𝑟𝑡
−)]𝛼1 − (1 − 𝑑𝑡)λ[𝜃(𝑟𝑡
− − 𝑟𝑡
+)]𝛼2, 
where, 
𝑑𝑡 = { 
1, 𝑖𝑓      𝑟𝑡
+ ≥ 𝑟𝑡
−  
0, 𝑖𝑓      𝑟𝑡
+ < 𝑟𝑡
−  
and 𝜃 is the level of gearing, which is set equal to one. Then, 
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𝑈(𝑟𝑡)̂ =
1
𝑇
∑ [𝑑𝑡(𝜃(𝑟𝑡
+ − 𝑟𝑡
−))
𝛼1
− (1 − 𝑑𝑡)λ(𝜃(𝑟𝑡
− − 𝑟𝑡
+))
𝛼2
]𝑇𝑡=1 , 
and thus U is calculated as: 
𝑈 = { 
(𝑐𝑒 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡)
𝛼1
,               𝑖𝑓 𝑈(𝑟𝑡) ̂ ≥ 0            
−λ(𝑟𝑓,𝑡 − 𝑐𝑒)
𝛼2
 ,       𝑖𝑓 𝑈(𝑟𝑡) ̂ < 0          
.  
Again, if CE is defined as excess certainty equivalent return, then:  
𝐶𝐸 = { 
𝑈
1
𝛼1 ,                𝑖𝑓  𝑈 ≥ 0            
− (
−𝑈
λ
)
1
𝛼2 ,      𝑖𝑓 𝑈 < 0          
.                      (4.6) 
In the case of the long-short strategy, the difference in the certainty equivalent 
returns is reported as the psychic dividend. A more precise expression in terms of ex-
ante expected utility remains elusive. However, in this chapter additive dividends are 
considered when evaluating expected utility. The reason as to why a less clear 
expression is obtained is due to the necessity of considering the population values for 
expected loss aversion. 
If 𝑝 is the probability that the term y is positive, then expected loss aversion, 
𝐿𝐴, is equal to, 
𝐿𝐴 = 𝑈+𝑝 − 𝜆𝑈−(1 − 𝑝), 
where, 
𝑈+ = E[𝑦𝛼1|𝑦 ≥ 0], 
𝑈− = E[(−𝑦)𝛼2|𝑦 < 0], 
Then LA is calculated as  
𝐿𝐴 = { 
𝑐𝑒𝛼1 ,          𝑖𝑓  𝐿𝐴 ≥ 0     
−𝜆(𝑐𝑒)𝛼2 ,        𝑖𝑓 𝐿𝐴 < 0          
. 
To an approximation, ignoring a term of magnitude 𝑑𝑟, 
𝑈𝑑+ = 𝐸[(𝑑 + 𝑦)𝛼1|𝑦 + 𝑑 ≥ 0], 
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𝑈𝑑− = E[(−𝑑 − 𝑦)𝛼2|𝑦 + 𝑑 < 0], 
Let 𝑝𝑑 be the probability that the term, 𝑦 + 𝑑, is positive.  
𝐿𝐴(𝑑) = 𝑈𝑑+𝑝𝑑 − λ𝑈𝑑−(1 − 𝑝𝑑), 
and loss aversion, 𝐿𝐴(𝑑), varies with 𝑑. 
4.6 Results 
4.6.a Summary Statistics 
The following analysis describes the characteristics of the Good and Bad 
portfolios used in the calculations of the psychic dividends, as well as the factors used 
in the evaluation of the performance of these portfolios.  
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics 
Monthly return descriptive statistics for the market portfolio, MKT, risk-free rate of return, Rf, 
and the Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) size, value, and momentum factors (SMB, 
HML and UMD) from January 1990 to December 2013 for the U.S. market are reported in the 
following table. The market return is the CRSP value-weighted portfolio and the risk-free 
return is the Treasury bill rate. Factor returns are sourced from the Ken French website.60 
Descriptive statistics of the returns and number of stocks contained in the socially responsible 
(Good), socially irresponsible (Bad), and a long-short (Good-Bad) stock portfolio are also 
reported.  
                
  Mean Min Median Max St.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
MKT 0.903 -17.150 1.460 11.340 4.394 -0.691 1.218 
Rf 0.261 0.000 0.280 0.690 0.187 0.004 -1.126 
SMB 0.217 -16.390 0.060 22.020 3.318 0.824 8.444 
HML 0.241 -12.680 0.170 13.870 3.167 0.086 3.021 
UMD 0.587 -34.720 0.650 18.390 5.007 -1.635 11.325 
# stocks in Good 
Portfolio 
48.537 41 48 56 2.738 0.084 0.747 
# stocks in Bad 
Portfolio 
47.035 33 48 55 5.432 -0.736 -0.396 
R(Good) 0.969 -18.476 1.293 13.215 4.479 -0.552 1.328 
R(Bad) 1.025 -21.590 1.241 16.703 4.867 -0.469 2.167 
R(Good-Bad)  -0.056 -13.713 -0.252 11.970 3.870 -0.192 0.623 
        
The number of stocks contained in each of the Good and Bad portfolios are 
approximately the same (about 48 stocks each) and remain relatively stable in quantity 
throughout the sample period. The monthly returns for the Good and Bad portfolios 
along with the return from the market portfolio are also similar to one another. The 
correlation between the return series of the Good and Bad portfolio is 0.6750 and the 
difference in variance, using a Levene (1960) test for homogeneity of variance, is 
insignificant (f-statistic = 0.8342). The skewness of the Good and Bad portfolio return 
distributions are also insignificant from one another (z-statistic equal to 0.621). The 
insignificant difference for the third and fourth moments between the return 
                                                 
60 Ken French website; http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/ pages/faculty/ken.french. 
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distributions of these portfolios lends support to the approach used to calculate the 
psychic dividends from these two portfolios.61,62,63 
4.6.b SRI Performance Evaluation 
Table 4.3: Portfolio Return Differences 
Difference in mean monthly returns for the Good, Bad, and long-short (Good-Bad) stock 
portfolios, across the period from January 1990 to December 2013 are reported. Differences 
in mean returns are also reported across NBER U.S. economic expansion and recession sub-
periods, and for Up- and Down-market months, where ‘Up’ represents months where the 
market return is positive and ‘Down’ are months where negative market returns are observed. 
The market return is the CRSP value-weighted portfolio and the risk-free return is the Treasury 
bill rate. T-statistics are displayed in parenthesis and *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
            
 Mean Return (% per month) 
  Entire Period Expansion Recession 
Up-market 
Months  
Down-
market 
Months 
Good-Market 0.066 0.050 0.067 -0.1570 0.422*** 
 (0.7339) (0.5290) (0.1933) (-1.377) (2.782) 
Bad-Market 0.122 0.068 0.628 -0.3680 1.049*** 
 (0.5604) (0.3241) (0.7447) (-1.515) (2.822) 
Good-Bad -0.056 -0.018 -0.561 0.2120 -0.627** 
 (-0.2441) (-0.0817) (-0.5823) (0.8) (-1.595) 
(Good-Bad) - rf -0.340 -0.280 -0.819 -0.0470 -0.893** 
  (-1.5359) (-1.2787) (-0.8545) (-0.178) (-2.26) 
      
      
The raw mean monthly return of the Good and Bad portfolios, shown in Table 4.3, are 
not significantly different to the market return when measured across the entire sample 
period as well as across expansionary and recessionary sub-periods. The Bad portfolio 
is shown to outperform the Good portfolio across all periods in terms of raw returns 
by about six basis points per month, however this difference is also insignificant (t-
statistic = -0.244). The long-short portfolio, constructed from long Good stocks and 
                                                 
61 The method of testing for equality of the third central moment is described in Appendix C. 
62 Descriptive statistics for the Good and Bad portfolios that are constructed as a robustness measure by 
removing the stock size and stock quantity-per-industry constraints from the original SRI portfolios are 
reported in Table C.1 in Appendix C. 
63 Descriptive statistics for the monthly returns of the MSCI KLD Social 400 index and MSCI U.S. total 
return index across the period from January 1990 to December 2013 are reported in Table C.5 within 
Appendix C. 
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short Bad stocks underperform the risk-free rate of return by about 34 basis points per 
month across the entire period, 28 basis points during expansionary months and 82 
basis points during recessionary months. This underperformance however, is also 
statistically insignificant. The Good and Bad portfolios are shown to significantly 
outperform the market during down-market months, with the Good portfolio 
significantly outperforming the Bad portfolio. This results in the long-short portfolio 
significantly underperforming the market. These relationships are not observed during 
up-market months. A possible explanation of this result is that SRI may be picking up 
a latent factor. Without knowing the factor, I attribute it to a psychic dividend. If SRI 
is actually something different then that can possibly be controlled for in some 
portfolio sorting procedure. 
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Table 4.4:  CAPM and Four-Factor SRI Portfolio Exposures 
CAPM and Carhart (1997) four-factor regressions are estimated for the socially responsible (Good), socially irresponsible(Bad) and long short (Good – Bad) 
stock portfolios using monthly returns over the period from January 1990 to December 2013. The CAPM regressions show portfolio market-risk exposure (Rm-
Rf) and the Carhart (1997) regressions identify market-risk exposure (Rm-Rf), value exposure (HML), size exposure (SMB) and momentum exposure (UMD). 
Alpha indicates portfolio risk-adjusted returns. The market return is the CRSP value-weighted portfolio and the risk-free return is the Treasury bill. Factor 
returns are sourced from the Ken French website. Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors and t-statistics are displayed in parentheses with *, **, 
and *** denoting significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.   
                  
 Good – Rf  Bad - Rf  Good - Bad 
VARIABLES (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Alpha 0.0892 0.0661  0.268 0.118  -0.179 -0.0520 
 (0.968) (0.727)  (1.320) (0.594)  (-0.813) (-0.238) 
Rm - Rf 0.942*** 0.981***  0.785*** 0.858***  0.157*** 0.123** 
 (45.309) (44.488)  (17.129) (17.769)  (3.158) (2.317) 
SMB  -0.131***   -0.00164   -0.129* 
  (-4.570)   (-0.026)   (-1.875) 
HML  0.0176   0.353***   -0.336*** 
  (0.579)   (5.298)   (-4.581) 
UMD  0.0381**   0.0319   0.00623 
  (2.046)   (0.782)   (0.139) 
Observations 287 287  287 287  287 287 
R-squared 0.878 0.889  0.507 0.555  0.034 0.105 
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The intercept terms (alpha) from the regressions reported in Table 4.4 show 
that Good, Bad, and Good-Bad portfolios are unable to produce significantly positive 
(or negative) abnormal returns after adjusting for market, size, value and momentum 
risk factors. The Good and Bad portfolios are both found to be slightly underexposed 
to the market risk premium, the Good portfolio has greater exposure to large market 
capitalisation and momentum stocks whereas the Bad portfolio is shown to be 
overexposed to value stocks. The long-short portfolio is shown to have a significantly 
negative exposure to the value risk factor. These findings indicate that socially 
responsible stocks tend to be larger in size, and that socially irresponsible stocks tend 
to be growth oriented.64 Similar results of insignificant risk-adjusted return are also 
observed for these portfolios across economic recessions and expansions, and market 
Up and Down sub-periods.65,66 
Unlike Derwall, et al. (2005) and Chan and Walter (2014), who find evidence 
of eco-efficient portfolios significantly outperforming the market index and produce 
significantly positive risk-adjusted returns, the SRI portfolio constructed in this 
chapter, which also incorporates environmental screens, is unable to produce 
significantly positive market-excess, or risk-adjusted returns. This may be due to the 
stocks from other socially responsible industries that are included in the SRI portfolio 
underperforming. Blank and Daniel (2002), Thomas (2001) and Ziegler, et al. (2002) 
however, fail to find evidence of eco-friendly stock portfolios outperforming. The 
performance of the SRI portfolio is also consistent with the findings from other studies 
                                                 
64 These results are robust when removing the screens to construct the Good and Bad portfolios, as 
shown in Table C.2 in Appendix C.  
65 Refer to Table C.3 and Table C.4 in Appendix C for Carhart (1997) regression estimates of the Good 
and Bad portfolios across economic and market sub-periods, respectively.   
66 CAPM and Carhart (1997) four-factor regressions are estimated for the MSCI KLD 400 Social index 
in Table C.6 in Appendix C, over NBER-dated expansionary and recessionary sub-periods. The results 
are qualitatively similar to the Good portfolio regressions in Table 4.4. 
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that more broadly define SRI rather than just considering environmental factors. 
Statman (2008b) for example, when examining the KLD social 400 index relative to 
the S&P500, finds that this socially responsible index is unable to significantly 
outperform the market index in terms of raw returns or risk-adjusted returns. Galema, 
Plantinga, and Scholtens (2008) similarly show that the risk-adjusted returns of a high 
and low SRI-scored stock portfolio are indifferent from one another, and similar to the 
findings from this chapter, show that high SRI-ranked stocks are relatively more 
growth orientated. The exposure of the Good portfolio to growth stocks is additionally 
supported by Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), who show that a sin portfolio (constructed 
of alcohol, tobacco and gaming stocks) largely consists of value stocks. Yet, unlike 
the Good and Bad portfolios used in this chapter, Hong and Kacperczyk (2009)’s 
portfolio that is long sin stocks and short non-sin stocks is shown to produce 
significantly positive risk-adjusted returns. The relative performance exhibited by the 
Good and Bad portfolios are also validated by other studies, including; Lee, Faff, and 
Langfield-Smith (2009), Brzeszczyński and McIntosh (2013), and Humphrey, et al. 
(2012). These findings lend support to these portfolios as being representative of the 
typical SRI and non-SRI portfolio, as such, validating the use of them in the 
measurement of psychic dividends.  
4.6.c Psychic Dividends 
Using the Good and Bad portfolios, implied psychic dividends accruing to 
socially responsible investors from holding SRI portfolios are measured using power 
utility functions and loss-aversion utility functions for long-only portfolios, in the 
following analysis. 
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Table 4.5: Psychic Dividends to SRI Investors 
Psychic dividends (measured as a percentage per month) are reported as the difference in 
certainty equivalent returns of the Good and Bad portfolios over the period from January 1990 
to December 2013 for various levels of risk aversion. U is investor utility derived by from 
investing in the respected portfolios and CE is certainty equivalent return as calculated from 
equation 4.5. 
                
     Good Portfolio  Bad Portfolio     
 
Risk Aversion (α)  Certainty Equivalent Return  
Psychic 
Dividend 
 3  0.65%  0.67%  -0.02% 
 5  0.44%  0.41%  0.03% 
 7  0.22%  0.12%  0.09% 
U -   -1.48%   -1.54%     
CE -   -0.33%   -0.35%   0.02%  
       
 
The psychic dividend earned by socially responsible investors is calculated as 
the difference in certainty equivalent returns (ce) from the Good and Bad Portfolios, 
where ce is measured from equation 4.3. This psychic dividend, reported in Table 4.5, 
is in the range of about negative 1.6 basis points and 9.4 basis points per month for 
investors with typical levels of risk aversion (α equal to three, five and seven). The 
relationship of how this psychic dividend changes across varying levels of investor 
risk aversion is further illustrated in Figure 4.1. The value of the psychic dividend 
when measured as the difference in CE (calculated from equation 4.5) between the 
Good and Bad portfolios is shown in Table 4.5 to be equal to two basis points per 
month.67   
                                                 
67 Psychic dividends calculated from the MSCI KLD Social 400 index and the MSCI U.S. index in 
place of the Good and Bad portfolios, respectively, are reported in Table C.7 in Appendix C.  
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Figure 4.1: Risk-Aversion and Psychic Dividends to SRI 
The relationship between psychic dividends (measured in percentage per month) and investor risk-aversion (α) is displayed 
is the following chart. Psychic dividend is measured as the difference in the certainty equivalent returns (ce) of a socially 
responsible (Good) stock portfolio and socially irresponsible (Bad) stock portfolio, where ce is calculated for both portfolios 
from equation 4.3 using monthly returns from across the period January 1990 to December 2013. The construction of the 
Good and bad portfolios is described in detail in section 4.5.a.    
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The value of the psychic dividend is shown in Figure 4.1 to increase with risk 
aversion in a non-linear fashion and is negative for investors with risk aversion (α) 
less than three. In other words, the psychic dividend accruing from SRI will for higher 
for socially responsible investors who are more averse to risk.68  
The next set of analysis considers loss-aversion utility functions when 
computation psychic dividends to socially responsible investors. The difference in 
psychic returns when certainty equivalent returns, CE, (computed from equation 4.5) 
approaches zero, is interpreted as the psychic divided. Psychic returns along with CE 
for the corresponding Good and Bad portfolios are reported in Table 4.6.  
Table 4.6: Certainty Equivalence of Psychic Returns  
The certainty equivalent returns, CE, for a socially responsible (Good) stock portfolio and a 
socially irresponsible (Bad) stock portfolio are reported in this table across a range of psychic 
returns (measured as a percentage per month). The difference in the psychic return between 
the Good and Bad portfolios when the CE of both portfolios are equal to zero indicates the 
value of the psychic dividend to SRI.   
     
 CE of Psychic Return (% per month) 
Psychic Return  Good Portfolio Bad Portfolio 
0.69 -0.00811 -0.01924 
0.7 -0.00495 -0.01571 
0.71 -0.00203 -0.01228 
0.72 0.00074 -0.00895 
0.73 0.00729 -0.00577 
0.74 0.01481 -0.00280 
0.75 0.02279 -0.00024 
0.76 0.03114 0.00525 
0.77 0.03976 0.01247 
 
                                                 
68 The relationship between psychic dividends and investor risk-aversion when the MSCI KLD Social 
400 index and the MSCI U.S. total return are used in place of the Good and Bad portfolios, respectively, 
is presented in Figure C.3 in Appendix C.    
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The psychic return of the good portfolio is shown in Table 4.6 to be about 72 
basis points per month for the Good portfolio and about 76 basis points per months for 
the Bad portfolio when CE of the respected portfolio approaches zero. The difference 
in the psychic return between these two portfolios equates to about four basis points 
per month, which can be interpreted as the relative value derived by socially 
responsible investors from SRI. This result is further illustrated in Figure 4.2, which 
show how values of CE for these two portfolios change across varying levels of 
psychic return. The relationship between CE and psychic returns for a long-short 
strategy that is long Good stocks and short Bad stocks, where CE is calculated from 
equation 4.6 in section 4.5.e.ii, is also presented in Figure 4.2.      
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Figure 4.2: Certainty Equivalence of Psychic Returns 
 
The relationship between psychic returns and certainty equivalence (CE) of psychic returns, measured in percent per month, for a socially responsible (Good) 
portfolio, socially irresponsible (Bad) portfolio and a long-short (Good – Bad) portfolio of U.S. stocks is illustrated in this chart. The portfolios are constructed 
using monthly U.S. stock data across the period January 2000 to December 2013. The difference in psychic returns when CE of the Good and Bad portfolios is 
equal to zero (at the intersection of the horizontal axis) indicates the psychic dividend to SRI.    
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The intersection of the socially irresponsible (Bad) portfolio and the socially 
responsible (Good) portfolio curves with the psychic returns axis (when certainty CE 
of the psychic return is equal to zero) is shown in Figure 4.2 to occur at values of about 
72 and 76 basis points, respectively, which implies a psychic dividend of at least four 
basis points per month accruing to socially responsible investors. The psychic 
dividend from the long-short strategy can be interpreted from the intersection of the 
long-short portfolio curve with the psychic return axis (at CE equal to zero), which 
occurs at a value of 85 basis points per month. This result suggests that the psychic 
dividend derived from investing in such a long-short strategy will be valued by 
investors by an amount that is at least nine basis points per month greater than if they 
were to invest in a long-only socially responsible portfolio, and 13 basis points per 
month more than investing in a socially irresponsible portfolio. During economic 
expansions, the psychic dividend equates to about negative 12 basis points per month, 
and the long-short strategy resulting in a psychic return of 1.25 percent per month. 
However, during recessionary phases, investors are shown to value a socially 
responsible portfolio by at least 52 basis points per month compared to the socially 
irresponsible portfolio, and derive a psychic return of 2.25 percent per month from the 
long-short strategy.69,70       
4.6.d Proportion of Wealth Invested in SRI 
Based on the psychic dividend values determined in the previous analysis, the 
optimal proportion of wealth invested in SRI and the market portfolio is able to be 
                                                 
69 Refer to Figure C.1 and Figure C.2 in Appendix C for the relationship between psychic returns and 
CE for Good, Bad and long-short portfolios during NBER economic expansion and recession periods, 
respectively, and Figure C.4 for when the MSCI KLD Social 400 index and the MSCI U.S. total return 
indices are used in place of the Good and Bad portfolios, respectively.    
70 Figure C.4 in Appendix C displays the relationship between psychic returns and certainty equivalence 
(CE) of psychic returns when the Good and Bad portfolios are replaced with the MSCI KLD Social 400 
index and the MSCI U.S. index, respectively. 
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determined when investors are left with the choice of these two assets and cash. 
Following the approach of Srivastava, et al. (2013), the ratio of wealth invested in SRI 
and in the market portfolio is calculated via two approaches; a portfolio construction 
framework (which considers there to be only one type of investor) and an equilibrium 
framework (which differentiate investors into two types; those who are concerned with 
ESG aspects of investing, and those who are not). Using the portfolio construction 
framework, the ratio of socially responsible investment to passive market investment, 
where 𝜔𝑆 and 𝜔𝑀  are the weights of the optimal portfolio invested in SRI and the 
passive market portfolio respectively, can be calculated as:   
𝜔𝑆
𝜔𝑀
=
 𝜎𝑀
2 (𝜇𝑆+𝑝)−𝜎𝑆,𝑀𝜇𝑀
𝜎𝑆
2𝜇𝑀−𝜎𝑆,𝑀(𝜇𝑆+𝑝)
,           (4.7)   
where 𝜎𝑀
2  and 𝜎𝑆
2  is the variance of the market portfolio and socially responsible 
portfolio respectively and 𝜇𝑀 and 𝜇𝑆 is the excess return of the market portfolio and 
the socially responsible portfolio above the risk-free rate, respectively. 𝜎𝑆,𝑀  is the 
covariance between the socially responsible and market portfolios, and p is the psychic 
dividend.  
Under the equilibrium-based framework of Srivastava, et al. (2013), the 
optimal proportion of wealth invested in SRI and the market portfolio in a society in 
equilibrium can be calculated as: 
𝜔𝑆
𝜔𝑀
=
 𝜎𝑀
2 𝑑1−𝜎𝑆,𝑀𝑑2
𝜎𝑆
2𝑑2−𝜎𝑆,𝑀𝑑1
,            (4.8) 
 
where 𝑑1 = (𝜆𝑆
−1 + 𝜆−1)𝜇𝑆 +
𝑝
𝜆𝑆
− 𝑟𝑓  and 𝑑2 = (𝜆𝑆
−1 + 𝜆−1)𝜇𝑀 − 𝑟𝑓. 𝜆𝑠 and 𝜆𝐼 are λ 
are the coefficients of loss aversion for the SRI investor and non-SRI investor, 
respectively, and are both set equal to 2.25. 𝑟𝑓  is the risk-free rate of return. The 
optimal weights and relative proportions invested in SRI and the market portfolio 
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across varying levels of psychic dividends for both portfolio and equilibrium 
approaches are reported in Table 4.7. The relationship between psychic dividends and 
these optimal proportions are further illustrated in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4, 
respectively.   
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Table 4.7: Psychic Dividends and Optimal Portfolio Proportions 
The optimal relative portfolio proportions invested in a socially responsible portfolio, ωS, and 
in the market portfolio, ωM, (measured as a percentage) that correspond with varying levels of 
psychic dividend, p, (measured in percent per month) using the portfolio framework and 
equilibrium-based framework of Srivastava, et al. (2013) are reported.  
𝜔𝑆
𝜔𝑀
 is the ratio of the 
optimal proportion of wealth invested in a socially responsible portfolio and the optimal 
proportion of wealth invested in the market portfolio.  
                
 Portfolio Construction Approach 
 
Equilibrium Approach 
p ωS ωM 
𝜔𝑆
𝜔𝑀
 
 ωS ωM 
𝜔𝑆
𝜔𝑀
 
0 2.299 -0.602 -3.818  1.711 -0.882 -1.940 
0.1 4.247 -2.423 -1.753  2.576 -1.691 -1.524 
0.2 6.195 -4.243 -1.460  3.442 -2.500 -1.377 
0.3 8.143 -6.063 -1.343  4.308 -3.309 -1.302 
0.4 10.091 -7.883 -1.280  5.174 -4.118 -1.256 
0.5 12.039 -9.704 -1.241  6.040 -4.927 -1.226 
0.6 13.988 -11.524 -1.214  6.905 -5.736 -1.204 
0.7 15.936 -13.344 -1.194  7.771 -6.545 -1.187 
0.8 17.884 -15.165 -1.179  8.637 -7.354 -1.174 
0.9 19.832 -16.985 -1.168  9.503 -8.163 -1.164 
1 21.780 -18.805 -1.158  10.369 -8.972 -1.156 
1.1 23.728 -20.626 -1.150  11.235 -9.781 -1.149 
1.2 25.676 -22.446 -1.144  12.100 -10.590 -1.143 
1.3 27.624 -24.266 -1.138  12.966 -11.399 -1.137 
1.4 29.572 -26.087 -1.134  13.832 -12.208 -1.133 
1.5 31.520 -27.907 -1.129  14.698 -13.017 -1.129 
1.6 33.468 -29.727 -1.126  15.564 -13.826 -1.126 
1.7 35.417 -31.548 -1.123  16.429 -14.635 -1.123 
1.8 37.365 -33.368 -1.120  17.295 -15.444 -1.120 
1.9 39.313 -35.188 -1.117  18.161 -16.253 -1.117 
2 41.261 -37.009 -1.115  19.027 -17.062 -1.115 
2.1 43.209 -38.829 -1.113  19.893 -17.871 -1.113 
2.2 45.157 -40.649 -1.111  20.759 -18.680 -1.111 
2.3 47.105 -42.470 -1.109  21.624 -19.489 -1.110 
2.4 49.053 -44.290 -1.108  22.490 -20.298 -1.108 
2.5 51.001 -46.110 -1.106  23.356 -21.108 -1.107 
2.6 52.949 -47.930 -1.105  24.222 -21.917 -1.105 
2.7 54.898 -49.751 -1.103  25.088 -22.726 -1.104 
2.8 56.846 -51.571 -1.102  25.954 -23.535 -1.103 
2.9 58.794 -53.391 -1.101  26.819 -24.344 -1.102 
3 60.742 -55.212 -1.100   27.685 -25.153 -1.101 
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Figure 4.3: Psychic Dividends and Optimal Relative SRI Portfolio Proportions (Portfolio Framework)  
The ratio of the relative proportion of wealth invested optimally in a socially responsible portfolio, ωS, and the market portfolio, ωM, calculated 
using the portfolio construction framework of Srivastava, et al. (2013), is reported across varying values of psychic dividend (measured in  
percentage per month). The socially responsible portfolio is constructed using monthly U.S. stock data from January 1990 to December 2013 
and is described in detail in section 4.5.a. The market portfolio is the CRSP value-weighted portfolio for U.S. stocks.  
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Figure 4.4: Psychic Dividends and Optimal Relative SRI Portfolio Proportions (Equilibrium-based Framework) 
The ratio of the relative proportion of wealth invested optimally in a socially responsible portfolio, ωS, and the market portfolio, ωM, calculated 
using the equilibrium-based framework of Srivastava, et al. (2013), is reported across varying values of psychic dividend (measured in  
percentage per month). The socially responsible portfolio is constructed using monthly U.S. stock data from January 1990 to December 2013 
and is described in detail in section 4.5.a. The market portfolio is the CRSP value-weighted portfolio for U.S. stocks.  
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Table 4.7 reports the relative proportion of wealth invested in SRI, ωS, and in 
the market, ωM, for optimal portfolios calculated from both portfolio and equilibrium 
approaches across varying values of psychic dividend, p. These results show that when 
considering all types of investors, the relative proportion of the optimal portfolio 
invested in SRI across the same level of psychic return, decreases. For psychic 
dividends greater than 4.5 basis points per month, the proportion of wealth invested in 
SRI relative to the market for the optimal portfolio is negative under the portfolio 
framework. Whereas the proportion of wealth invested in SRI relative to the market is 
negative for psychic dividends greater than seven basis points per month under the 
equilibrium framework. The negative proportions are shown to result from a short 
position taken in market portfolio and a long position for the SRI portfolio. The short 
position of the market can be attributed to the SRI (Good) portfolio outperforming the 
market portfolio over the sample period. Subsequently, for socially responsible 
investors with a psychic dividend corresponding to negative value for ωS/ωM, investors 
are required to short sell the market and invest over 100 percent of their wealth in SRI 
in order to be holding an optimal portfolio. For the observed psychic dividend of four 
basis points per month computed in the previous analysis, the optimal proportion 
invested in SRI relative to the market is measured to be about 22.76 from the portfolio 
construction framework and 4.38 under the equilibrium framework. The relationship 
between psychic dividend and these optimal proportions are illustrated in Figure 4.3 
and Figure 4.4, respectively. 
To approximate the proportion of wealth held by investors in SRI relative to 
the market portfolio, net assets under management invested in U.S mutual funds that 
are classified as being SRI are compared to the net assets under management of all 
other U.S mutual funds. If these proportions of assets under management approximate 
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the value invested in SRI and in the market portfolio by investors, then the value of 
the psychic dividend can subsequently be measured.  
Morningstar currently identifies $125 billion in U.S funds under management 
classified as SRI from a total of $26,621 billion. This gives a proportion of about 0.47 
percent in SRI to 99.53 percent in ‘non-SRI’. Using these proportions as invested 
wealth results in a psychic dividend of about -1.20 percent per month (calculate from 
the portfolio construction method using equation 4.7). This psychic dividend increases 
to about -0.86 percent per month when investors are differentiated into two types as 
determined under an equilibrium framework (calculated from equation 4.8). This 
negative psychic dividend can be attributed to SRI having a much smaller proportion 
of net wealth invested relative to the market, despite SRI outperforming the market 
over the sample period. Possible explanations of this result are that the actual net 
proportion of wealth invested in SRI is much higher than 0.47 percent, or otherwise, 
the expected return to SRI estimated in this chapter have been vastly overstated.  
4.7 Conclusion  
The prevalent asset management literature surrounding SRI performance 
confounds traditional arguments that constrained portfolios underperform optimal 
unconstrained portfolios. Considering an aggregation of socially 
responsible/irresponsible screens that are commonly used in current SRI performance 
studies, a socially irresponsible portfolio of U.S. equity stocks is shown in this chapter 
to outperform a socially responsible portfolio only during economic recessions, yet is 
unable able to outperform when returns are risk-adjusted. In light of this performance 
differential (or lack thereof) that exist between SRI and non-SRI, a degree of non-
financial satisfaction is assumed to accrue to some investor from holding SRI. The 
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significance of this non-financial satisfaction is evident from the immense growth in 
the global SRI asset-management industry in recent years. A measure of the amount 
by which socially responsible investors value this non-financial satisfaction is 
therefore provided in this chapter. Previous studies attempt to quantify this value as 
the difference in certainty equivalence returns of SRI and non-SRI portfolios, this 
chapter extends the definition of certainty equivalence from the limiting case of 
exponential utility to more general cases that include constant relative risk aversion 
and loss aversion, and is subsequently referred to as the ‘psychic dividend’ from SRI. 
This psychic dividend is subsequently measured as being at least four basis points per 
month for a long-only portfolio of socially responsible stocks and at least 85 basis 
points per month for a portfolio that is long socially-responsible stocks and short 
socially-irresponsible stocks. This psychic dividend is also shown to increase with 
investor risk aversion and also during economic recessions.  
Applying the framework developed in Srivastava, et al. (2013), the proportion 
of wealth invested in SRI relative to the market portfolio is identified. When investors 
are restricted to only SRI and the market and for a psychic dividend equal to four basis 
points per month, the proportion of wealth held in SRI is measured to be about 22.76 
times greater than the proportion held in the market portfolio when there is one type 
of investor, and 4.38 times when investors are separated into two types. For large 
values of psychic dividend, the optimal portfolio requires a short position in the market 
portfolio and over 100% of wealth invested in SRI. This approach is also used to 
estimate psychic dividends using the relative proportions of aggregate assets under 
management invested in SRI and non-SRI U.S. mutual funds as an approximation of 
wealth invested in SRI and the market. This approach values psychic dividend at -1.20 
percent per month and -0.86 percent per month from these two frameworks, 
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respectively. Possible explanations of this negative psychic dividend may be attributed 
to the actual aggregate proportion of wealth invested in SRI, relative to the market, 
being substantially higher than the relative proportion of aggregate assets under 
management in SRI-classified mutual funds. Or, alternatively, the actual expected 
return to SRI is vastly overstated, implying that the market portfolio significantly 
outperforms SRI. The empirical evidence from this chapter therefore suggests that 
asset managers may be free to incorporate ESG mandates into investment practices 
without the repercussion of asset outflows resulting from portfolio underperformance, 
due to this non-financial satisfaction that is shown to accrue to individuals from 
investing in a socially responsible manner.      
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Chapter 5. Conclusion 
 
Three essays were presented in this dissertation that examined topics related to 
equity portfolio management. The first two essays investigated issues concerning 
portfolio asset allocations and performance evaluation of Australian managed funds 
while the third essay investigated issues relating to socially responsible investing. 
Specifically, the first essay examined the appropriateness of Australian equity fund 
benchmarks and whether funds with inappropriate benchmarks outperform and attract 
increased flows of assets under management. In light of the lack of regulations 
surrounding the benchmarking of Australian managed funds and the absence of 
publicly available equity style indices, this essay finds that a large majority of funds 
are best suited to their self-reported benchmarks. The funds that are considered to be 
inappropriately benchmarked, however, are shown to be better matched to alternative 
S&P/ASX indices. No funds are significantly better matched to passive size-
value/growth style indices despite a large majority of ‘style-orientated’ funds reporting 
broad market-based indices as their benchmark. This chapter further shows that 
managers who report mismatched benchmarks are unable to outperform 
‘appropriately-matched’ funds or attract increased funds of assets under management. 
This implies that attempts to make fund performance appear more attractive through 
the misallocation of benchmarks go unrewarded. The findings from this chapter refute 
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those from previous studies that suggest that benchmark mismatching will be 
prevalent amongst funds in markets where regulations concerning benchmarking are 
not stringent. As such, investors can generally rely on a fund’s self-reported 
benchmark to adequately capture passive style returns and thus be used to accurately 
evaluate performance.  
Chapter 3 of this dissertation explored how fund portfolio exposures are 
influenced by industry booms and the subsequent effect that these exposures have on 
fund performance and flows. Using the Australian mining boom as a natural 
experiment, this essay has strengthened our understanding of whether equity funds are 
able to capture industry outperformance and the effect that exposures to booming 
industries have on fund investors. This essay shows that Australian equity funds, on 
average, increased their exposure to mining-related stocks across the mining boom in 
relative and absolute terms. However, those funds with higher exposure to this 
industry were unable to outperform relative to those funds with lower exposures, in 
terms of both raw and risk-adjusted returns. This suggests that fund managers are not 
able to extract abnormal returns from industry outperformance. Nevertheless, this 
essay also shows that funds with higher mining exposure were successful in attracting 
greater funds inflows. This indicates that the investment decisions of mutual fund 
investors are also influenced by industry booms. This mining exposure-flow 
relationship is shown to be more pervasive amongst wholesale funds relative to retail 
funds, despite increased mining exposure being more detrimental to the performance 
of wholesale funds. This inflow may be attributed to investors mistaking industry 
allocation for fund skill and is consistent with investors being attracted to hot 
investment styles. Subsequently, this essay suggests that investors should be wary 
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during times of industry expansions as industry allocation is not a substitute for stock 
selection skill. 
The final essay of this dissertation (Chapter 4) measured the value of the non-
financial satisfaction that accrues to socially responsible investors. This non-financial 
benefit is referred to as the “psychic dividend” of SRI. This essay shows that SRI 
portfolios do not significantly underperform (or outperform) non-SRI portfolios when 
measured using raw or risk-adjusted returns, regardless of economic or market 
conditions. However, the psychic dividend to SRI is valued at an amount that is at 
least four basis points per month for a long-only portfolio of socially responsible 
stocks and at least 85 basis points per month for a portfolio that is long socially-
responsible stocks and short socially-irresponsible stocks. This psychic dividend is 
shown to increase with investor risk-aversion and also during economic recessions. 
An implication of identifying the value of this psychic dividend is that SRI asset 
managers may be free to incorporate SRI mandates into investment practices without 
the repercussion of asset outflows resulting from the underperformance of a portfolio 
by an amount that is at least as large as this psychic dividend.  
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Appendix A  
The following charts and tables contained in this appendix support the 
empirical analysis conducted in the first essay (Chapter 2: Equity Fund Benchmark 
Appropriateness, Performance and Flows) of this dissertation.  
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Table A.1: Style Index Return Descriptive Statistics (II) 
Descriptive statistics for the monthly returns over the period from January 2000 to December 2011 of the six alternative 
passive Australian size/value-growth investable equity style indices are reported in this table. These indices are constructed 
as a robustness check for the other size/value-growth style indices that are used in Chapter 2.   
                  
Rank Index Mean  Min Median Max St. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
1 Small Value 1.737 -21.491 2.394 18.845 5.433 -0.644 3.019 
2 Value 1.193 -13.402 1.981 14.578 4.376 -0.711 1.602 
3 Large Value 1.163 -13.269 2.035 14.524 4.353 -0.683 1.484 
4 Large Growth 0.648 -13.960 1.407 8.999 4.122 -1.004 1.569 
5 Growth 0.631 -14.397 1.480 8.953 4.172 -1.062 1.776 
6 Small Growth 0.230 -30.183 1.468 14.178 6.832 -1.136 2.933 
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Figure A.1: Style Index Prices (II) 
Monthly prices from January 2000 to December 2011 for the six ‘alternative’ passively-constructed investable size-value/growth equity style indices 
that are used as a robustness measure for the style indices used throughout Chapter 2 are displayed in the following chart. Each index has a base value 
of 100 points at the beginning of the period. Indices are constructed from the universe of the largest 300 Australian equity stocks by market capitalisation 
with book-to-market values of equity used to define the value/growth dimension and market capitalisation for the size dimension. The indices are also 
value-weighted and rebalanced monthly. The construction of these indices is described in detail in section 2.4.d.  
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Table A.2: Index Correlations 
Correlation coefficients are reported for the monthly returns between each of the eight passively-constructed Australian size-value/growth equity style indices 
as well as for each of the S&P/ASX accumulation indices that serve as benchmarks for the Australian equity funds contained in the sample over the period from 
January 2000 to December 2011. 
                                      
  Growth Value  
Large 
Value 
Large 
Core 
Large 
Growth 
Small 
Value 
Small 
Core 
Small 
Growth 
ASX 
Small 
Res. 
ASX 
Small 
Ords 
ASX 
300 
Res. 
ASX 
300  
ASX 
300 
Ind. 
ASX 
200  
ASX 
200 
Ind. 
ASX 
100  
ASX 
All 
Ords 
ASX 
50  
Growth 1.000                  
Value  0.667 1.000                 
Large Value 0.475 0.784 1.000                
Large Core 0.629 0.708 0.435 1.000               
Large Growth 0.856 0.578 0.471 0.544 1.000              
Small Value 0.685 0.845 0.497 0.655 0.509 1.000             
Small Core 0.783 0.809 0.487 0.662 0.608 0.893 1.000            
Small Growth 0.771 0.643 0.376 0.543 0.578 0.786 0.827 1.000           
ASX Small 
Res. 0.740 0.681 0.446 0.625 0.592 0.738 0.832 0.788 1.000          
ASX Small 
Ords 0.833 0.792 0.471 0.666 0.616 0.893 0.936 0.905 0.853 1.000         
ASX 300 Res. 0.728 0.707 0.615 0.725 0.636 0.608 0.693 0.630 0.825 0.706 1.000        
ASX 300  0.814 0.821 0.536 0.853 0.692 0.818 0.836 0.749 0.745 0.883 0.762 1.000       
ASX 300 Ind. 0.702 0.756 0.428 0.774 0.592 0.791 0.754 0.664 0.565 0.810 0.525 0.946 1.000      
ASX 200  0.809 0.820 0.536 0.856 0.689 0.811 0.829 0.739 0.738 0.876 0.760 1.000 0.947 1.000     
ASX 200 Ind. 0.697 0.752 0.426 0.774 0.590 0.784 0.747 0.655 0.560 0.803 0.522 0.944 1.000 0.946 1.000    
ASX 100  0.795 0.812 0.536 0.864 0.689 0.793 0.807 0.714 0.716 0.851 0.755 0.998 0.948 0.999 0.947 1.000   
ASX All Ords 0.832 0.832 0.551 0.840 0.702 0.833 0.861 0.775 0.769 0.903 0.775 0.997 0.933 0.996 0.931 0.992 1.000  
ASX 50  0.770 0.796 0.538 0.874 0.679 0.767 0.776 0.685 0.694 0.819 0.751 0.991 0.941 0.992 0.941 0.996 0.982 1.000 
                   
 
 186 
 
Table A.3:  Four-Factor Style Index Exposures (II) 
Carhart (1997) four-factor regressions are estimated for the six ‘alternative’ passively-constructed investable size-value/growth style equity 
indices that are used as a robustness check for the style indices used throughout Chapter 2. The regressions are estimated using monthly returns 
over the period from January 2000 to December 2011. The Carhart (1997) regressions identify index risk-adjusted returns (alpha) and exposures 
towards the market-risk premium (Rm-Rf), the value factor (HML), the size factor (SMB) and the momentum factor (UMD). Construction of 
these style indices are described in detail in section 2.4.d. Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors. T-statistics are displayed in 
parentheses and *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.   
              
VARIABLES Large Growth Large Value Small Growth Small Value Growth Value 
Alpha -0.0267 0.292* -0.974*** 0.659*** -0.0667 0.310** 
 (-0.212) (1.818) (-3.881) (3.255) (-0.547) (1.998) 
Rm-rf 1.018*** 1.105*** 1.328*** 1.215*** 1.031*** 1.114*** 
 (30.081) (25.619) (19.707) (22.347) (31.535) (26.751) 
SMB -0.0670*** -0.0154 0.500*** 0.294*** -0.0421* 0.00168 
 (-2.978) (-0.538) (11.149) (8.139) (-1.937) (0.061) 
HML -0.202*** 0.254*** 0.0497 0.335*** -0.193*** 0.257*** 
 (-4.364) (4.298) (0.539) (4.505) (-4.315) (4.520) 
UMD 0.0755* -0.0699 -0.0240 -0.170** 0.0701* -0.0771 
 (1.813) (-1.317) (-0.289) (-2.536) (1.741) (-1.504) 
Observations 128 128 128 128 128 128 
R-squared 0.893 0.846 0.844 0.843 0.903 0.858 
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Table A.4: Fund Performance and Benchmark Mismatching (II) 
 
Regressions that describe the relationship between fund performance and benchmark mismatching are estimated using monthly panel data from January 2000 to December 2011 for a sample of 
Australian actively managed equity funds. The dependent fund performance variables include; Benchmark-excess returns, Ri-Rb, excess returns, Ri-rf, CAPM Alpha and Carhart alpha. The 
explanatory variables include a binomial Mismatch variable which takes a value of one if a fund is considered mismatched from its benchmark (at five and one percent significance levels, as 
determined from a Levene (1960) test for homogeneity of variance on fund-benchmark tracking-error volatilities), or zero otherwise. A binomial wholesale variable that takes a value of one if a 
fund is classified as a wholesale fund, or zero for a retail fund is also included. A mismatch-wholesale interaction variable is additionally included. A vector of control variables which comprise 
of; the natural log of a fund’s total net assets, Size, the natural log of the number of months since a fund’s inception date, Age, return Volatility (measured as the historical standard deviation of 
monthly raw returns over the previous 12 months), lag flow of assets under management, Lag Flow, and the Net flow of assets under management into all funds with the same investment style, 
Net Style Flows, are contained in the regressions. All control variables are lagged one-month and regressions are estimated with time-fixed effects (month dummies) and style-fixed effects (style 
dummies). Robust standard errors are clustered at the fund level and t-statistics are displayed in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
VARIABLES ri-rb  ri-rf  CAPM Alpha  Carhart Alpha 
Constant -0.656*** -0.680***  -1.594*** -1.632***  -0.273* -0.287*  -0.398*** -0.416*** 
 (-2.694) (-2.761)  (-5.644) (-5.745)  (-1.880) (-1.959)  (-2.845) (-2.940) 
Mismatch (5%) -0.116   -0.176**   -0.0390   0.0438  
 (-1.329)   (-2.000)   (-0.950)   (0.673)  
Mismatch (1%)  -0.204   -0.368   -0.124   -0.245 
  (-0.608)   (-1.208)   (-1.226)   (-1.467) 
Mismatch (5%)*Wholesale 0.150   0.242*   0.164   0.152  
 (1.018)   (1.888)   (1.463)   (1.234)  
Mismatch (1%)*Wholesale  0.0656   0.333   0.108   0.263 
  (0.191)   (1.071)   (0.939)   (1.337) 
Wholesale  0.0818*** 0.0885***  0.0825*** 0.0902***  0.0623*** 0.0694***  0.0645*** 0.0713*** 
 (3.176) (3.461)  (2.980) (3.307)  (2.812) (3.110)  (2.799) (3.049) 
Size -0.0230*** -0.0215***  -0.0237*** -0.0216**  -0.00332 -0.00247  0.00304 0.00378 
 (-2.841) (-2.598)  (-2.636) (-2.380)  (-0.607) (-0.452)  (0.554) (0.694) 
Age 0.0459** 0.0443*  0.0357 0.0345  0.0515** 0.0493**  0.0264 0.0252 
 (2.015) (1.956)  (1.459) (1.423)  (2.503) (2.419)  (1.241) (1.193) 
Volatility 0.129*** 0.129***  0.126*** 0.127***  -0.00960 -0.00892  0.0122 0.0141 
 (4.380) (4.386)  (4.133) (4.156)  (-0.529) (-0.489)  (0.744) (0.846) 
Lag Flow 0.00489 0.00495  0.00449 0.00460  0.0177*** 0.0177***  0.0167*** 0.0166*** 
 (1.399) (1.413)  (1.081) (1.107)  (6.255) (6.249)  (6.325) (6.254) 
Net Style Flow 0.101*** 0.101***  0.00973 0.00924  0.0212*** 0.0213***  0.0112* 0.0114* 
 (4.282) (4.285)  (0.425) (0.405)  (2.650) (2.679)  (1.673) (1.725) 
Style Dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Time-fixed Effects Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Observations 15,824 15,824  15,824 15,824  12,468 12,468  12,468 12,468 
R-squared 0.081 0.081   0.867 0.867   0.284 0.282   0.219 0.216 
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Table A.5: Fund Flows and Benchmark Mismatching (II) 
 
Regressions that describe the relationship between fund benchmark mismatching and flows are 
estimated in the following table using monthly panel data for a sample of Australian actively managed 
equity funds over the period from January 2000 to December 2011. The dependent variable is fund-
level percentage flow of assets under management, Flow. The explanatory variables are fund-level 
include a binomial benchmark mismatching variable, Mismatch, as well as a wholesale-mismatch 
interaction variable, Mismatch*Wholesale. The mismatch dummy takes on a value of one if the fund is 
mismatched from its self-reported benchmark, or zero otherwise. Wholesale, is a binomial variable that 
takes on a value of one if a fund is classified as a wholesale fund or zero if it is a retail fund. Funds are 
considered mismatched from their benchmarks at five and one percent significance level as determined 
from a Levene (1960) test for homogeneity of variance from fund benchmark-relative tracking-error 
volatilities. Performance control variables include; raw fund returns, Return, as well as three fractional 
performance controls (LowPerfi,t MidPerfi,t and HighPerfi,t) based on the percentile ranks of monthly 
lagged raw fund returns and constructed using fractional 33%-33%-33% breakpoints used to define the 
Low, Mid and High fractile ranks. These performance measures are also interacted with the Mismatch 
variable. The regressions also include a vector of control variables, comprising; the natural log of a 
fund’s total net assets, Size, the natural log of the number of months since a fund’s inception date, Age, 
return Volatility, measured as the historical standard deviation of monthly raw returns over the previous 
12 months for each fund, flow of assets under management during the previous month, Lag Flow, and 
the net flow of assets under management into all funds with the same investment style, Net Style Flow. 
All independent variables are lagged by one-month and regressions are estimated with time-fixed 
effects (month dummies) and style-fixed effects (style dummies). Robust standard errors are clustered 
at the fund level and t-statistics are displayed in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
VARIABLES Flow Flow Flow Flow Flow Flow 
Constant 4.662*** 4.676*** 4.543*** 4.556*** 4.637*** 4.521*** 
 (8.280) (8.321) (8.027) (8.066) (8.260) (8.011) 
Mismatch (5% level) -0.115 -0.174 -0.108 -0.171   
 (-0.679) (-1.043) (-0.640) (-1.024)   
Mismatch (1% level)    -0.279 -0.269 
     (-1.490) (-1.442) 
Wholesale   0.0342  0.0299 0.0400 0.0361 
  (0.318)  (0.278) (0.384) (0.348) 
Mismatch*Wholesale  0.137  0.147   
  (0.404)  (0.431)   
Return  0.0211* 0.0208*   0.0209*  
 (1.763) (1.742)   (1.748)  
Low Return Rank   0.864*** 0.860***  0.858*** 
   (2.608) (2.594)  (2.589) 
Mid Return Rank   -0.173 -0.176  -0.178 
   (-0.684) (-0.700)  (-0.707) 
High Return Rank   -0.0334 -0.0350  -0.0225 
   (-0.074) (-0.078)  (-0.050) 
Size 
-
0.0650** 
-
0.0671** 
-
0.0653** 
-
0.0673** 
-
0.0652** 
-
0.0655** 
 (-2.270) (-2.302) (-2.286) (-2.314) (-2.244) (-2.259) 
Age 
-
0.709*** 
-
0.705*** 
-
0.712*** 
-
0.708*** 
-
0.707*** 
-
0.710*** 
 (-9.334) (-9.178) (-9.354) (-9.198) (-9.244) (-9.265) 
Volatility 0.0515 0.0506 0.0587 0.0579 0.0507 0.0579 
 (1.173) (1.150) (1.334) (1.313) (1.155) (1.316) 
Lag Flow 0.221*** 0.221*** 0.221*** 0.221*** 0.221*** 0.221*** 
 (8.927) (8.925) (8.915) (8.912) (8.925) (8.913) 
Net Style Flow 0.565*** 0.564*** 0.565*** 0.564*** 0.563*** 0.564*** 
 (9.866) (9.874) (9.878) (9.887) (9.865) (9.878) 
Style Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time-fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21,797 21,797 21,797 21,797 21,797 21,797 
R-squared 0.187 0.187 0.187 0.187 0.187 0.187 
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 Appendix B 
The following charts and tables contained in this appendix support the 
empirical analysis conducted in the second essay (Chapter 3: Prospecting for Alpha: 
Equity Fund Performance, Flows and the Mining Boom in Australia) of this 
dissertation.  
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Table B.1: Industry Index Return Correlations 
Correlation coefficients are reported between the monthly returns from each of the ten industry indices and the Top 300 index over the period from 
January 2000 to December 2011. The indices are constructed from the largest 300 Australian stocks by market capitalisation using tier one and two 
GICS categories to group stocks into one of ten industries. The industries include Mining, Materials (excluding Metals-and-mining), Consumer Staples, 
Consumer Discretionary, Industrials, Telecommunications, Utilities, Information Technology and Health Care. A market index is also included (Top 
300 Market) that is constructed from the largest 300 Australian stocks by market capitalisation. All indices are value-weighted and rebalanced monthly. 
                       
  Mining Materials Industrials 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
Consumer 
Staples 
Health 
Care Financials IT Telecomm. Utilities 
Top 300 
Market 
Mining 1.000           
Materials 0.664 1.000          
Industrials 0.537 0.696 1.000         
Consumer Disc. 0.346 0.528 0.593 1.000        
Consumer Stpls. 0.457 0.572 0.579 0.444 1.000       
Health Care 0.387 0.480 0.519 0.420 0.572 1.000      
Financials 0.442 0.647 0.730 0.547 0.612 0.518 1.000     
Info. Tech. 0.319 0.332 0.402 0.466 0.217 0.360 0.294 1.000    
Telecomm. 0.165 0.235 0.223 0.291 0.253 0.202 0.259 0.203 1.000   
Utilities 0.337 0.410 0.432 0.303 0.502 0.444 0.464 0.264 0.259 1.000  
Top 300 Market 0.777 0.805 0.816 0.687 0.701 0.617 0.842 0.454 0.378 0.518 1.000 
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Figure B.1: Industry Index Stock Quantities 
The number of constituent stocks from the Top 300 index belonging to each of the ten industry-constructed indices is reported across the period from January 
2000 to December 2011. Industry indices are constructed from tier one and tier two GICS categories of all Australian listed stocks contained in the Top 300 
index. The Top 300 is a value-weighted accumulation index of the 300 largest Australian listed stocks by market capitalisation that is rebalanced monthly.   
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  Figure B.2: Industry Index Prices 
Monthly industry index prices are displayed across period from January 2000 to December 2011. The indices are constructed from the largest 300 Australian 
stocks by market capitalisation using tier one and two GICS categories to group stocks into one of ten industries. The industries include Mining, Materials 
(excluding Metals-and-mining), Consumer Staples, Consumer Discretionary, Industrials, Telecommunications, Utilities, Information Technology and Health 
Care. A market index is also included (Top 300 Market) that is constructed from the largest 300 Australian stocks by market capitalisation. All indices are 
value-weighted and rebalanced monthly and begin with a base price of 100 points at the start of the sample period.     
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Table B.2: Decile Fund Portfolio Mining Exposures (Calendar Year Sub-Periods) 
 
Average monthly mining exposures (measured as a percentage of total industry exposure) for equal-weighted decile portfolios constructed from a sample of 
Australian actively managed equity funds are reported over calendar year sub-periods from January 2003 to December 2011. Funds are sorted equally into 
decile portfolios each month based on their one-month lagged mining-exposure and rebalanced monthly. Decile one (ten) contains funds with the highest 
(lowest) exposure to mining stocks. Differences in average mining exposure between the High and Low and average of top two and bottom two portfolios over 
the sample period are also reported. Fund-level mining exposure is measured from a Sharpe (1992) constrained regression approach across 36-month rolling 
windows and expressed as a percentage. T-statistics are displayed in parentheses and *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
          
Decile 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
1 [High] 29.90 30.21 32.64 38.53 40.52 43.02 47.94 47.57 54.24 
2 18.12 19.01 22.40 26.36 29.43 32.80 36.24 34.78 35.57 
3 16.08 17.02 20.22 23.76 26.15 28.89 31.97 30.90 30.62 
4 14.23 15.42 18.85 21.86 24.18 26.60 29.57 28.45 28.32 
5 12.07 14.07 17.71 20.38 22.49 24.90 27.49 26.37 26.39 
6 10.16 12.51 16.32 18.66 20.75 23.18 25.32 24.32 24.34 
7 7.95 10.72 14.11 16.52 18.56 20.35 22.16 21.26 21.67 
8 4.87 8.44 10.59 12.58 14.58 15.78 16.23 15.52 16.42 
9 1.55 4.70 5.55 6.33 8.60 10.71 9.07 8.02 9.73 
10 [Low] 0.05 0.42 0.58 0.41 1.80 2.38 2.37 1.35 0.98 
Av. Top 5 18.01 19.11 22.33 26.15 28.52 31.22 34.62 33.59 34.99 
Av. Bottom 5 4.89 7.33 9.41 10.88 12.83 14.45 15.00 14.07 14.60 
Decile Average 11.50 13.25 15.90 18.54 20.71 22.86 24.84 23.85 24.83 
Top 300 Market 19.62 18.86 19.77 21.82 22.74 30.48 29.59 29.41 29.77 
Dec Av. – Top 300 -8.12 -5.61 -3.87 -3.28 -2.03 -7.62 -4.75 -5.55 -4.94 
High - Low 29.855*** 29.794*** 32.064*** 38.122*** 38.718*** 40.637*** 45.574*** 46.213*** 53.256*** 
 (28.736) (32.204) (38.744) (57.115) (63.941) (70.84) (86.696) (93.594) (85.644) 
Top 5 - Bottom 5 13.118*** 11.771*** 12.922*** 15.268*** 15.696*** 16.771*** 19.619*** 19.517*** 20.39*** 
  (45.144) (45.675) (54.075) (65.647) (71.183) (76.594) (87.424) (90.513) (81.547) 
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Table B.3: Decile Fund Portfolio Returns (Calendar Year Sub-Periods) 
Average monthly returns (measured as a percentage) for equal-weighted decile portfolios constructed from a sample of Australian actively managed equity 
funds are reported over calendar year sub-periods from January 2003 to December 2011. Funds are sorted equally into decile portfolios each month based 
on their one-month lagged mining-exposure and rebalanced monthly. Decile one (ten) contains funds with the highest (lowest) exposure to mining stocks. 
Differences in average mining exposure between the High and Low and average of top two and bottom two portfolios over the sample period are also 
reported. Fund-level mining exposure is measured from a Sharpe (1992) constrained regression approach across 36-month rolling windows and expressed 
as a percentage. T-statistics are displayed in parentheses and *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
                    
Decile 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
1 [High] 1.917 1.860 1.756 2.137 1.670 -5.221 3.735 1.107 -1.235 
2 1.386 2.101 1.801 1.750 1.623 -4.624 3.716 0.433 -1.219 
3 1.486 2.268 1.758 1.774 1.346 -4.483 3.053 0.292 -0.978 
4 1.330 2.173 1.614 1.776 1.317 -4.085 3.175 0.225 -0.945 
5 1.327 2.245 1.761 1.790 1.219 -4.178 2.895 0.125 -0.907 
6 1.372 2.115 1.726 1.765 1.165 -3.873 3.200 0.103 -0.977 
7 1.264 2.058 1.622 1.849 1.123 -4.303 3.088 0.182 -0.963 
8 1.784 2.195 1.591 2.120 1.306 -4.231 2.987 0.150 -0.960 
9 1.944 2.260 1.301 2.183 1.222 -3.802 2.962 0.181 -1.067 
10 [Low] 1.990 2.408 1.396 2.191 1.000 -3.655 2.862 0.274 -0.759 
Av. top5 1.487 2.130 1.738 1.845 1.434 -4.517 3.314 0.435 -1.055 
Av. bottom 5 1.673 2.208 1.527 2.022 1.163 -3.972 3.019 0.178 -0.945 
Decile Average 1.580 2.168 1.633 1.934 1.299 -4.245 3.167 0.307 -1.001 
Mining Index Return 2.207 1.100 3.606 1.969 3.414 -3.497 3.637 0.931 -2.241 
Decile Av. - Mining 
Index Return -0.627 1.068 -1.974 -0.035 -2.115 -0.749 -0.470 -0.624 1.240 
High - Low -0.073 -0.548*** 0.36 -0.054 0.67*** -1.566*** 0.873*** 0.833*** -0.476** 
 (-0.227) (-2.638) (1.354) (-0.229) (3.311) (-3.522) (3.029) (3.191) (-2.024) 
Top 5 - Bottom 5 -0.186 -0.078 0.211** -0.177** 0.271*** -0.545** 0.295** 0.257** -0.111 
  (-1.501) (-1.04) (2.056) (-2.095) (3.511) (-3.121) (2.411) (2.354) (-1.27) 
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Table B.4: Decile Fund Portfolio Flows (Calendar Year Sub-Periods) 
Average monthly flows (measured as a percentage of assets under management) for equal-weighted decile fund portfolios constructed from a sample of 
Australian actively managed equity funds are reported over calendar year sub-periods from January 2003 to December 2011. Funds are sorted equally into 
decile portfolios each month based on their one-month lagged mining-exposure and rebalanced monthly. Decile one (ten) contains funds with the highest 
(lowest) exposure to mining stocks. Differences in average mining exposure between the High and Low and average of top two and bottom two portfolios 
over the sample period are also reported. Fund-level mining exposure is measured from a Sharpe (1992) constrained regression approach across 36-month 
rolling windows and expressed as a percentage. T-statistics are displayed in parentheses and *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
                    
Decile 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
1 [High] 2.746 2.009 2.928 1.718 1.572 0.564 0.959 0.028 -0.140 
2 1.691 1.425 1.674 2.084 1.578 0.810 0.810 0.027 -0.587 
3 1.710 1.535 1.684 1.363 1.182 0.321 0.367 -0.285 -0.961 
4 1.578 1.372 0.879 1.231 1.451 0.364 0.099 0.163 -0.699 
5 0.747 0.658 1.114 1.111 1.212 0.738 1.087 0.068 -0.516 
6 -0.031 0.641 0.865 0.413 0.894 0.270 0.530 -0.047 -0.610 
7 0.766 0.638 0.863 1.168 1.083 -0.048 -0.116 0.371 -0.190 
8 0.100 1.034 1.263 0.921 1.097 0.040 1.156 0.590 -0.600 
9 0.853 0.952 1.046 0.884 1.456 -0.104 0.845 0.127 -0.488 
10 [Low] 1.329 1.887 0.585 0.763 1.621 0.047 0.161 -0.034 -0.607 
Av. Top 5 1.695 1.397 1.653 1.502 1.399 0.561 0.664 0.000 -0.581 
Av. Bottom 5 0.608 1.039 0.927 0.830 1.227 0.042 0.512 0.202 -0.499 
Decile Average 1.149 1.215 1.290 1.165 1.315 0.300 0.590 0.101 -0.540 
High - Low 1.417*** 0.122 2.343*** 0.955*** -0.049 0.518*** 0.797*** 0.062 0.467*** 
 (3.839) (0.358) (7.969) (3.744) (-0.179) (2.656) (4.271) (0.371) (3.255) 
Top 5 - Bottom 5 1.087*** 0.358** 0.726*** 0.672*** 0.173 0.519*** 0.152*** -0.201*** -0.082 
 (6.833) (2.38) (5.591) (6.196) (1.585) (6.025) (1.89) (-2.887) (-1.335) 
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Table B.5: Decile Fund Portfolio Size (Calendar Year Sub-Periods) 
Average monthly fund size, measured as total net assets under management (in $millions), for equal-weighted decile fund portfolios constructed from 
a sample of Australian actively managed equity funds are reported over calendar year sub-periods from January 2003 to December 2011. Funds are 
sorted equally into decile portfolios each month based on their one-month lagged mining-exposure and rebalanced monthly. Decile one (ten) contains 
funds with the highest (lowest) exposure to mining stocks. Differences in average mining exposure between the High and Low and average of top two 
and bottom two portfolios over the sample period are also reported. Fund-level mining exposure is measured from a Sharpe (1992) constrained 
regression approach across 36-month rolling windows and expressed as a percentage. T-statistics are displayed in parentheses and *, **, and *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
                    
Decile 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
1 [High] 284 369 168 325 412 240 76.7 90.5 99.4 
2 413 319 370 185 198 271 176 212 202 
3 258 295 412 314 365 224 271 281 164 
4 339 384 394 379 404 213 216 397 384 
5 466 400 352 422 455 395 355 331 300 
6 516 360 408 435 540 613 272 291 301 
7 432 536 451 617 424 301 292 299 261 
8 963 547 338 264 393 259 156 162 151 
9 651 621 151 257 312 263 295 369 394 
10 [Low] 392 787 1050 900 929 629 445 395 254 
Av. Top 5 353 353 340 325 367 268 219 262 230 
Av. Bottom 5 591 571 481 496 521 413 293 303 272 
Decile Average 471.4 461.8 409.4 409.8 443.2 340.8 255.47 282.75 251.04 
High - Low -108*** -418*** -882*** -575*** -517*** -389*** -368.3*** -304.5*** -154.6*** 
 (-1.882) (-3.67) (-8.068) (-5.691) (-4.976) (-5.333) (-7.855) (-7.718) (-7.372) 
Top 5 - Bottom 5 -238*** -218*** -141*** -171*** -154*** -145*** -74*** -41*** -42*** 
 (-6.184) (-6.332) (-4.846) (-6.198) (-5.472) (-7.361) (-5.019) (-2.682) (-3.16) 
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Defining the Australian Mining Boom Period 
The Reserve Bank of Australia’s Index of Commodity Prices (ICP) provides 
an indication of the prices received by Australian commodity exporters. The ICP 
categorises commodities into one of four groups, these being: Rural commodities, 
Base metals, Bulk commodities and Other resources. The Rural commodities consist 
of; Wool, Beef and Veal, Wheat, Barley, Canola, Sugar, Cotton, Milk powder, and 
Lamb and Mutton. The Base metals commodities consist of; Aluminium, Lead, 
Copper, Zinc and Nickel. The Bulk commodities contain; Iron ore, Metallurgical coal 
and Thermal coal. And the Other Resources includes; LNG, Crude oil, Alumina, Gold 
and Copper ore. The Base metals, Bulk commodities and “Other resources” 
components of the ICP are considered to provide a more accurate evaluation of the 
state of the mining sector when compared to the aggregated ICP given that these 
categories contain only “mining” commodities. The non-rural component of the ICP, 
displayed in Figure B.3 along with the Mining Industry Index and Top 300 Market 
Index below, is used to identify the commencement of the Australian mining boom. 
This chart shows the prices of non-rural/mining commodities beginning to trend 
upwards from January 2004 before peaking in October of 2008 after the onset of the 
GFC in September 2008 then peaking again for a second time in September 2011. This 
period from January 2004 to September 2008 is therefore considered as the “mining-
boom period”. 71  
 
 
                                                 
71 Further data and information relating to the Index of Commodity Prices (ICP) can be found at the 
Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) website; http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2013/mar/ 
3.html. 
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Figure B.3:  Index of Commodity Prices, Mining Industry Index and Top 300 Market Prices  
A Time-series of monthly prices for the non-rural component of the RBA Index of Commodity Prices (ICP) are reported from January 2000 to 
March 2013 in the following chart alongside prices for the Mining index and the Top 300 Market index. The non-rural component of the ICP 
includes all commodities categorised as either a base metals, bulk commodities or ‘other’ resources, as defined by the RBA.72 The Mining index is 
value-weighted and constructed from Australian listed stocks from the universe of the Top 300 index and rebalanced monthly. The Top 300 is a 
value-weighted accumulation index of the 300 largest Australian listed stocks by market capitalisation that is rebalanced monthly. 
 
                                                 
72 ICP data is sourced from the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) website, http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2013/mar/3.html.  
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Table B.6: Industry Index Return Descriptive Statistics (Mining Boom, Non-Boom and GFC Sub Periods) 
Descriptive statistics for the monthly returns of ten industry indices and a market index (Top 300) across mining-boom, non-mining boom and the 
global financial crisis (GFC) sub-periods from January 2000 to December 2011 are reported. The indices are constructed from the top 300 Australian 
listed stocks by market capitalisation using tier one and two GICS categories to group stocks into one of ten industries. The industries include Mining, 
Materials (excluding metals-and-mining), Consumer Staples, Consumer Discretionary, Industrials, Telecommunications, Utilities, Information 
Technology and Health Care. The Top 300 is constructed from the largest 300 Australian stocks by market capitalisation. All indices are value-weighted 
and rebalanced monthly. The mining boom period is identified The mining boom period is identified from January 2004 to September 2008 and from 
December 2009 until July 2011 from the RBA’s non-rural component of the index of commodity prices (ICP). The non-boom period is from January 
2003 until December 2003, October 2008 until November 2009 and from August 2011 onwards. The GFC period is defined from September 2008 
until Differences April 2009. Mean return of the mining index and the Top 300 across each of the sub periods are also reported. T-statistics are displayed 
in parentheses and *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
                        
 Entire Period  Non-booming Period  Mining Boom Period 
Industry Index Mean Median St. Dev.    Mean Median St. Dev.    Mean Median St. Dev.  
Mining 1.149 1.179 5.877  0.706 0.206 5.305  1.440 1.300 6.358 
Materials 0.923 1.322 3.910  1.683 1.115 5.128  0.877 1.380 4.050 
Industrials 0.881 1.194 3.430  0.764 0.795 3.603  0.880 1.331 3.881 
Consumer Discretionary 0.856 1.238 4.922  0.735 0.749 4.710  0.783 1.466 5.252 
Consumer Staples 0.653 1.473 4.379  1.110 1.357 4.100  0.565 1.693 4.682 
Health Care 0.639 0.607 4.525  0.546 0.700 5.033  0.923 0.786 4.143 
Financials 0.455 0.726 5.038  0.713 0.757 3.789  0.600 1.387 5.769 
Information Technology 0.189 0.524 5.853  1.204 1.859 6.554  0.191 0.605 5.234 
Telecommunications -0.070 0.461 4.597  1.407 1.260 7.924  0.216 0.520 4.476 
Utilities -0.421 -0.185 7.867  0.984 0.642 9.006  0.692 0.684 5.634 
Top 300 Market 0.586 1.348 3.713   0.807 0.798 3.592   0.732 1.776 4.067 
Mining - Top 300 0.562*    -0.101    0.707*   
T-stat (1.814)       (-0.395)       (-1.737)     
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Table B.6 Continued
              
 GFC Period  Mining Boom Period ex. GFC  
Industry Index Mean Median St. Dev.    Mean Median St. Dev.  
Mining 2.809 1.458 4.469  1.526 2.141 7.092 
Materials 0.453 -0.163 4.944  1.058 1.575 4.157 
Industrials 1.717 1.147 4.726  0.892 1.659 3.821 
Consumer 
Discretionary 1.595 2.020 8.105  0.769 1.724 5.041 
Consumer Staples 1.882 1.160 7.395  0.511 2.158 4.189 
Health Care 0.512 0.461 4.577  1.264 0.945 4.321 
Financials 1.638 3.337 9.679  0.459 1.777 5.063 
Information Tech. 2.373 4.099 8.388  -0.121 0.525 4.792 
Telecommunications -0.302 -0.070 4.595  0.345 0.401 4.545 
Utilities 3.179 1.605 8.521  0.636 0.944 5.347 
Top 300 Market 1.723 2.269 5.009   0.739 2.308 4.057 
Mining - Top 300 1.086    0.788   
T-stat (1.182)       (1.351)     
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Table B.7: Mining-Exposed Decile Fund Portfolios (Mining Boom and Non-Boom Sub Periods) 
 
 
Average monthly mining exposure, returns, flows, fund size and fund age for equal-weighted decile portfolios constructed from a sample of Australian actively managed 
equity funds across mining-boom (Boom) and non-mining boom (non-boom) sub-periods from January 2000 to December 2011 are reported. Funds are sorted equally 
into decile portfolios each month based on their one-month lagged mining-exposure and rebalanced monthly. Decile one (ten) contains funds with the highest (lowest) 
exposure to mining stocks. Differences in average Mining Exposure, Returns and Flows between the High and Low and average of top two and bottom two portfolios 
over the sample period are also reported. Fund-level mining exposure is measured from a Sharpe (1992) constrained regression approach across 36-month rolling 
windows and expressed as a percentage, Return is average raw fund return in percentage per month, Flow is the net monthly percentage flow of assets under 
management, Size is the net value of assets under management in $millions and Age is the number of months since inception date. The mining boom period is identified 
from January 2004 to September 2008 and from December 2009 until July 2011 from the RBA’s non-rural component of the index of commodity prices (ICP). The 
non-boom period is from January 2003 until December 2003, October 2008 until November 2009 and from August 2011 onwards. T-statistics are displayed in 
parentheses and *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 Mining Industry Exposure (%)  Return  (% per month)  Flows (% per month) 
Decile Entire Period Boom Non-Boom   Entire Period Boom Non-Boom   Entire Period Boom Non-Boom 
1 43.193 41.514 47.618  0.730 0.399 1.603  1.061 1.144 0.842 
2 30.362 29.441 32.791  0.650 0.303 1.566  0.829 0.947 0.516 
3 26.822 26.171 28.522  0.565 0.266 1.352  0.483 0.581 0.228 
4 24.705 24.134 26.208  0.588 0.279 1.400  0.485 0.642 0.065 
5 22.948 22.442 24.268  0.537 0.250 1.292  0.571 0.614 0.460 
6 21.096 20.663 22.238  0.585 0.267 1.424  0.242 0.318 0.040 
7 18.523 18.172 19.448  0.514 0.215 1.300  0.391 0.587 -0.130 
8 13.969 13.713 14.636  0.582 0.285 1.362  0.541 0.652 0.248 
9 7.958 7.687 8.672  0.597 0.303 1.376  0.479 0.550 0.296 
10 1.367 1.166 1.890  0.648 0.366 1.391  0.424 0.539 0.123 
Av. of Top 5 29.569 28.711 31.823  0.614 0.299 1.442  0.685 0.785 0.422 
Av. of Bottom 5 12.551 12.254 13.330  0.585 0.287 1.371  0.415 0.529 0.116 
Average 21.049 20.472 22.566  0.599 0.293 1.406  0.551 0.658 0.269 
Mining Index 24.669 24.510 25.043   1.228 1.300 1.119         
Average - Mining 
Index -3.619 -4.038 -2.477  -0.629 -1.007 0.287     
Dec. 1 - Dec. 10 41.826*** 40.347*** 45.728***  0.082 0.033 0.212  63.705*** 60.454*** 71.914*** 
 (168.83) (147.32) (88.09)  (0.755) (0.271) (0.942)  (8.29) (6.536) (5.28) 
Av. Top5 - 
Av.Bottom5 17.018*** 16.457*** 18.493***  0.028 0.012 0.071  26.98*** 25.559*** 30.643*** 
  (187.34) (164.19) (94.81)   (0.653) (0.248) (0.788)   (8.32) (6.57) (5.3) 
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Table B.7 Continued 
 Fund Size ($ million)  Fund Age (months) 
Decile Entire Period Boom Non-Boom   Entire Period Boom Non-Boom 
1 [High] 204 236 121  78.577 78.452 78.904 
2 239 247 217  87.842 85.931 92.888 
3 276 298 219  95.433 93.698 99.997 
4 340 370 262  99.805 96.152 109.433 
5 375 378 364  97.544 94.130 106.346 
6 398 429 316  98.599 98.595 98.610 
7 374 403 298  87.851 84.448 96.866 
8 292 286 309  85.223 82.852 91.436 
9 344 340 354  84.363 79.761 96.511 
10 [Low] 603 687 385   79.938 79.281 81.659 
Av. of Top 5 287 306 237  91.855 89.683 97.550 
Av. of Bottom 5 403 430 332  87.139 84.936 92.938 
Decile Average 345 368 285   89.496 87.307 95.247 
High - Low -399*** -451*** -264***  -1.361 -0.829 -2.756 
 (-16.47) (-14.288) (-8.25)  (-0.993) (-0.51) (-1.079) 
Top 5 - Bottom 5 -116*** -124*** -95***  4.716*** 4.746*** 4.612*** 
  (-15.71) (-13.49) (-9.3)   (7.219) (6.222) (3.662) 
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Table B.8: Four-Factor Decile Fund Portfolio Exposures (Mining Boom and Non-Boom Sub Periods) 
 
Carhart (1997) four-factor regressions are estimated for equal-weighted decile portfolios constructed from a sample of Australian actively managed equity funds across mining-boom (Boom) and 
non-mining boom (Non-boom) sub-periods from January 2000 to December 2011. Funds are sorted equally into decile portfolios each month based on their one-month lagged mining-exposure 
and rebalanced monthly, with decile one (ten) containing funds with the highest (lowest) exposure to mining stocks. Equal weighted monthly portfolio returns are then calculated for each decile 
over the sample period. Fund-level mining exposure is measured from a Sharpe (1992) constrained regression approach across 36-month rolling windows. Carhart (1997) regressions are also 
estimated for long-short portfolios constructed from decile one and decile ten, as well as for a portfolio that is long deciles one and two and short deciles nine and ten. The mining boom period is 
identified from January 2004 to September 2008 and from December 2009 until July 2011 from the RBA’s non-rural component of the index of commodity prices (ICP). The non-boom period is 
from January 2003 until December 2003, October 2008 until November 2009 and from August 2011 onwards. T-statistics are displayed in parentheses and *, **, and *** denote significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 MKT  SMB  HML  UMD 
Decile 
Entire 
Period 
Boom Non-boom    
Entire 
Period 
Boom  
Non-
boom  
  
Entire 
Period 
Boom Non-boom    
Entire 
Period 
Boom 
Non-
boom  
1 [High] 1.185*** 1.05*** 1.24***  0.086*** 0.13*** 0.067**  -0.045 -0.072 -0.013  -0.009 0.044 -0.01 
 (34.43) (16.417) (34.85)  (3.787) (3.567) (2.351)  (-0.91) (-0.799) (-0.248)  (-0.165) (0.341) (-0.191) 
2 1.113*** 1.089*** 1.114***  0.018 0.036 -0.004  -0.014 0.028 -0.036  0.031 0.082 0.008 
 (46.84) (30.262) (36.3)  (1.333) (1.479) (-0.213)  (-0.443) (0.335) (-0.98)  (0.872) (1.154) (0.183) 
3 1.082*** 1.048*** 1.098***  -0.015 -0.005 -0.024  0.03 -0.008 0.045  -0.06 -0.036 -0.063 
 (38.946) (33.598) (31.099)  (-1.316) (-0.313) (-1.38)  (0.924) (-0.139) (1.112)  (-1.614) (-0.729) (-1.599) 
4 1.04*** 1.053*** 1.03***  -0.012 -0.012 -0.02  0.021 0.032 0.007  0.002 0.055 -0.021 
 (67.804) (30.867) (71.169)  (-1.119) (-0.498) (-1.401)  (1.087) (0.593) (0.297)  (0.072) (1.06) (-0.817) 
5 1.017*** 1.015*** 1.017***  -0.006 -0.01 -0.005  0.022 0.032 0.022  -0.004 -0.015 0.000 
 (82.643) (44.3) (74.094)  (-0.656) (-0.643) (-0.323)  (0.973) (0.534) (0.856)  (-0.168) (-0.341) (-0.012) 
6 1.005*** 1.042*** 0.986***  -0.015 -0.02 -0.026  0.024 0.05 0.001  0.022 0.016 0.012 
 (44.975) (35.761) (40.186)  (-1.282) (-0.968) (-1.434)  (0.907) (0.781) (0.029)  (0.694) (0.366) (0.345) 
7 1.057*** 1.093*** 1.044***  0.003 0.01 -0.005  0.061** 0.055 0.049*  -0.05* -0.09 -0.045 
 (61.205) (42.203) (52.87)  (0.281) (0.489) (-0.317)  (2.481) (1.036) (1.774)  (-1.857) (-1.631) (-1.463) 
8 1.05*** 1.094*** 1.027***  0.025* 0.02 0.019  0.131*** 0.175*** 0.104***  -0.063* -0.09 -0.067* 
 (56.664) (25.763) (53.866)  (1.834) (0.652) (1.149)  (5.205) (3.14) (3.553)  (-1.894) (-1.287) (-1.794) 
9 0.963*** 1.059*** 0.914***  0.052*** 0.005 0.059**  0.158*** 0.253*** 0.113**  -0.026 -0.094* -0.026 
 (24.526) (37.506) (19.458)  (2.714) (0.24) (2.077)  (3.628) (6.27) (2.011)  (-0.441) (-1.792) (-0.403) 
10 [Low] 0.949*** 1.056*** 0.91***  0.054** 0.009 0.069**  0.204*** 0.192** 0.192**  -0.011 -0.083 0.000 
  (19.586) (22.533) (14.33)   (2.566) (0.319) (2.19)   (3.53) (2.384) (2.577)   (-0.144) (-0.883) (-0.005) 
1 - 10 0.24*** -0.002 0.334***  0.037 0.122** -0.001  -0.242*** -0.268** -0.197*  0.009 0.132 -0.003 
 (3.394) (-0.033) (3.799)  (1.067) (2.495) (-0.013)  (-2.656) (-2.482) (-1.733)  (0.076) (0.989) (-0.026) 
Top 5 - 
Bottom 5 
0.087** -0.013 0.128***  -0.005 0.024 -0.018  -0.106** -0.147*** -0.078  0.025 0.099* 0.014 
  (2.502) (-0.602) (2.944)   (-0.31) (1.089) (-0.936)   (-2.603) (-3.363) (-1.552)   (0.464) (1.946) (0.244) 
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Table B.8 Continued  
          
  Carhart Alpha 
Decile   Entire Period Boom  Non-boom 
1 [High]  0.008 0.024 -0.036 
  (0.078) (0.097) (-0.312) 
2  0.02 0.095 -0.02 
  (0.263) (0.569) (-0.22) 
3  0.024 0.091 -0.018 
  (0.372) (0.669) (-0.233) 
4  0.028 0.051 0.014 
  (0.502) (0.33) (0.239) 
5  -0.005 0.038 -0.011 
  (-0.083) (0.317) (-0.18) 
6  0.04 0.161 -0.001 
  (0.667) (1.174) (-0.012) 
7  -0.06 -0.098 -0.062 
  (-0.995) (-0.726) (-0.902) 
8  0.062 0.119 0.05 
  (0.937) (0.797) (0.676) 
9  0.104 0.389*** 0.066 
  (1.005) (3.113) (0.553) 
10 [Low]  0.128 0.271 0.112 
    (0.944) (1.405) (0.699) 
1 - 10  -0.559*** -0.589** -0.621*** 
  (-2.947) (-2.129) (-2.737) 
Top 5 - Bottom 5  -0.479*** -0.451*** -0.52*** 
    (-5.497) (-4.018) (-5.013) 
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Appendix C 
The following charts and tables contained in this appendix support the empirical 
analysis conducted in the third essay (Psychic Dividends of Socially Responsible 
Investors) of this dissertation.  
Table C.1: SRI Portfolio Descriptive Statistics (II) 
 
Descriptive statistics for the monthly returns and quantity of stocks contained in the socially 
responsible (Good) and socially irresponsible (Bad) U.S. stock portfolios from January 1990 
to December 2013 are reported. The Good and Bad portfolios are constructed as a robustness 
measure for those portfolios used throughout Chapter 5 by removing the stock size and stock 
quantity per industry constraints. 
 
  Mean Min  Median Max St. Dev.  Skew Kurt 
# Stocks in Good 
portfolio 109.446 83 107 167 15.278 0.945 1.304 
# Stocks in Bad 
portfolio 94.718 65 97 119 12.740 -0.278 -0.784 
R(Good) 0.984 -23.655 1.218 18.768 5.127 -0.623 2.115 
R(Bad) 1.034 -20.068 1.417 14.459 4.436 -0.607 2.250 
        
As a robustness measure for the approach used to calculate the return series of our two 
SRI portfolios, both portfolios are re-constructed by removing the size and number of 
stocks per industry constraint. An insignificant difference is observed when comparing 
the portfolio returns using the two approaches despite the average number of stocks 
per month substantially increasing. The difference in the mean return of the two Good 
portfolios is 3.3 basis points per month (t stat = 0.311). Similarly, a negligible 
difference in the mean return of the two Bad portfolios, of 0.09 basis points per month 
(t-stat = 0.013) is observed.    
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Table C.2:  CAPM and Four-Factor SRI Portfolio Exposures (II) 
CAPM and Carhart (1997) four-factor regressions are estimated for a socially responsible (Good), socially 
irresponsible (Bad) and a long-short (Good – Bad) U.S. stock portfolios using monthly returns over the period from 
January 1990 to December 2013. The Good and Bad portfolios are constructed as a robustness measure from those 
used throughout Chapter 5 by removing the stock size and stock quantity per industry constraints. The CAPM 
regressions show portfolio market-risk exposure (Rm-Rf) and the Carhart (1997) regressions identify market-risk 
exposure (Rm-Rf), value exposure (HML), size exposure (SMB) and momentum exposure (UMD). Alpha indicates 
portfolio risk-adjusted returns. The market return is the CRSP value-weighted portfolio and the risk-free return is the 
Treasury bill. Factor returns are sourced from the Ken French website. Regressions are estimated with robust standard 
errors and t-statistics are displayed in parentheses, with *, **, and *** denoting significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively.   
                  
 Good-rf  Bad-rf  (Good-Bad) 
Variables (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
Alpha 0.00875 0.0327  0.258 0.133  -0.249 -0.100 
 (0.099) (0.393)  (1.602) (0.835)  (-1.285) (-0.546) 
Rm-rf 1.116*** 1.078***  0.802*** 0.871***  0.315*** 0.207*** 
 (56.139) (53.346)  (22.088) (22.515)  (7.194) (4.646) 
SMB  0.107***   -0.0534   0.161*** 
  (4.088)   (-1.064)   (2.774) 
HML  -0.122***   0.223***   -0.344*** 
  (-4.356)   (4.166)   (-5.583) 
UMD  0.0116   0.0657**   -0.0541 
  (0.678)   (2.010)   (-1.435) 
Observations 287 287  287 287  287 287 
R-squared 0.917 0.930   0.631 0.660   0.154 0.283 
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The risk-adjusted returns are shown to be insignificant for the Good and Bad 
portfolios presented in Table C.2 above. The loading on the size factor for the Good 
portfolio changes from significantly negative to significantly positive, indicating that 
the composition of this portfolio changes from large stocks to small stocks. This also 
changes the sign of the size factor for the long short portfolio from significantly 
negative to positive. The sign of the value factor for the Good portfolio becomes 
significantly negative, indicating that this portfolio is more exposed to growth stocks. 
Unlike the originally-constructed Good portfolio, this portfolio does not capture 
significant exposure to momentum stocks, yet the Bad portfolio does. All other factor 
loading for these portfolios remain quantitatively similar to the original portfolio 
construction.       
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Table C.3: CAPM and Four-Factor SRI Portfolio Exposures (NBER Business Cycle Sub-periods) 
CAPM and Carhart (1997) four-factor regressions are estimated for the socially responsible (Good), socially irresponsible(Bad) and long-short (Good – Bad) 
stock portfolios using monthly returns over NBER-dated economic expansion and recession sub-periods from January 1990 to December 2013. The CAPM 
regressions show portfolio market-risk exposure (Rm-Rf) and the Carhart (1997) regressions identify market-risk exposure (Rm-Rf), value exposure (HML), size 
exposure (SMB) and momentum exposure (UMD). Alpha indicates portfolio risk-adjusted returns. The market return is the CRSP value-weighted portfolio and 
the risk-free return is the Treasury bill. Factor returns are sourced from the Ken French website. Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors and t-
statistics are displayed in parentheses, with *, **, and *** denoting significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.   
                                  
 NBER Expansionary Phase  NBER Recessionary Phase 
 Good-rf   Bad-rf   Good-Bad  Good-rf   Bad-rf   Good-Bad 
VARIABLES (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10)  (11) (12) 
Alpha 0.105 0.0501  0.299 0.000429  0.191*** 0.1000*  -0.0330 0.122  0.441 0.777  0.0543 -0.0164 
 (1.086) (0.522)  (1.449) (0.002)  (3.509) (1.806)  (-0.094) (0.316)  (0.507) (0.821)  (0.369) (-0.075) 
Rm-rf 0.941*** 0.979***  0.750*** 0.879***   -0.190***  0.938*** 0.999***  0.884*** 1.015***   0.172 
 (39.370) (39.385)  (14.650) (17.301)   (-2.864)  (18.235) (13.194)  (6.953) (5.482)   (0.479) 
SMB  -0.137***   0.0530   -0.462***   -0.0833   -0.255   0.189 
  (-4.597)   (0.872)   (-6.246)   (-0.673)   (-0.844)   (0.686) 
HML  0.0314   0.494***   0.0116   -0.0588   -0.248   -0.0229 
  (0.946)   (7.269)   (0.236)   (-0.621)   (-1.068)   (-0.138) 
UMD  0.0483**   0.0367  -0.194 0.0497   0.0407   0.0636  -0.474 -0.655 
  (2.191)   (0.815)  (-0.885) (0.232)   (0.714)   (0.456)  (-0.471) (-0.583) 
Observations 255 255  255 255  255 255  32 32  32 32  32 32 
R-squared 0.860 0.874   0.459 0.556   0.046 0.181   0.917 0.922   0.617 0.646   0.005 0.030 
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Table C.4: CAPM and Four-Factor SRI Portfolio Exposures (Market Return Sub-periods) 
CAPM and Carhart (1997) four-factor regressions are estimated for the socially responsible (Good), socially irresponsible(Bad) and long-short (Good – Bad) 
stock portfolios using monthly returns over Up- and Down-market sub-periods from January 1990 to December 2013. ‘Up’ represents months where the market 
return is positive and ‘Down’ are months where negative market returns are observed. The CAPM regressions show portfolio market-risk exposure (Rm-Rf) and 
the Carhart (1997) regressions identify market-risk exposure (Rm-Rf), value exposure (HML), size exposure (SMB) and momentum exposure (UMD). Alpha 
indicates portfolio risk-adjusted returns. The market return is the CRSP value-weighted portfolio and the risk-free return is the Treasury bill. Factor returns are 
sourced from the Ken French website. Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors and t-statistics are displayed in parentheses, with *, **, and *** 
denoting significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.    
                                   
 Up Months  Down Months 
 Good-rf   Bad-rf   Good-Bad  Good-rf   Bad-rf   Good-Bad 
Variables (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10)  (11) (12) 
Alpha -0.368** -0.0694  0.0375 0.0267  0.374 -0.0592  0.00157 -0.178  -0.508 -0.127  0.273 0.438 
 (-2.377) (-0.471)  (0.178) (0.127)  (0.929) (-0.147)  (0.003) (-0.306)  (-1.157) (-0.283)  (0.436) (0.702) 
Rm-rf 1.019*** 0.968***  0.959*** 0.954***  0.769*** 0.921***  0.740*** 0.804***  0.224** 0.121  0.224* 0.179 
 (26.471) (25.897)  (23.313) (21.968)  (7.637) (8.952)  (6.459) (6.672)  (2.041) (1.054)  (1.832) (1.384) 
SMB  -0.183***   -0.0636   0.0555   -0.0394   -0.180**   -0.0599 
  (-6.857)   (-1.394)   (0.754)   (-0.311)   (-2.202)   (-0.441) 
HML  -0.0999***   0.0139   0.489***   0.236**   
-
0.449***   
-
0.224** 
  (-2.948)   (0.372)   (5.246)   (2.278)   (-4.327)   (-2.022) 
UMD  -0.0479***   -0.0554*   0.0236   0.107   0.0331   -0.111 
  (-2.893)   (-1.705)   (0.516)   (1.184)   (0.650)   (-1.152) 
                                    
Observations 185 185  102 102  185 185  102 102  185 185  102 102 
R-squared 0.794 0.842   0.845 0.853   0.242 0.355   0.294 0.338   0.022 0.133   0.032 0.083 
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Figure C.1: Certainty Equivalence of Psychic Returns (NBER Expansionary Phase) 
 
The relationship between psychic returns and certainty equivalence (CE) of psychic returns, measured in percent per month, for a socially responsible 
(Good) portfolio, socially irresponsible (Bad) portfolio and a long-short (Good – Bad) portfolio of U.S. stocks is illustrated in this chart. The portfolios 
are constructed using monthly U.S. stock data across NBER-dated economic expansionary sub-periods from January 1990 to December 2013. The 
difference in psychic returns when CE of the Good and Bad portfolios is equal to zero (at the intersection of the horizontal axis) indicates the psychic 
dividend to SRI.    
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Figure C.2: Certainty Equivalence of Psychic Returns (NBER Recessionary Phase) 
The relationship between psychic returns and certainty equivalence (CE) of psychic returns, measured in percent per month, for a socially 
responsible (Good) portfolio, socially irresponsible (Bad) portfolio and a long-short (Good – Bad) portfolio of U.S. stocks is illustrated in this chart. 
The portfolios are constructed using monthly U.S. stock data across NBER-dated economic recessionary sub-periods from January 1990 to 
December 2013. The difference in psychic returns when CE of the Good and Bad portfolios is equal to zero (at the intersection of the horizontal 
axis) indicates the psychic dividend to SRI.    
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Table C.5:  KLD Social 400 and MSCI U.S. Index Return Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the monthly returns of the MSCI KLD Social 400 index and MSCI 
U.S. total return index across the period from January 1990 to December 2013 are reported in 
this table.  
                
  Mean Min Median Max Std. Dev. Skew Kurt 
KLD 
Social 400 0.775 -15.640 0.670 10.680 4.376 -0.500 0.866 
MSCI 
U.S. 0.887 -17.102 1.291 11.426 4.292 -0.615 1.167 
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Table C.6: CAPM and Four-Factor MSCI KLD 400 Social Index Exposures 
CAPM and Carhart (1997) four-factor regressions are estimated for the MSCI KLD 400 Social index using monthly returns 
over NBER expansion and recessionary sub-periods from January 1990 to December 2013. The CAPM regressions show 
portfolio market-risk exposure (Rm-Rf) and the Carhart (1997) regressions identify market-risk exposure (Rm-Rf), value 
exposure (HML), size exposure (SMB) and momentum exposure (UMD). Alpha indicates portfolio risk-adjusted returns. The 
market return is the CRSP value-weight portfolio and the risk-free return is the Treasury bill. Factor returns are sourced from 
the Ken French website. Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors and t-statistics are displayed in parentheses with 
*, **, and *** denoting significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.    
                  
 Entire Period  Expansion  Recession 
VARIABLES (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
Alpha -0.0943 -0.0326  -0.0869 -0.00125  -0.169 -0.248 
 (-1.233) (-0.448)  (-1.090) (-0.017)  (-0.572) (-0.774) 
Rm-rf 0.952*** 0.958***  0.953*** 0.957***  0.946*** 0.908*** 
 (55.417) (54.508)  (48.390) (49.736)  (21.929) (14.497) 
SMB  -0.138***   -0.158***   0.0233 
  (-6.022)   (-6.850)   (0.227) 
HML  -0.0372   -0.0708***   0.105 
  (-1.523)   (-2.738)   (1.341) 
UMD  -0.0452***   -0.0513***   -0.0296 
  (-3.042)   (-2.999)   (-0.627) 
Observations 286 286  254 254  32 32 
R-squared 0.915 0.928   0.903 0.923   0.941 0.946 
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Table C.7:  Psychic Dividends to SRI Investors (Using the MSCI U.S. index and the 
MSCI KLD Social 400 index)    
Psychic dividends (measured as a percentage per month) are reported as the difference in 
certainty equivalent returns of the MSCI KLD Social 400 index and the MSCI U.S. total return 
index over the period from January 2000 to December 2013 for various levels of risk aversion. 
U is investor utility derived by from investing in the respected portfolios and CE is certainty 
equivalent return as calculated from equation 4.5. 
                
     Good Portfolio  Bad Portfolio     
 
Risk Aversion (α)  Certainty Equivalent Return  
Psychic 
Dividend 
 3  0.48%  0.57%  -0.09% 
 5  0.27%  0.37%  -0.10% 
 7  0.06%  0.16%  -0.10% 
U -   -1.74%   -1.57%     
CE -   -0.40%   -0.36%   0.04%  
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Figure C.3: Risk-Aversion and Psychic Dividends to SRI (II) 
The relationship between psychic dividends (measured in percentage per month) and investor risk-aversion (α) is displayed is the 
following chart. Psychic dividend is measured as the difference in the certainty equivalent returns (ce) of the MSCI KLD Social 400 
index and the MSCI U.S. total return index, where ce is calculated for both portfolios from equation 4.3 using monthly returns from 
across the period January 1990 to December 2013. The construction of the Good and bad portfolios is described in detail in section 
4.5.a.    
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Figure C.4: Certainty Equivalence of Psychic Returns (Using the MSCI U.S. index and the MSCI KLD Social 400 index)    
The relationship between psychic returns and certainty equivalence (CE) of psychic returns, measured in percent per month, for the MSCI KLD Social 
400 index, the MSCI U.S. total return index and a long-short portfolio (KLD Social 400 – MSCI U.S. total return index) using monthly returns across 
the period from January 2000 to December 2013 is illustrated in this chart. The difference in psychic returns when CE of the MSCI KLD Social 400 
index and the MSCI U.S. total return index is equal to zero (at the intersection of the horizontal axis) indicates the psychic dividend to SRI.    
 
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
C
E
 o
f 
P
sy
ch
ic
 D
iv
id
en
d
 (
%
 p
er
 m
o
n
th
)
Psychic Dividend (% per month)
KLD Social
400 - MSCI
KLD Social
400
MSCI
(0.476, 0.000)
(0.844, 0.000) (0.787, 0.000) 
 217 
 
Testing for Equality of the Third Central Moment  
The following approach is used to test for the difference in the third central moment 
of two distributions, with independent random variables X and Y,  
𝜇3
𝑥 = 𝜇3
𝑦
, 
where, 
𝜇3
𝑥 = 𝐸 [(𝑋 − 𝐸(𝑋))
3
]. 
It turns out that generally if we calculate,  
𝑚3
𝑥 =
1
𝑛
∑ (𝑥𝑖 − ?̅?)
3𝑛
𝑖=1 , 
that 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑚3
𝑥) =
𝜇6
𝑥−6𝜇4
𝑥𝜇2
𝑥−(𝜇3
𝑥)2
𝑛
+ terms in 
1
𝑛2
. 
This results from taking a series expansion of the exact third moment in the general 
case and dropping higher order terms. The above formula in the case of normality 
becomes 
6𝜎4
𝑛
. Note that 𝜇𝑗
𝑥 = 𝐸 [(𝑋 − 𝐸(𝑋))
𝑗
]. 
It therefore follows that: 
√𝑛(𝑚3
𝑥 − 𝑚3
𝑦) 
𝑑
→ 𝑁(0, 𝜎2), 
where,  
𝜎2 = 𝜇6
𝑥 − 6𝜇4
𝑥𝜇2
𝑥 − (𝜇3
𝑥)2+𝜇6
𝑦 − 6𝜇4
𝑦𝜇2
𝑦 − (𝜇3
𝑦)
2
 
so, 
√𝑛(𝑚3
𝑥−𝑚3
𝑦
)
𝜎
 
𝑑
→ 𝑁(0,1). 
Whilst in principle we could repeat the exercise for calculating the equality of fourth 
moments; this would involve standard errors based on eighth moments which will be 
sufficiently erratic in sample as to be of questionable value. 
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